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In this dissertation, I analyse the drivers of trade, both modern and historical, and how
these forces influence trade flows and growth outcomes. In the first chapter, I investigate
the effects of ethnic linkages on trade between countries within Africa. I construct a newly
digitised and geo-referenced dataset of historical trade routes for pre-colonial Africa. The
empirical strategy exploits the role of historical trade routes in shaping the distribution
of ethnic groups across countries to estimate the impact of shared ethnicity on modern
trade flows. The impact of ethnic links is quantitatively similar to that of formal trade
agreements, with trade more than doubling between countries that share a common ethnic
group. The results are driven by a few ethnic groups creating powerful links between
countries despite often being minority groups. In the second chapter, I estimate a modified
gravity model that incorporates the impact of conflict in adjacent countries into transport
costs. I use geographic variation in the location of countries and conflicts to identify an
adjacent conflict effect that negatively impacts trade. Countries with already precarious
access to external markets (such as landlocked countries) are more adversely affected by
adjacent conflict, experiencing up to twice as severe a drop in trade as other countries.
In the third chapter, I exploit an ancient textual source, the Periplus of the Erythraean
Sea, to measure and model ancient trade in the Indian Ocean. I construct sailing times
between ancient cities and estimate a gravity model: distance matters for trade in the
region, but there are significant non-linear effects due to resource endowments. Trade
appears to encourage economic growth in the long run, particularly for those cities that
export a greater variety of products. Additionally, some cities appear to be constrained
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This dissertation is concerned with understanding the drivers of trade and the way in which
these forces impact trade flows and growth outcomes. Social or cultural characteristics
and geography can both influence the ability of countries (and cities) to access external
markets in positive and negative ways. In the following chapters I explore how social
elements can develop trade promoting networks, as well as how the geography of trade
routes can both be a hazard to trade flows and facilitate them.
Market access and availability of trade networks are important factors determining
how easily agents and countries can buy and sell goods internationally and limiting or
encouraging these connections can have significant implications not just for trade but also
wider economic outcomes. The three questions I examine are: 1) how ethnic networks
influence aggregate trade patterns; 2) whether adjacent conflict negatively impacts trade
flows; and 3) in what way geography and climate influenced long-distance trade networks
in the late Iron Age Indian Ocean. The first question addresses how local networks can
foster and develop trade. Whereas much research on social connections focuses on the
micro-level outcomes, the networks created by these connections can have large aggregate
effects. The second question seeks to answer how disruptions to infrastructure and access
to external markets can impact trade in negative ways. Geography is often understood as a
static feature of trade routes, but particular geographic circumstances can have important
effects on these trade routes by exposing them to potential disruption and threatening trade
flows through conflict. Finally, the third question asks how geography and climate can
encourage the creation of ocean-spanning networks. The unique features of a geographic
area, such as wind patterns, can facilitate trade by reducing the costs and risks of engaging
in long-distance networks that would have otherwise been closed.
In the first chapter, I investigate how local ethnic networks influence trade within
Africa. Commercial relationships require both trust and information and the potential
connections between ethnic groups across national boundaries can foster economic link-
ages and facilitate trade by providing a basis for trust and the exchange of information. I
develop a new dataset of ethnicity in Africa from never before used sources in order to test
the impact of cross-border ethnic commonality on trade. The empirical approach exploits
the exogenous nature of pre-colonial trade posts and routes across the continent to instru-
ment for the modern ethnic link measure. These pre-colonial trade networks influenced
pre-modern population movements and the intensity of countries’ integration into these
1
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routes is correlated with modern shared ethnicities. I find that ethnic networks are strong
promoters of trade, with ethnic links between countries more than doubling trade. The
magnitude of the effect is on par with the impact of formal trade agreements between
governments. The number of shared groups and the similarity in ethnic composition of
countries tend to have less of an effect on trade, implying that the effect is driven by a few
ethnic communities creating powerful links between countries despite often being minority
groups.
The second chapter is in this same line of research, but looks at the potential negative
effects of conflict through the disruption of trade routes. In it, I explore the effect of
conflict in adjacent countries on trade. Conflict in adjacent countries can potentially block
or disrupt vital trade routes, I therefore develop a modified gravity model to analyse the
trade implications of adjacent conflict. Geography plays an important role in identifying
the effect, with landlocked countries that rely on foreign ports to trade more at risk of
disruption from adjacent conflict blocking access to those ports. I use this difference in
geography to disentangle the different effects of adjacent conflict, specifically whether a
country is landlocked or not and whether the adjacent conflict occurs in a shoreward
country or an inland country. While trade on the whole is negatively impacted, I find that
landlocked countries experience significantly more negative effects than coastal countries.
Similarly, conflicts that occur in shoreward countries are more disruptive to trade than
conflicts that occur inland. This implies a market access effect in that conflict in an
adjacent country can disrupt trade routes, lowering trade. This effect is most pronounced
for landlocked countries which need to ship goods through another country in order to
access external markets, but the effect on coastal countries also indicates a broader, more
disruptive effect across all types of trade routes—hindering trade for all neighbours.
For the third chapter, I take a longer view of history and analyse the nature of trade
networks in the first half of the first millennium. To do this, I build an entirely new
dataset of trade goods and partners from ancient textual sources and use a Ricardian
gravity model to analyse the impact of distance on trade flows in the Indian Ocean during
this period. The unique seasonal wind patterns of the monsoon allowed maritime trade
between distant cities, from the east coast of Africa to India. Trade in the Indian Ocean
in the Iron Age was significantly influenced by distance, but even more so by travel time:
sailing time between ports is a better fit to the model than simple distance indicating that
wind currents and the conditions presented by the monsoon system created a sustainable
network of long-distance trade. Further, the impact of distance is non-linear, with ports
that are close together breaking from the standard gravity impact of distance and trading
less. I find that this appears to be related to an endowment effect, with cities that have
similar baskets of export goods trading less than those that are more different. The
geographic nature of resource endowments means that cities that are close together tend
to share common resource endowments, producing this non-linearity in the relationship
between distance and trade.
I further find that trade appears to encourage economic growth in the long-run, with
2
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cities that export a greater variety of products having significantly more activity in their
vicinities in the following 500 years. This is most pronounced for cities that export man-
ufactured products and other ‘high-value’ goods, while those that are more dependent on
raw materials and cash-crops such as spices and incense faring worse—implying an ancient
version of the ‘resource curse’.
The insights of this work provide perspective on how market access and trade networks
can grow and develop. Social connections can build trust and reciprocity that form the
foundation of trade networks between communities in different countries. Geography can
expose trade routes to dangers that create risk for trade; tenuous connections to foreign
ports can be easily threatened by conflict related disruptions. However, geography can
also create ideal circumstances for facilitating long-distance trade networks; historically,
climate and wind patterns could dictate the ability of what would otherwise have been
distant cities to trade with each other in robust and sophisticated ways. These features
are what influence trade flows and networks, and understanding them will help us to




Bridging New Divides: Ethnic
Linkages and Trade in Africa
1 Introduction
The question of what determines trade between countries in Africa has tended to focus
on factors from more recent history such as the end of colonialism (Head et al., 2010;
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2016; Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008) or the formal
economic linkages between governments on the continent (Geda and Kebret, 2007; Glick
and Rose, 2002; Rose, 2004). Less attention has been given to informal institutional
connections between countries, such as networks based on ethnicity. Through the processes
of colonisation and decolonisation, groups that had been historically connected were split
between various countries following arbitrary colonial boundaries. As a result, ethnic
groups located along historical trade routes were often distributed among multiple states
and sometimes quite distant from one another. Commercial relationships are hindered by
the presence of moral hazard and information asymmetries; and the potential connections
between these groups across national boundaries may foster economic linkages or facilitate
trade by providing a basis for trust and information exchange.
This chapter examines the impact of ethnic networks on trade between countries in
Africa. To do this, I construct a new dataset of ethnic groups and common ethnicities for
the continent at a level of detail not previously available. The dataset uses local missionary
data for ethnic groups that measure both ethnic population size and geographic location.
The empirical strategy exploits the role of historical trade routes in shaping the distribution
of ethnic groups across countries, a variation which is exogenous to later migration and
population flows, and the fragmentation of Africa into different post-colonial states. I
find that ethnic links increase trade between countries: trade more than doubles between
countries that share a common ethnic community. This effect is similar to that of customs
unions and regional trade agreements and is in line with, but distinct from, recent work
on linguistic links.1
1Melitz (2008); Melitz and Toubal (2014); Selmier II and Oh (2013).
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Importantly, this effect is driven by a few ethnic communities creating powerful links
between countries despite often being minority groups. The results indicate that the
extensive margin is driving the results: having an ethnic link is more important than the
number of links or population sizes. Minority ethnic groups, particularly small enclaves
within countries, are developing and exploiting networks across borders to facilitate trade.
In this way, these networks are addressing issues of trust and information not covered by
formal institutional systems.
This chapter contributes to the literature by combining ethnic population data with his-
torical data on trade routes to investigate the effect of common ethnic links at a continent-
wide scale and on national-level trade flows. This contribution is closest to Melitz and
Toubal (2014) which deals with common spoken language (rather than common official
language at the state level) and Aker et al. (2014) which looks at cross-border ethnic
effects on trade between markets in Niger and Nigeria. This chapter expands on Melitz
and Toubal (2014) by looking specifically at ethnicity which may differ from linguistic
identities; it also incorporates historical trade routes and the impact they had on the ge-
ographic spread of ethnic groups to better identify the effect. The focus of this work on
the effect of ethnic ties at a continent-wide level and in terms of total national trade flows
compliments the emphasis of Aker et al. (2014) on micro-level effects. By creating this
synthesis of ethnic links and national trade flows, this chapter presents evidence for the
scalability of network mechanisms to influence national trade flows and the role of ethnic
networks specifically in this process.
An important issue in estimating the impact of ethnic links on trade is reverse causality
and omitted variables. It could be that trade directly influences the migration of ethnic
groups and this could bias results. Other unobserved linkages might also exist between
trade partners, such as similarity in consumption preferences, which could correlate with
similarities in ethnic populations. The empirical strategy therefore exploits pre-colonial
trade routes in order to isolate exogenous variation in the geographic distribution of eth-
nic groups. This empirical strategy relies on the assumptions that these historical trade
networks are (i) predictive of current ethnic similarities between countries, and (ii) ex-
ogenous to current trade patterns. This chapter presents strong evidence in support of
the relevance and exogeneity of the instrument: these pre-colonial trade routes track cur-
rent ethnic distributions such as the Hausa along former West African networks or the
Yao in South-East Africa, and were functionally disrupted by the process of colonisation
which dismantled them in favour of different routes that were more favourable to the
metropole. Threats to these assumptions include the potential for these historical routes
to be tracking something other than the distribution of ethnic groups, such as colonial era
infrastructure, resource endowments, or the persistence of preferences across time. Each
of these is addressed through historical evidence or robustness checks.
Trade is affected by moral hazard. With imperfect contract enforcement and costly
verification, buyers cannot easily ensure that sellers will correctly fulfil the agreed contract
without incurring significant costs. This has been shown by Alfani and Gourdon (2012)
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and Greif (1993) which look at the cases of medieval European merchant collectives and
Maghribi trade networks; with Guiso et al. (2009), Roy et al. (2014), and Yu et al. (2015)
in more modern contexts.2 Ties between ethnic groups can alleviate some of the costs
associated with moral hazard as they allow the contracting agents to more effectively
punish a partner who reneges on the deal through social connections. This has been
developed along linguistic ties by Melitz (2008), Melitz and Toubal (2014), and Selmier
II and Oh (2013)3 with work on ethnic ties focusing generally on intra-country trade
(Fafchamps, 2003; Robinson, 2016), with Aker et al. (2014) being an exception.
Related to this is the issue of information asymmetry which can lead to supply chain
inefficiencies, signalling issues, and other trade frictions across borders. This is often
addressed in the context of financial flows and optimal transactions (Portes et al., 2001;
Portes and Rey, 2005), but it also impacts trade. Chae (2005) looks at the impact of
information on timing and supply chains while Hudson and Jones (2003) and Rauch (2001)
look at the issues of signalling and overcoming information barriers in cross-country trade.
More broadly under this umbrella is work relating to how social relationships and
networks can influence economic activity. Fafchamps (2001) and Lorenzen (2001) both look
at the role of social networks and clustering in reducing coordination costs for trade, while
Burchardi and Hassan (2013) and Woolcock and Narayan (2000) look at the implications
of these reduced costs for development. This is taken further still by Baldacchino (2005)
which extends the role of social network coordination to the development of governance and
economic institutions within communities. Also within this work on social relationships
is literature concerning the role of imperial legacies and the social connections generated
by shared history. Both Head et al. (2010) and Beestermoller and Rauch (2018) address
the legacy and erosion of these imperial relationships between countries and their former
metropoles. This is generalised by Gokmen et al. (2020) which looks at the long run trends
related to the strengthening and weakening of imperial trade ties between countries.
Running parallel with this literature is work dealing with immigration, migrants, and
economic activity which addresses similar themes, but from the opposite direction. These
range from the more tangential literature on migrants and remittance flows (well sum-
marised by Rapoport and Docquier, 2006) to the role of immigration in trade promotion.
The role of different networks and the efficiency of certain networks compared to others
are both ideas investigated by Felbermayr et al. (2010), Rauch and Trindade (2002), and
Wagner et al. (2002). Differing effects on imports and exports is the focus of Head and
Ries (1998) and Konecny (2011), while the historical impact of this effect is looked at by
Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999). This work frequently demonstrates that small groups
of immigrants are sufficient to form strong trade links, an observation which echoes the
finding of this chapter of the central role of minority ethnic groups in developing trade
links between countries.
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2 introduces the ethnic variables,
2Also Spring and Grossmann (2016) for the opposite result.
3See Egger and Toubal (2016) for a summary.
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while Section 3 presents the empirical strategy used in this analysis. The results are
discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Ethnicity
Trading relationships, particularly across borders, require information and trust to secure
the transactions. Common ethnic ties may help in alleviating information asymmetries and
reducing the threat of moral hazard. This chapter constructs two measures to investigate
this relationship. The first captures the current ethnic links between countries based on
population data. One issue with this measure is that current ethnic composition may
reflect modern migration flows along trade routes. To mitigate this issue, I also construct
a measure of common ethnic ties using historical trade routes.
2.1 Ethnic Variables
The data used to construct the ethnic variables come from a database maintained by the
Joshua Project. The raw dataset is current for the year 2012 and, given the time-span of
the analysis, significant population changes during the period are not expected across the
sample. After combining and simplifying the raw data on ethnic groups, a total of 2381
distinct ethnic groups are included.4 The data provide specific population counts of each
ethnic group in a country, capturing the presence of population groups as small as 500
people.
Maps of historical ethnic territories are often suggested as the base to construct vari-
ables about ethnicity. Such maps are favoured because they remove the issues of en-
dogeneity related to modern population movements (discussed further in Section 3.3).
However, the information contained in such maps is related to the territorial extent of
dominant groups within a region, this ignores the presence of smaller and minority groups
which may be present across numerous regions, but never dominant in any. These smaller
groups could potentially drive significant trade flows between countries dominated by dif-
ferent majority groups. In this respect, the use of detailed population data provided by
this dataset is superior to more territory-based methods at identifying effects driven by
potentially small groups.5
I construct four unique variables for ethnic links between countries for this analysis.
The first is a straightforward dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the countries
share any ethnicity, and zero if they do not:
Linkij =
1 if ∃ k for which ξik > 0 and ξjk > 0;0 otherwise.
where ξik is the percentage of the population in country i of ethnicity k. Across all country
pairs the likelihood of sharing an ethnic group has a mean of 0.35. The threshold used for
4More detail about the data construction is provided in Appendix D.
5Variations on the main analysis using territorial maps are presented in Appendix A.
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this indicator is any population regardless of how small, though the effective threshold is
between 500 and 1000 people since that is the lower-bound on the population data. Within
a search framework, this measure is analogous to a perfect search where if an individual
of a given ethnicity exists in one country and there is a co-ethnic in the partner country,
they will find each other with a probability of 1. These ethnic matches then generate
connections that foster trade.
The second variable sums the number of ethnic links between countries. This incorpo-
rates the idea that the more shared ethnic groups a country-pair has, the more opportu-
nities there are for ethnic networks to develop from one or more of those shared groups.
This is as if each ethnic group were able to perfectly search for matches between the two
countries, with the results of those matches being additive for trade promotion. This count






1 if ξik > 0 and ξjk > 0;0 otherwise.
where ξik is the percentage of the population in country i of ethnicity k.
A third variable captures the probability of an individual from one country randomly
matching with a co-ethnic from the other country. This structure assumes implicitly
that the meetings between traders are random (there is no directed search) and contrasts
with the previous measure’s perfect search structure. In this construction, the size of the
relevant ethnicities matters to promote matches. The variable for this ethnic probability





where ξik is the percentage of the population in country i of ethnicity k. Since the ξ terms
are multiplied across the two countries, the value for a given ethnicity that is not shared
between the countries is zero, since one or both of the ξ terms would be zero and a match
would be impossible. These are then summed across all ethnicities and the resulting value
is an index of the probability of making an ethnic match ranging from 0 to 1 with a higher
value indicating greater probability of two co-ethnics meeting.
A final measure incorporates the extent to which the two countries trading are ethni-
cally similar in composition. This implies the concept of co-ethnics in each country having
similar tastes and habits that influence demand, fuelling trade in similar goods between
countries. This ethnic commonality index is given as a sum of the differences of population
percentages across all ethnic groups in the two countries:
ECIij = 1−
∑
k |ξik − ξjk|
2
where ξik is again the percentage of the population in country i of ethnicity k. The ξ
terms are subtracted across the two countries and then summed across all ethnicities in
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the country pair, resulting in an index of ethnicities shared by the countries ranging from
0 to 1 with a higher value indicating greater ethnic similarity.
2.2 Historical Networks as an Instrument
The instrument used in this analysis is based on pre-colonial trade routes constructed from
textual data from a variety of sources on historical trade throughout the continent.6 The
collected data include both the location of trade posts and the connections between them.
Ultimately, 196 separate trade posts are identified within five unique networks and one
additional supra-network involving three of the smaller networks (see Figure 1.1). The five
primary networks are: 1) North Africa; 2) the Congo Basin; 3) the East African Coast; 4)
South-East Africa; and 5) the Horn of Africa. The larger supra-network of Central Africa
includes trade posts within the Congo Basin, East African Coast, and South-East Africa
networks where some connections across these networks existed.7
The trade posts in these networks are attested from the medieval period through to
the nineteenth century and are quite consistent over time. The age of sources is somewhat
skewed since most of the accounts are from Europeans and so networks that are further
south are first mentioned later in the time range, coinciding with European arrival in the
regions. Similarly, since the majority of included trade posts are observed and recorded by
Europeans, this will naturally exclude many locally important but unobserved locations.
This selection bias is difficult to overcome, but the impact on the instrument is of less
concern because missed trade posts will bias the results against shared connections and so
reduce the power of the estimation, meaning that the results may be underestimating the
effect.
The routes that made up these trade networks emerged from the competition of various
states and groups for resources and regional power. Trade along them consisted of a
variety of activities, from formal long-distance caravans to individual merchants trading
local products. The range of products traded along these routes were similarly varied,
including raw materials, refined products, processed metals, manufactures of different
types and qualities, cloths and textiles, art and jewellery, and agricultural goods.8 The
individual routes that made up the networks tended to be dominated by particular ethnic
groups which traded along them and established communities in the various entrepôts.9
This predominance of certain groups did not preclude other groups from sharing in the
trade and different groups came to dominate different routes at different times.
The process of colonisation caused a breakdown in these routes and the influence of
the groups that maintained them. Often there was a specific effort on the part of colo-
6Sources include Bovill (1995), Chirikure (2017), Coquery-Vidrovitch (2005), Gray and Birmingham
(1970), King and van Zwanenberg (1975), and Ogot (1974).
7A more detailed description of the different networks and how they were constructed is presented in
Appendix C.
8Further details on the networks and trade goods are provided in Appendix C.
9Some examples of this include the Yao in south-eastern Africa, the Nyamwezi near the Great Lakes,
the Chokwe in the southern Congo Basin, the Hausa in the Sahel, and the Tuareg in areas of the Sahara.
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Figure 1.1. Map of Historical African Trade Networks
Note: Major trade nodes correspond to the points and the dashed lines
are the routes connecting them; current political borders are shown over-
laid. (Source: Author’s own calculations based on Bovill, 1995; Chirikure,
2017; Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2005; Gray and Birmingham, 1970; King and
van Zwanenberg, 1975; Ogot, 1974).
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nial powers to break the dominance of these groups and dismantle the trade networks in
order to redirect resources to the colonial administrations.10 When new infrastructure
was created, it tended to serve a very different purpose than the previous trade routes;
colonial-era infrastructure was either oriented towards extracting resources for the benefit
of the metropole or directed by strategic and military concerns rather than commerce.
This process followed an orientation that bypassed pre-existing trade posts and routes,
displacing the networks and ensuring they remained that way. Colonial boundaries ag-
gravated this process by severing the routes and restricting trade across borders—both
between empires and sometimes within them. The subsequent fracturing of states along
these restrictive borders during the process of decolonisation entrenched these divisions.
The result of this long process of colonisation and decolonisation was a significant
disruption in the functionality of the pre-colonial trade routes by reducing their importance
and often dismantling them altogether. Colonial infrastructure had different goals than
these historical routes, and so modern transportation links mirror these strategic concerns
rather than pre-colonial commercial ones. Despite this, previous movements of ethnic
groups along these routes were not reversed, leaving in place the communities that had
been established to maintain the trading system and allowing these networks to be an
effective instrument for shared ethnic ties across countries.
The variable itself is a measure of the number of trade posts that a country pair
possesses which share a network—effectively the number of shared network trade posts






1 if δin > 0 and δjn > 0;0 otherwise.
where δin is the number of trade posts in country i belonging to network n. This measures
how integrated each of the two countries are within shared trade networks. In assigning
network membership to trade posts, the path of least assumptions was followed—network
membership was largely accepted at face value as attested in the sources with as few in-
terpolations of wider linkages as possible. While this methodology increases the number
of networks and the isolation of those networks, the benefit is that it leaves little open to
interpretation beyond what is presented in the historical records. Empirically, by increas-
ing the number of networks (and increasing the isolation of networks by under-measuring
connectedness) it will bias the variable downwards, meaning that the results may be un-
derestimated.
10The Portuguese campaigns against the Chokwe in the region of Angola and the British wars against





The objective of this chapter is to gauge the impact of common ethnic groups on the bilat-
eral trade between countries. Gravity models have been used extensively in the literature
to model the relationship between trade flows and transaction costs.11 The structural
gravity model, as presented in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004),
relies on monopolistic competition and CES consumer preferences to represent trade be-
tween two countries as a function of the respective economic size of the countries and the








Where Xijt represents the bilateral trade between country i and country j in period t, K
is a constant, Yit and Yjt are the total outputs of country i and j respectively in period
t, Pit and Pjt are the price levels of country i and j respectively in period t, and Tijt
represents transport costs between country i and country j in period t. Costs, Tijt, are
‘iceberg’ transport costs such that Tiit = 1 and Tijt ≥ 1.
The trade cost term Tijt is modelled as a composite (usually multiplicative) function
of the various factors impacting the cost of trade,
Tijt = f(τijt, dijt) (1.2)
where dijt is the distance between countries i and j and τijt is any other ‘border effect’ that
could impact trade between i and j. This supplementary effect may often include transac-
tion costs such as common legal systems, common institutional variables, contiguity, and
any other dyadic impact on trade.
3.2 Empirical Specification
Using the multiplicative form of the Tijt term, Equation 1.1 can be linearised with logs as
follows
ln(Xijt) = α ln(YitYjt) + ln(dijt) + ln(τijt)
− ln(Pit)σ−1 − ln(Pjt)σ−1 + εijt
(1.3)
Fundamental to the estimation of structural gravity equations is how to deal with the
price indices Pit and Pjt, the unobservable ‘multi-lateral resistance’ terms (see Anderson
and van Wincoop, 2003). I include country-year fixed effects to account for these and other
unobservable factors.12 Trade data are from the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development database, while the measure of distance used in this chapter is the linear
11See Head and Mayer (2014)
12In line with Glick and Rose (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), and Baier and Bergstrand
(2007).
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distance between the two capitals of the country pair.13 The data covers the continent of
Africa for the years 1995-2012, including North African countries and countries south of
the Sahara without distinction.
In this analysis I divide τijt into geographic variables, socio-historic variables, and eco-
nomic variables. The geographic variables are sourced from the Centre d’Études Prospec-
tives et d’Info Internationales (CEPII) database and include whether a country in the
pair is landlocked (land), an island (isle), or whether the countries share a border (bord).
The socio-historic variables include variables for common ethnicity (ethn), common official
language (lang), and common colonial past (col). This last variable will capture any insti-
tutional similarities between the countries such as legal systems and governance structures.
These variables are (almost always) time invariant but are not absorbed into the country
fixed effects as they are country-pair based, allowing them to be separately identified from
the country fixed effects. The final set of variables deals with broad economic ties and ac-
counts for whether the countries are members of the same currency union (curr), customs
union (cust), regional trade agreement (rta), or regional economic grouping (grp).14
With this division of the τijt term and inclusion of the fixed effects, the specification
of the model for estimation becomes,
ln(Xijt) = α+ β1 ln(dij) + β2landij + β3isleij
+ β4bordij + β5ethnij + β6langij + β7colij
+ β8currijt + β9custijt + β10rtaijt + β11grpijt
+ µit + µjt + εijt
(1.4)
where µit and µjt represent the country-year effects and εijt is a normally distributed error
term clustered at the country-pair (ij) level.
3.3 Instrumental Variable Framework
Using modern ethnic population data raises a significant concern about endogeneity such
as reverse causation. It is possible that modern distributions of ethnic groups between
countries are driven by modern trade flows, with people following the commerce to settle
across borders in countries with strong trade links to their home countries. To address
this concern, I use historical networks to instrument for shared ethnicity.
Since the instrumented variable (shared ethnicity) is a dummy variable and the primary
instrument is not a dummy variable (shared network trade posts) I use the standard in-
strumental variable approach for continuous instruments with non-continuous endogenous
13For a more detailed discussion of distance measuring in gravity models see Mayer and Zignago (2011).
14Currency unions included in the data all use either a single currency or a pegged currency system
in preparation for the introduction of a single currency. Customs unions include both common market
agreements and more relaxed tariff agreement zones. Regional trade agreements are classified as agreements
between countries that involve preferential trade zones or free trade zones. Economic groupings constitute
agreements between groups of states that seek to further broad economic goals—most usually development
or trade related objectives. Currency unions account for 3.4% of country pairings, 5% of country pairs are




variables.15 Following this method, I estimate a probit model first and generate predicted
values of shared ethnicity. I then proceed with a normal two-stage least squares estimation
with shared ethnicity instrumented by the predicted values from the probit model and the
instrument (shared network trade posts).
The validity of historical networks as an instrument for common ethnic links rests on
two assumptions. First, historical networks must be correlated with ethnic distributions.
As discussed in Section 2.2, the unique nature of historical trade links along these routes
meant that ethnic groups dominant along the routes would settle communities at various
posts within the networks. This is strongly supported by the results of a naive first stage
presented in Table 1.1. This table presents the results of regressing the various ethnic
variables on the historical network instrument with country fixed effects included. From
these results there is a strong association between geographic ethnic distribution and
historical networks. Combining this with the historical evidence provides a strong case for
these historical networks to be a predictor of ethnic distributions across countries.
Table 1.1. Naive First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Link Count ECI EPI
Shared Network 0.023** 0.182** 0.031** 0.013**
(0.003) (0.031) (0.006) (0.004)
CFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1396 1429 1429 1429
R2 0.212 0.054 0.019 0.003
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is the relevant ethnic variable; Shared Network is the
number of shared network posts in the country-pair.
Added to this are possible measurement issues with the instrument. The potential of
omitted routes or trade posts is ever-present in the data since it relies on historical textual
accounts. While the reasons for this are more fully addressed in Section 2.2, the result is
that there may be routes or trade posts that are missed in the data, either through limits
to what those writing the accounts could see and understand or due to survivor-bias of
the observed routes at the time of recording. Ultimately, this could reduce the number of
recorded routes and trade posts in the data, therefore missing some connections between
countries. While this problem is difficult to fix ex-ante, its effects are such that it would
serve to under-report the extent of connections between countries and therefore under-
represent shared ethnic groups, potentially reducing the predictive power of the instrument
in the first stage.
The second assumption is that the exclusion restriction is satisfied: historical networks
impact trade only through their effect on common ethnic groups. This assumption is
15As outlined in Windmeijer and Silva (1997).
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threatened by the possibility that the instrument is actually capturing something other
than the distribution of ethnic groups, such as infrastructure overlaid on the routes during
the colonial period or historical endowments continuing to influence trade in products.
These possibilities are unlikely due to the nature of colonial governance which tended
to construct infrastructure with the dual purpose of disrupting earlier economic systems
and extracting resources from the country. This meant that colonial era infrastructure was
often orthogonal (in purpose and construction) to earlier systems and networks for trade,
concentrating resources for export to the metropole and limiting the flow of goods across
imperial frontiers. Added to this is that the process of colonisation involved active efforts
by colonising powers to disrupt and dismantle trade networks and connections through
war and the imposition of strict borders.16 Further, the process of decolonisation which
solidified colonial era boundaries as national frontiers, erecting further barriers across what
were by then defunct trade routes. This twin process of colonisation and decolonisation
lead to the discontinuation of these pre-colonial routes, removing the potential for their
direct influence on current trade flows between countries. A variable for common colonial
past is included to further control for the possibility of some residual links existing between
countries previously within the same empire, and robustness checks with a more subtle
control for imperial legacies is presented in Section 4.3.
Table 1.2. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Link 16555 0.353 0.478 0 1
Count 16555 1.583 4.161 0 61
ECI 16555 0.010 0.035 0 0.428
EPI 16555 0.002 0.010 0 0.233
Network 16555 2.322 5.862 0 33
Correlations
Link Count ECI EPI Network
ln(Dist) -0.669 -0.584 -0.533 -0.342 -0.179
Border 0.431 0.696 0.542 0.330 0.248
Link 1.000 0.515 0.375 0.215 0.232
Count 1.000 0.585 0.288 0.226
ECI 1.000 0.792 0.105
EPI 1.000 0.025
Note: Link is the ethnic dummy variable; Count is the sum of shared ethnic groups; ECI is the Ethnic
Commonality Index; EPI is the Ethnic Probability Index; Network is the number of shared network trade
posts.
16A survey of the literature documenting this process is provided by Austen (1987).
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Ethnic Count 4.478 0 +4.478**
(0.078) (-)
ECI 0.028 0 +0.028**
(0.001) (-)
EPI 0.004 0 +0.004**
(0.000) (-)
ln(Trade) 7.718 5.275 +2.443**
(0.046) (0.032)
Language 0.618 0.533 +0.085**
(0.006) (0.005)
Colony 0.459 0.313 +0.182**
(0.007) (0.004)
Network>0 Network=0 Difference
Ethnic Link 0.578 0.302 +0.276**
(0.009) (0.004)
Ethnic Count 3.374 1.173 +2.201**
(0.117) (0.028)
ECI 0.017 0.008 +0.009**
(0.001) (0.000)
EPI 0.002 0.001 +0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
ln(Trade) 8.567 5.582 +2.985**
(0.057) (0.030)
Language 0.643 0.545 +0.098**
(0.009) (0.004)
Colony 0.477 0.339 +0.138**
(0.009) (0.004)
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: This table shows the difference in means of Ethnic Link, Ethnic Count, ECI,
EPI, ln(Trade), Language, and Colony when there is a common ethnicity between
countries (Ethnic Link = 1) and not (Ethnic Link = 0); and when countries are part
of the same network (Network > 0) and not (Network = 0); standard errors are in
parentheses
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Ethnic links between countries are not particularly common, the majority of country pairs
do not have common ethnic communities; as the first panel of Table 1.2 shows, 35% of
country pairs have a link. Added to this is the diversity of ethnicities across countries—no
two countries are exactly the same in terms of ethnic composition as shown by the low
maximum value of the Ethnic Commonality Index. Interestingly, no two countries have a
common ethnicity that is a majority of the population in both countries; if this were the
case, the maximum value for the Ethnic Probability Index would reach above 0.25.
The distribution of ethnicities across countries tends to be geographically clustered:
countries that share an ethnicity tend to be closer together, as shown in the correlation
panel of Table 1.2, and countries that share a border tend to share ethnicities, as shown
in the same table. This is most pronounced for the Ethnic Count variable and Ethnic
Commonality Index, the higher correlations of these variables with the border measure
demonstrates that proximity is more important for country pairs to share multiple ethnic-
ities and have similar ethnic compositions.
Despite the fact that the four ethnic variables are all correlated with each other, having
a common ethnic link does not indicate that the countries are very similar ethnically. This
is shown in the first panel of Table 1.3 where the values of both the ECI and EPI are
low (0.028 and 0.004 respectively) when the countries share an ethnicity. This means that
despite having a common ethnicity, the countries are neither similarly ethnically composed
nor contain large groups of the same ethnicity. Importantly, this demonstrates that what is
driving the common ethnicity between countries are minorities, not major ethnic groups or
large populations. Even if an ethnic group makes up a large proportion of the population
in one country this is not mirrored in any other country so regardless of the size of a
given population in one country, the connections to other countries are still made through
minority groups in those countries.
Added to this, country pairs that were part of the same historical network are more
likely to share an ethnicity and tend to share more of them (3.4 groups on average) as
shown in the second panel of Table 1.3. While these countries also tend to be more similar
in ethnic composition, as with a shared ethnic link these values are not very large (1.7%
for the ECI and 0.2% for the EPI). The ethnic link variable tracks connections between
countries that are sometimes quite distant and the historical network variable appears to
track a similar feature.
4 Results
4.1 Main Results
The first stage results of the IV analysis are presented in Table 1.4 for all four ethnic
variables constructed in Section 2.1. The instrument performs well for only one of the
variables considered, the Ethnic Link dummy variable, with the results for the other
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Table 1.4. IV First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Link Count ECI EPI
Shared Network 0.009** 0.041 -0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.026) (0.006) (0.004)
CYFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 16523 16523 16523 16523
R2 0.684 0.547 0.469 0.221
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is the relevant ethnic link variable; Shared Network
is the number of shared trade network posts in the country-pair; ln(Distance),
Landlocked, Island, Border, Language, Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA, and
Group are all included.
specifications not being significant. In the context of the Ethnic Links variable, the Shared
Network Variable is not found to be a weak instrument. The Ethnic Link variable captures
the potential effect of very small populations within countries, rather than relationships
conditional on the size of populations (as with the ECI and EPI measures) or the number
of distinct communities (as with the Ethnic Count measure). The fact that the instrument
performs well for the Ethnic Link variable but not the others demonstrates that the legacy
of these historical trade networks is rooted in linking distant countries through minority
groups. This makes the population-based data used in this analysis well suited to capturing
this effect through the ability to capture small populations within countries.
Table 1.5 presents the results for the estimations with the dummy variable for a shared
ethnic group. The first column contains the standard OLS specification. The coefficient
is strongly positive and significant, with trade increasing by a factor of nearly two-thirds
(64%). Importantly, the effect of common ethnic ties is significant with the inclusion of
variables for common coloniser, common official language, or shared economic groups and
treaties. Due to the geographic ‘clustering’ of what these variables capture it might be
assumed that any effect of a common ethnicity would be capturing the regional nature of
these variables. However, the results clearly demonstrate that the impact of the ethnic
group variable is not as a proxy for other regional effects caused by the associations between
governments.
The results from the instrumental variable estimation are presented in the second
column of Table 1.5, with the reduced form in the third. The estimated IV parameter
is equal to 0.82, indicating that trade more than doubles (an increase of 127%) between
countries that share an ethnic link. This result is similar to the magnitude of customs
unions and trade agreements, indicating that this is a powerful effect across countries.
The large difference between the OLS and IV coefficients could be a result of two forces.
This could represent a local average treatment effect because of the possibility that
19
CHAPTER I. BRIDGING NEW DIVIDES: ETHNIC LINKAGES AND TRADE IN
AFRICA








CYFE Yes Yes Yes
N 16523 16523 16523
R2 0.451 0.690 0.451
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade;
Ethnic Link is a dummy variable; Shared Network is the number of shared
network trade posts; ln(Distance), Landlocked, Island, Border, Language,
Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA, and Group are all included.
the instrument is under-estimating the levels of connectedness between countries (due to
the omission of some trade posts in the textual data). The instrument would then be
measuring the effect of ethnic links on a particular sub-sample of the data with the most
prominant historical networks where the effect of ethnic links could be stronger. This
would produce larger results by conditioning the effect of a common ethnicity on the
presence of a historical network. The other explanation is that there may be downward
bias in the OLS specification (as indicated by some of the robustness specifications in
Section 4.3). This would imply that the instrument is presenting a truer picture of the
effect of ethnicity on trade than the OLS specification.
These results show that ethnic groups are playing a role in promoting trade between
countries, likely by developing networks that can fill an institutional gap. There is a
need for institutions to overcome barriers to trade like trust and information asymmetries,
and these networks provide that. The power of these ethnic groups to drive trade is
demonstrated in the strength of the effect, emphasising an impact beyond what may be
expected from generally small communities. While the results indicate that ethnic groups
are increasing trade across borders, the analysis is inconclusive about which ethnic groups
are driving this effect and the extent to which the dominant historical ethnic groups remain
so today.17
17While this issue is beyond the scope of this chapter, a preliminary analysis of the modern influence
of several historically dominant groups is contained in Appendix A.
20
4. RESULTS
4.2 Alternative Measures of Ethnic Links
The results for the other ethnic variable constructions are presented in Table 1.6. The
first column contains the results for the count of shared ethnic groups. The results are not
significant, and the weak effect of this variable seems to indicate that the marginal impact
of an increase in the number of ethnic links is low, if it were to impact it at all, with each
additional link potentially correlating with a 2% increase in trade.








CYFE Yes Yes Yes
N 16523 16523 16523
R2 0.449 0.449 0.448
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade;
ln(Distance), Landlocked, Island, Border, Language, Colony, Currency,
Customs, RTA, and Group are all included.
The second column presents the results for the ethnic commonality index which mea-
sures the degree to which the two countries are ethnically similar. The coefficient on the
index is negative and not significant, indicating that a large population of a common ethnic
group is not associated with an increase in trade. The coefficient, even if it were significant
is quite small, with a 1% increase in the ethnic similarity of the two countries reducing
trade by approximately 3%.
Additionally, when the ethnic link dummy variable is included, both are significant and
the ethnic link dummy is positive with a similar magnitude to the baseline OLS. These
results seem to indicate that while the presence of a common ethnic link fosters trade,
as the population concentration of that link (and any other links) grows, the association
is negative, implying a potentially non-linear functional form for the commonality index.
Using a non-linear specification shows that trade is increasing in ethnic similarity until
a critical threshold is reached and then begins to decrease. This supports the idea that
small amounts of ethnic similarity (i.e. smaller ethnic groups that are common between
the countries) are driving the effect.18
18The results of including the ethnic dummy variable and a deeper exploration of the non-linearity of
the ethnic commonality index are provided in Appendix A.
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Lastly, the third column contains the results for the ethnic probability index. The
coefficient on this measure is negative, but it is not significant indicating that the random
search concept of how ethnic groups influence trade is not appropriate in this instance.
This result adds to the the result for the ethnic commonality index and lends support to
the idea that the extensive margin (having a common ethnic group, regardless of size) is
driving the effects on trade.
4.3 Robustness
I conduct a number of robustness checks on the baseline specification. I summarise the
results in this subsection and include a more detailed discussion along with the relevant
Tables and Figures in Appendix B. The robustness checks are divided into two parts:
those dealing with the exclusion restriction for the instrument, and those addressing the
measurement of variables and the sample.
Exclusion Restriction The first set of robustness checks address the exclusion restric-
tion for the instrument discussed in Section 3.3. This includes the incorporation of vari-
ables to control for colonial institutions, colonial infrastructure, and resource endowments.
Preferences are addressed through an analysis of results for specific product groups.
The instrument may be measuring the persistent effects of colonial institutions that
currently impact trade through the harmonisation of administrative or institutional pro-
cesses. While the baseline results include a variable for common coloniser, I introduce
more nuance to the measure by interacting it with distance to account for the idea that
colonial territories that were closer together tended to be under the same colonial admin-
istration or have more direct administrative ties. I then create a second measure of the
common coloniser variable that controls for each different empire separately to address
any difference in effect depending on the systems used in the different empires. These
empire-specific variables are then interacted with distance to again capture the different
effects depending on proximity. None of these measures affect the results, they all remain
in line with those in Table 1.5, demonstrating that institutional connections formed during
the colonial period are not influencing the instrument.
In order to rule out that the relationship is driven by common infrastructure built
during colonisation, I create a variable using data from Jedwab and Moradi (2016) on rail
lines constructed during the colonial period. I develop two separate variables for colonial
infrastructure. The first is the presence of a colonial-era rail link between the countries.
The second is the presence of a shared rail link interacted with having the same colonial
power to incorporate the differing effects of rail lines that spanned imperial borders. The
incorporation of these controls for infrastructure produce results with coefficients that are
not statistically different from the baseline results. They remain positive and significant,
indicating that infrastructure is not a factor in the relationship detected in the IV analysis.
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Climate and topography greatly influence what agriculture or raw materials can be
produced within a country and these resource endowments can influence both historical
and modern trade. To show that the baseline results are not related to the distribution of
resources, and more directly that the instrument is not influenced by these endowments,
I create a series of variables capturing the different climatic and topographical distinc-
tions between countries. These include things such as soil quality, rainfall, and elevation.
Each variable is constructed by taking the difference between the measured value of the
relevant aspect for each country, producing a continuous index of difference between the
countries—effectively measuring the climatic and topographical ‘distance’ between coun-
tries. By capturing these differences, the variables can approximate differences in resource
endowments which could drive trade between countries. The inclusion of these controls
do not produce results that are significantly different from the main results and show that
the instrument is robust to differences in resources and endowments.
To demonstrate that the instrument is not influenced by the effect of preferences es-
tablished through pre-colonial trade and still currently influencing trade flows, I estimate
the relevant product categories separately. If the effect were driven by the persistence
of historical consumer preferences, there would be a differentiated effect between product
categories that include goods influenced by these preferences—products traded histori-
cally such as agricultural produce and raw materials—and product categories developed
after these preferences were established (such as manufactures, chemical products, and
machinery). The results do not show such a differentiation, making it very implausible
that preferences are driving this effect. There is very little difference between product
categories: all the results are in line with the baseline estimation for each category with
the exception of fuel which is a positive outlier.
Ultimately, the resilience of the results in the IV analysis to the inclusion of variables for
institutions, infrastructure, or resource endowments, combined with the robustness of the
results across product categories provide support for the exclusion restriction assumption
and that the impact of historical trade networks on modern trade flows is through the
effect of ethnic groups.
Measurement and Sample The second set of robustness checks look at variations in
the measurement of variables and changes to the estimation sample.
The first of these checks is on the construction of the instrument used in the IV
analysis. To test the sensitivity of the results to the construction of the instrument, I
create an alternative measure of shared network posts incorporating the size of the various
trade posts. The value for this measure is based on the number of times each trade post
is mentioned in the sources, approximating the importance of the various trade posts. I
then use this to weight the sum of trade posts across networks, giving more prominence
to countries with trade posts that are more important within the networks. I use this
new weighted version of shared network posts to instrument for shared ethnic links. It
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performs in line with the original construction and produces no appreciable change in the
results, indicating the strength of the historical data as an instrument.
As a second test I include measures that account for religious ties between countries.
Since often religion and ethnicity have a strong interdependence and both can influence
networks that promote trade, incorporating religion controls helps to confirm the unique
effect of shared ethnic groups beyond (and possibly across) religious lines. Three vari-
ables are constructed in line with those created for ethnicity in Section 2.1: a dummy
variable for shared majority religion, a proportional index, and a measure of religious sim-
ilarity between the countries. The inclusion of these measures does not change the results,
demonstrating that the effect of ethnicity is robust to religious effects. To emphasise this,
an identical exercise is performed for Muslim populations only due to the historical promi-
nence of Islam within trade relationships on the continent. The effect of ethnic links is
also robust to the inclusion of these variables.
Third, because of the subjectivity of ethnic categorisation, I test the robustness of the
results to different constructions of the main ethnicity variable. I increase the population
threshold to 1000 people and 10000 people, and also change the definition of an ethnic
group, lumping some groups together to reduce the overall number of groups. The results
are not significantly impacted by these changes, indicating that the results are not sensitive
to the threshold imposed for a common ethnicity or the definition of specific ethnic groups.
As a fourth check, I explore variations in the measure of distance in the gravity equation
used in the estimation. I include three alternative measures of distance: the distance
between major cities, the distance between country centroids, and a distance measure
based on transportation methods that measures the sea and road distance necessary to
connect two countries. The first of these substitutes the largest city in the country for the
capital which is used in the original analysis. The second uses country centroids instead
of cities. The third measure is a construction that measures the total distance along roads
and waterways between the countries, giving a better approximation of the actual distance
the goods travel. The results remain unchanged with the distance as measured between
major cities. The incorporation of the other two measures produces coefficients for the
ethnic links variable that are slightly lower in magnitude, though they are not statistically
different from the main results.
Fifth, I accommodate the inclusion of zero trade flows and missing data through the use
of the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) model of Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
Due to the low number of zeros in the data (0.009% of cases) and the comparatively larger
number of missing data points (31.6% of cases) two different constructions are used. The
first includes only those zero flows identified as such in the data. The second converts the
missing data to zeros and includes those observations as well since often missing values
can be misinterpreted zeros. Both these specifications produce results in line with the
baseline estimation in column 1 of Table 1.5. In both cases the coefficients are slightly
larger indicating that the OLS specification appears to be under-estimating the effect.
Finally, I test the sensitivity of the results to sample choice. The first round of these
24
5. CONCLUSION
removes various regions from the sample that may have a disproportionate affect on the
results either due to having a small number of ethnic groups distributed across many coun-
tries or a high number of ethnic groups shared among many smaller countries. Removing
these regions changes the magnitudes of the coefficients, but all remain strongly positive
and significant. Despite the fluctuations in the magnitudes, the coefficients are not sta-
tistically different from the baseline results. The second round performs tests on the time
period included in the sample by estimating year cross-sections. The coefficients for the
individual years vary somewhat, but all except one are in line with the main result. The
cross-section for 2001 produces an anomalous negative result that could be explained by
a significant drop in underlying global trade trends during that year. Results for cross-
sections using multi-year averages are broadly similar, with coefficients that are positive
and not statistically different from the baseline estimates. These exercises demonstrate
that the results are not overly sensitive to sample choice.
5 Conclusion
This chapter provides evidence for the effect of ethnic ties on trade between countries. I
build a dataset based on modern population distributions and construct several measures
to capture various types of ethnic link. The research design enables the use of exogenous
historical trade networks to instrument for modern ethnic group distribution across African
countries in order to provide verification of causal mechanisms. I find that ethnicity has
a large and significant effect on trade between countries, countries that share an ethnicity
more than double their bilateral trade. This result is robust to different specifications of the
ethnic variable and variations in the sample and controls. Ultimately, the results indicate
that the defining feature of the effect is on the extensive margin—having an ethnic link is
more important than the size of populations or the number of shared links. These results
imply that the presence of common ethnicities goes some way towards mitigating issues
related to moral hazard and asymmetric information, facilitating trade across borders.
This study does not come without limitations. Ethnic issues are consistently a point
of debate with respect to Africa and the ethnicity variable identified in this analysis could
always be adjusted to capture different degrees of variation between ethnic groups. The
method chosen here is effective and seeks to maintain localised ethnic self-identification.
Similarly, the issue of a difference in effect between discontiguous and contiguous ethnic
groups is beyond the scope of this study but would offer interesting avenues to explore the
ways in which ethnicity builds trade bridges between countries. The instrument used in
this analysis comes with its own qualifications (discussed more fully in Section 3.3) and
improving on its construction would allow for more insight into the distribution of ethnic
groups and the potential persistence of the impacts of specific historical groups on trade.
Despite these issues, the insights provided here are extremely relevant to research in
trade and the impacts of local networks on trust and information. Beyond this, the unique
instrument used opens avenues into economic history with the legacy of historical trade
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and the distribution of dominant ethnic groups. This work also provides evidence at
a broad scale of the ethnic border effects found in several studies of cross-border market
prices. This contributes to the growing consensus around the importance of local networks
for trade and provides generalisable results for these effects.
Although not necessarily obvious, the generalisability of the results lend themselves
to possible policy implications. While formally exploiting ethnic networks is difficult in a
policy context, these results reveal potential gaps in contract and information quality that
are easily solved with policy measures. Pursuing reforms in these areas would reduce the
need for ethnic networks to mitigate trust and information issues and would encourage
the development of more robust, institutionalised trade between countries.
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A Appendix: Alternative Specifications
A.1 Non-linearity of Ethnic Commonality Index
As discussed briefly in this chapter, the effect of the Ethnic Commonality Index is negative
and insignificant. There is evidence, however, that the effect of this variable is non-linear
and that it can have a significant impact on trade between countries and supports the
conclusion of the principal analysis regarding small ethnic groups. This subsection presents
these non-linear results for the ECI variable.
Table 1.7 shows a more in-depth presentation of the results for the ECI variable. In the
first column is the basic regression for reference. The main coefficient of the ECI variable is
negative and insignificant. This changes when the dummy ethnic link variable is included
in the specification. As shown in column 2, the coefficient for ECI remains negative but
becomes significant while the coefficient for the Ethnic Link variable is consistent with the
results presented in this chapter.











CYFE Yes Yes Yes
N 16523 16523 16523
R2 0.449 0.452 0.451
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade;
Ethnic Link is a dummy variable; ln(Distance), Landlocked, Island, Border,
Language, Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA, and Group are all included.
This would seem to indicate that there may be a non-linear effect in terms of the ethnic
commonality variable; with the presence of a link creating a positive effect on trade, while
the impact decreases as ethnic similarity increases. In order to explore this possibility a
non-linear model is developed for the ECI variable of the following form:
ln(Xijt) = α+ β1ECI + β2
√
ECI + β3Dij + β4Mijt + µit + µjt + εijt
where Dij and Mijt are time invariant and variant (respectively) control variables used in
the principal analysis. Country-year fixed effects are represented by the µ terms and εijt
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is an error term, clustered at the country pair level.
The non-linear specification (presented in column 3) has the ECI variable significant in
both terms of the polynomial. The negative coefficient on the ECI term and the positive
coefficient on the sqrt(ECI) term gives the function an inverted-U shape. This means that
the effect of the ECI variable on trade is increasing for low levels of ethnic commonality
between the countries until a critical value is reached and the effect decreases again.
This result reinforces the notion that the effect of ethnic groups on trade is one of
minority groups, with small shared groups driving most of the effect. The ECI result
adds to this by demonstrating that the effect is more prominent in largely heterogeneous
countries (with a low overall ECI score) that share some small groups (increasing with the
ECI variable for lower values).
A.2 Ethnic Maps
While the main analysis of this chapter uses detailed population data in order to capture
the effect of small minority groups within countries, there are alternative ways to measure
the presence of common ethnicity. One dominant method is the use of maps of historical
ethnic territory. While the use of these maps removes the ability to measure the effect of
small ethnic groups, they also remove the issue of endogeneity by determining common
ethnicity without the potential influence of modern trade flows. Two maps are presented
in this appendix to construct similar measures of shared ethnic links.
The first map (see Figure 1.2) is from the Times of London and was published in
1972 (Lewis and Foy, 1972) while the second map (Figure 1.3) is from Murdock’s 1959
study of ethnicity in Africa (Murdock, 1959). The use of these representations of common
ethnic communities is straightforward, as these maps represent clear ethnic distributions.
However, it also creates two issues: 1) the structure of these maps and the territories
they illustrate remove the ability to assess the impact of the size of populations within
countries as there is no way to determine how densely populated the various parts of the
mapped territories were; and, 2) it clouds the potential influence of smaller minority groups
that are not represented as dominant territorially. This creates an increased sensitivity to
classification issues since only groups that were considered the dominant players in various
territories have been included in the maps and it necessarily reduces the number of ethnic
groups (to the hundreds rather than thousands as in the population data). In this sense,
they can only be used as checks on the main analysis.
In the case of each map, the map and its ethnic territories were digitised19 and overlaid
on a map of modern African countries. Any pair of countries that share the same ethnic
territory (or share parts of a discontiguous ethnic territory) were deemed to have a common
ethnicity. This dummy variable operates in the same fashion as that in the principal
analysis and is independently created for each map. Both maps suffer from issues of
the clumping and splitting of groups in different ways. While this problem is somewhat
19Digitisation of the Murdock map comes from Nunn (2008), the Times map was digitised by the author.
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Figure 1.2. Digitised Map of African Ethnic Groups (Times of London, 1972)
Note: Colour blocks correspond to areas occupied by individual ethnic
groups as defined in Lewis and Foy (1972); current political borders are
shown overlaid.
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Figure 1.3. Digitised Map of African Ethnic Groups (Murdock, 1959)
Note: Colour blocks correspond to areas occupied by individual ethnic
groups as defined in Murdock (1959); current political borders are shown
overlaid.
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mitigated by the fact the variable for common ethnicity is constructed as a dummy for the
existence of any common ethnicity, it makes it difficult to conduct a more detailed analysis.
Splitting is more problematic as the structure of the dummy variable for common ethnicity
cannot mitigate this impact; in fact, the problem is likely exacerbated by the nature of the
common ethnicity variable. For this reason, these must be viewed largely as robustness
checks on the main analysis. The Times map produces a total of 167 unique ethnicities,
with 17.8% of country pairs sharing an ethnic group, while the Murdock map has a total
of 835 unique ethnicities, with 12.3% of country pairs sharing an ethnic group.
Times of London Map, 1972 The first map used to derive ethnic data is the map of
ethnic territories published in the Times of London in 1972 (see Figure 1.2). This map was
collated from several disparate sources and it is quite comprehensive in its treatment of
African ethnic group territory. There is only one significant issue with its representation:
the map tends to clump together some groups that the authors decided (somewhat arbitrar-
ily it appears) belong together. This is most clear among the nomadic and semi-nomadic
peoples of the Sahara which have been clustered into one pan-Saharan mega-group that
also includes almost all of North Africa. While the motivations for this are a mystery, it
does unfortunately mean that all Saharan and North African ethnicities are treated as a
single group (lumping together peoples as disparate as Arabs, Tuareg, and Sahrawi). This
issue is also evident in other places, though less clearly so. In several parts of the map
some groups are included together while other groups are excluded (for example, Pedi is
clustered with Eastern Sotho but Northern Sotho is excluded).
Murdock Map, 1959 The second map used for ethnic data is the map included with
Murdock’s 1959 study of ethnicity in Africa (see Figure 1.3). The entire work is a study
of African ethnicity and culture that included a comprehensive map of the locations of
various African ethnic groups. Murdock’s map is very comprehensive, encompassing the
territorial limits of hundreds of ethnic groups. In contrast to the Times Map, this map
tends to suffer from the error of splitting (Braun and Hammonds, 2008). Ethnic groups
that would normally be considered one group are divided into separate parts in seemingly
arbitrary ways. The most notable example of this is the treatment of the Somali clans.
In Murdock’s map, each clan is classed as a separate ethnic group, despite them all being
ethnically Somali. This would be equivalent to deciding that the Duncans and MacDonalds
of Scotland are separate ethnicities. The issue with this is not the number of ethnic
groups, but rather the way in which they were split. The splits that were made seem to
manufacture new divisions within ethnic groups that the members of the groups may not
recognise themselves.
Results The first column of Table 1.8 presents the results of the estimation using a
common ethnicity variable constructed from the Times of London map (see Figure 1.2).
The common ethnicity variable is strongly positive with a coefficient of 0.886, representing
31
CHAPTER I. BRIDGING NEW DIVIDES: ETHNIC LINKAGES AND TRADE IN
AFRICA
a 130% increase in trade. This is in line with the results from the IV estimation in the
main analysis. The second column of Table 1.8 shows the result of using the Murdock
map (see Figure 1.3) to construct a variable for common ethnicity. Again, the sign and
the magnitude of the ethnic variable is in line with the previous estimation.
Table 1.8. Map-derived Ethnicity
(1) (2)
Times Murdock





Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of
total bilateral trade; Ethnic Link is a dummy vari-
able; ln(Distance), Landlocked, Island, Border, Lan-
guage, Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA, and Group
are all included.
These results provide further support for the idea of local ethnic networks facilitating
trade between countries while simultaneously tackling the issue of population movements.
By using maps of the historical extent of ethnic groups on the continent, the issue of
modern trade driving population movements does not impact this estimation. The maps
themselves approach the idea of ethnicity very differently, with the Times map tending to
clump ethnicities together, while the Murdock map tends to split them. The strength of
the results in the face of these divergent approaches to classification lends further support
to the case for common ethnicity driving trade between countries.
A.3 Specific Groups
While the historical persistence of the influence of specific ethnic groups is beyond the scope
of this chapter, this subsection includes some preliminary investigation of this question by
looking at the modern influence of four historically important groups. Three of these
groups (the Fulbe, Hausa, and Tuareg) are from the Sahel-Sahara area while the fourth,
the Swahili, are present in East Africa. Below are brief historical sketches of each group’s
impact on trade and commerce in its region followed by the results.20
Fulbe The Fulbe people (alternatively called Fulani, Fula, Peul, among many others
depending on the country and language) are a semi-pastoral ethnic group from West
20For a more complete discussion of historical linkages between cities in the Sahel, Sahara, and East
African coast see Bovill (1995), and Coquery-Vidrovitch (2005).
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Africa. They are one of the most widely dispersed ethnic groups in Africa and are the
largest group in the Sahel region. Their origins are from the northern Senegambian region
but through migrations, conquest, and trade they spread throughout West Africa and the
Sahel. Historically, Fulbe states in the Sahel began to assert themselves in the sixteenth
century as they laid claim to trade routes, entrepôts, and merchant towns. As these
states became more successful and prosperous, Fulbe from surrounding regions increasingly
abandoned historically pastoralist practices and settled in urban centres, often converting
to Islam. Fulbe merchants frequently travelled the caravan routes in the region, setting
up communities in various cities throughout the area. Fulbe states grew in dominance in
the region, eventually culminating in the Sokoto caliphate of the nineteenth century.
Hausa The Hausa people are concentrated in the eastern Sahel region and have a long
history of independent city states commanding trade links across the Sahara. The Hausa
city-states established themselves as southern terminals to trans-Saharan trade and Hausa
merchants plied these trade routes frequently. By the twelfth century the principal Hausa
city states of Katsina, Zazzau, Gobir, Kano, Rano, and Biram had come to dominate
Sahelian and trans-Saharan trade. The mercantile power of the cities extended far along
rivers and into the desert, though the territory they directly controlled remained smaller.
Tuareg The Tuareg people principally inhabit the Sahara and are traditionally pas-
toralists. The nomadic lifestyle of many Tuareg people in the Sahara led them to be relied
upon as caravan drivers through the desert. Since antiquity these caravans had been or-
ganised and led by Tuareg people and the Tuareg came to dominate the trade routes and
way-stations within the desert.
Swahili The Swahili people are from the eastern coast of Africa, the word Swahili is
derived from the Arabic term meaning ‘people of the coast’. The Swahili Coast has been
a principal trade hub since antiquity, it was called Azania in the Greco-Roman period
and had been attested to in numerous sources throughout history. The eventual rise of
Swahili city-states on the coast and settlements on offshore islands was a direct result of
the prosperity created by the trade networks of the Indian Ocean. These cities would
serve as points of exchange, buying goods from the interior and then selling them onwards
to their networks in the Indian Ocean. Swahili communities emerged at both ends of
this trade network; establishing communities in the interior of East Africa and at the
terminals for their Indian Ocean trade. As a result of this trade the cities of Bagamoyo,
Kilwa, Mzizima (now Dar es Salaam), Malindi, Mombasa, Pangani, Quelimane, Sofala, and
Tanga became some of the richest cities in the region. These networks were so lucrative
that they attracted first the Portuguese and then the Omanis, who dominated the region
from the sixteenth century.
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Results Table 1.9 presents the results for the four relevant models: column 1 presents
the impact of Fulbe networks; column 2 shows the effect of Hausa networks; column 3 deals
with Tuareg networks; column 4 includes the impact of Swahili networks. Each specifica-
tion includes the normal Ethnic Link variable from the main analysis and a variable for
the specific group (Fulbe, Hausa, Tuareg, and Swahili). This helps to isolate the effect of
the individual group under consideration from the more general average ethnic link effect
across the rest of the continent.
In the first three columns, the variable for the specific group is positive, but not
significant, indicating that the effect of the given ethnic groups cannot be separated from
the general effect of having a common ethnicity. The effect for the Swahili group is strongly
positive and significant, indicating that the effect of Swahili networks is separate from
and stronger than the general ethnic link effect. These results present some preliminary
evidence for the potential persistence of historically dominant groups, but they are not
comprehensive. Further analysis of more groups, ideally with more localised impacts,
would shed more light on this issue.
Table 1.9. Historical Ethnic Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fulbe Hausa Tuareg Swahili
Ethnic Link 0.459** 0.473** 0.492** 0.332*
(0.168) (0.173) (0.163) (0.176)
Specific Group 0.232 0.083 0.200 0.690**
(0.242) (0.255) (0.333) (0.292)
CYFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 16523 16523 16523 16523
R2 0.452 0.451 0.451 0.453
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade; Ethnic Link
and Specific Group are dummy variables; ln(Distance), Landlocked, Island, Border,
Language, Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA, and Group are all included.
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B Appendix: Sensitivity Analysis
This appendix presents a series of robustness checks around the baseline specification.
B.1 Exclusion Restriction
The IV analysis presented in this chapter rests on the assumption outlined in Section 3.3
that historical trade networks only impact modern trade flows through their influence on
ethnic links between countries. While this assumption is supported by historical accounts,
there is still potential that other factors such as infrastructure and institutions created
during the colonial period, country resource endowments, or consumer preferences could
be related to these former trade routes and the legacy of these factors is what is actually
being picked up in the analysis. To address this, I create a series of variables to control
for colonial infrastructure, institutions, and country endowments. To address the concern
around consumer preferences, I analyse the effect of the instrument on different product
categories.
Institutions and Infrastructure To control for institutions and infrastructure cre-
ated during the colonial period, I develop more nuanced variables for common coloniser
effects. To account for institutions, I construct three additional variables for the effects of
a common coloniser. The first of these is an interaction term of the colonial variable from
the baseline estimation and distance to proxy for potential colonial institutional effects.
Former dependencies of the same coloniser that are closer together could be more likely
to have been under the same administrative umbrella or to have had shared institutional
connections with each other. This potential is captured by this variable. The effect of this
control in presented in column 1 of Table 1.10. The coefficient for common ethnic groups
across countries remains unchanged with this inclusion.
The second of these institutional variables is a more refined measure of the common
coloniser variable which splits the variable into control variables for each of the six major
colonial powers: Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. This
division allows for different institutional effects depending on the specific imperial power.
The inclusion of these controls in the second column also do not affect the results of
the variable for a common ethnicity. The third variable takes the separated colonial
variables and interacts them with distance as in the first case. This modification does not
significantly impact the effect of the Ethnic Link variable.
To tackle the effect of infrastructure, I create a variable to account for the presence
of colonial railroads in order to incorporate controls for infrastructure effects, shown in
the fourth column of the same table. The data for this dummy variable is from Jedwab
and Moradi (2016) and it accounts for the presence of the same rail system within both
countries. Railroads were the primary form of connective infrastructure created during the
colonial period and this variable gives an indication of the presence of infrastructure links
between countries. The presence of a common rail system does not negatively impact the
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results for a common ethnic link, lending support to the assumption that the instrument
is indeed independent of any colonial infrastructure effects.
Table 1.10. Colonial Institution Controls







Ethnic Link 0.818** 0.879** 0.835** 0.863** 0.791**
(0.304) (0.309) (0.300) (0.318) (0.332)
CYFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 16523 16466 16466 16523 16307
R2 0.691 0.693 0.695 0.691 0.679
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade; Ethnic Link
is instrumented by Shared Network; Rail is a variable controlling for the presence
of a shared colonial railroad (data from Jedwab and Moradi, 2016); ln(Distance),
Landlocked, Island, Border, Language, Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA, and Group
are all included.
In the final column of Table 1.10, I create an additional measure of colonial infrastruc-
ture by interacting the variable capturing the presence of a rail system with the common
coloniser variable. This captures the dual presence of a rail system that is under the con-
trol of the same colonial power in order to differentiate from rail systems that spanned
empires. The inclusion of this more subtle measure of colonial infrastructure does not sig-
nificantly change the overall effect of having an ethnic link, it is not statistically different
from the baseline estimation and remains strongly positive and significant. These results
give empirical credibility to the historical evidence supporting the independence of the
instrument.
Resource Endowments In order to control for the potential impacts of country en-
dowment, I create a series of variables to account for different climatic and topographic
features of the various countries in the dataset. While endowments of resources are difficult
to calculate for historical periods (particularly pre-colonial Africa), climate and topogra-
phy differences can proxy for such endowment effects between countries: if two countries
have significantly different climates or topographies they are likely to possess significantly
different resources which could drive historical trade patterns that are mirrored in modern
trade flows due to the persistence of these resource differences.
I create five separate variables to control for different geographic features: soil qual-
ity, forest cover, rainfall, elevation, and mountains. Each variable is calculated as the
arithmetic difference between the values of the measures for the two countries in order
to capture the climatic or topographical ‘distance’ between the environments of the two
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countries.21 The results are presented in Table 1.11. The data for all but one of these
variables comes from the World Bank, with the measure used to create the mountains
variable derived from the ruggedness variable used in Nunn and Puga (2012).
Table 1.11. Country Endowment Controls





Rain Elevation Mountains Combined
Ethnic Link 0.859** 0.856** 0.872** 0.902** 0.827** 0.894**
(0.327) (0.328) (0.320) (0.322) (0.324) (0.324)
CYFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 15800 15800 16523 16523 16523 15800
R2 0.696 0.696 0.691 0.690 0.691 0.697
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade; Ethnic Link is instrumented by Shared
Network; soil quality, forest cover, rain, come from World Bank data; mountains variable comes from Nunn
and Puga (2012); ln(Distance), Landlocked, Island, Border, Language, Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA, and
Group are all included.
The first column presents the soil quality variable. This control measures the difference
in the percent of arable land in the countries, capturing the variation in soil quality and
potential agricultural output for the two countries. The inclusion of this control does not
change the results for the Ethnic Link variable.
The second column shows the results for the forest cover variable which measures
the difference in the percent of forest coverage in the two countries. This captures the
difference in availability of resources such as timber and plant material, but also proxies
for the prevalence of open land such as savannahs and deserts. Including this variable does
not appreciably change the coefficient on Ethnic Link or its significance.
The third column includes a variable measuring the difference in annual rainfall be-
tween the countries. This control captures the differing potential for crops and resources
based on water requirements, since areas that are more wet are able to produce different
crops than drier regions. There is no significant change to the results with the inclusion
of this measure.
The fourth column adds a variable which captures the difference in average elevation
of the two countries. This accounts for the fact that different elevations produce different
micro-climates that influence available resources and agriculture. The is no significant
difference in the results when this variable is included, despite the small increase in the
coefficient on the Ethnic Link variable.
The fifth column includes a measure of the difference in ruggedness between the two
countries. As mentioned, this value is adapted from Nunn and Puga (2012) and quantifies
the heterogeneity in the topography of a country—essentially the extent and frequency
21Using non-linear transformations of the variables that weight differences depending on their place
within the variable distributions does not produce different results (results available upon request).
37
CHAPTER I. BRIDGING NEW DIVIDES: ETHNIC LINKAGES AND TRADE IN
AFRICA
of changes in elevation. The variable used here captures the difference in ruggedness
between the countries since different resources tend to be present in more mountainous or
hilly environments. The inclusion of this measure also does not affect the results, with the
coefficient on the Ethnic Link variable almost exactly in line with that presented in Table
1.5.
Finally, in the last column, all five measures for different climatic and topographical
effects are included together as collective controls for endowment differences. The results
for the Ethnic Link variable are robust to the inclusion of these different controls, demon-
strating that the instrument is not picking up persistent differences in resource endowment.
Preferences It is possible that the instrument is actually capturing persistence in con-
sumer preferences across time, where habits and tastes established prior to the colonial
period create a tendency for consumers to buy specific goods from specific countries. This
could be reflected in historical trade routes and the persistence of these preferences could
be influencing modern trade flows. While preferences themselves cannot be measured di-
rectly for the pre-colonial period, tastes can be assumed from the types of goods traded.
In theory, if these potentially static preferences are influencing modern trade flows then
there should be some consistency in the types of goods traded. If this is the case, then
agricultural goods and raw materials should be driving the effect of common ethnicity and
this preferences effect is what the instrument will be estimating.
Figure 1.4 presents the results for estimations using specific product categories. The
categories used (in the order they appear on the graph) are: agricultural products; liquor,
beverages, and tobacco; raw materials; fuel; organic oils and fats; chemical products;
manufactures; machinery and vehicles; and products not elsewhere specified. The product
categories used are standard SITC one-digit categories.22
From the graph it is clear that all product categories are in line with the results from
the main analysis (blue line) except for fuel which is an outlier. This shows that the effect
of a common ethnicity is not being driven by a specific industry and is not particularly
sensitive to product category divisions. Importantly, product categories that are unlikely
to be affected by historic preferences (such as chemicals, manufactures, and machinery)
are positive, significant, and in line with the main results.
This indicates that preferences are unlikely to be a driving factor in the results and
demonstrates that the instrument is not being influenced by historically persistent prefer-
ences. If it were, the effect would be driven by product categories such as agriculture, raw
materials, or organic oils—all products that could conceivably have been present in pre-
colonial trade systems—and the results for these categories would be consistently larger
than the other product categories.
22This division of categories combines manufactures and miscellaneous manufactured articles (categories
6 and 8 in the SITC system) for simplicity. Keeping these categories separate does not change the results.
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Figure 1.4. Product-specific Coefficients
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade;
Ethnic Link is instrumented by Shared Network.
The results from the inclusion of controls for factors such as infrastructure, institutions,
and endowments combined with the evidence provided for preferences help to confirm the
historical evidence and the discussion in Section 3.3. While these are all factors that
could influence the relationship between the instrument and modern trade, the results
presented here demonstrate that the instrument is robust to the inclusion of these other
factors. This evidence contributes to satisfying the exclusion restriction, indicating that
the effect detected in the main results is the effect of common ethnic groups on trade
between countries.
B.2 Alternative Instrument
Along with sensitivity to the construction of the modern common ethnicity variables, the
results may also be sensitive to different formulations of the instrument. I provide a test of
the sensitivity of the results to the instrument used by constructing an alternative variable
for historical trade networks. Table 1.12 presents the results of using a weighted shared
network variable.
Whereas the instrument used in the main analysis is an unweighted count of shared
trade posts, the variable used here incorporates a weighting system for each post based
on an approximation of its size. While the size of specific trade posts is not mentioned in
the sources, this variable uses the number of times each post is mentioned in the sources
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as a proxy for size. This rests on the assumption that larger trade posts would be more
important within the networks and therefore more frequently mentioned in the sources.
The construction of this instrument is identical to that in the main analysis except for










1 if δin > 0 and δjn > 0;0 otherwise.
where δin is the number of weighted trade posts in country i belonging to network n given
by the sum of the number of mentions, ωp, across all trade posts p. Similarly to the original
instrument, this variable measures how integrated countries are within shared networks.
The inclusion of the weights gives more prominence to countries that contain trade posts
that were more important within the networks.
The results presented in Table 1.12 are in line with the main results in Table 1.5.
The incorporation of this construction of the instrument does not impact the results and
demonstrates the robustness of the historical data as an instrument for common ethnic
links.








CYFE Yes Yes Yes
N 16523 16523 16523
R2 0.451 0.690 0.451
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade;
Ethnic Link is a dummy variable; Shared Network is the number of shared
network trade posts; ln(Distance), Landlocked, Island, Border, Language,
Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA, and Group are all included.
B.3 Religion
The sometimes strong connections between religion and ethnic identity could lead to a
difficulty in isolating the ethnic effect from any effect caused by similar religious affiliation.
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To address this, I develop several measures of religious similarity that follow a similar
construction to the ethnic variables used in the analysis.
The first measure is similar to the Ethnic Link variable presented in Section 2.1. It
captures whether the countries share a majority religion:
Religionij =
1 if ∃ d for which ζid > 0.5 and ζjd > 0.5;0 otherwise.
where ζid is the percentage of the population in country i of religious denomination d. A
majority threshold was chosen due to the limited number of religions and the presence in
all countries of members of at least one shared religion. With a majority threshold it also
incorporates the potential commercial and legal power of the religion’s adherents.
The second measure is an index of religion analogous to the EPI of Section 2.1. It
captures the sum of shared proportions of religions within the countries. This measure is





where ζid is the percentage of the population in country i of religious denomination d.
The third measure is an index of religious similarity between the countries (following
the methodology of the ECI in Section 2.1):
RCIij = 1−
∑
d |ζid − ζjd|
2
where ζid is again the percentage of the population in country i of religious denomination d.
The ζ terms are subtracted across the two countries and then summed across all religions
in the country pair. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with a larger value indicating more
similarity.
The first column of Table 1.13 presents the results of including the common majority
religion variable. The second column and third column show the results of including the
two indices, the shared proportion index and the religious similarity index respectively.
The main results for a common ethnicity remain unchanged through the inclusion of all
three religious variables.
Islam Within the wider religious milieu of Africa, Islam was historically prominent across
trade networks and among trading populations. This means that it could have an outsized
influence on the results and that the instrument may be capturing the effect of networks
based on Islam specifically rather than ethnicities. To account for this, I develop three
variables that measure the Muslim population of countries identically to those constructed
for religion more generally.
The construction of each variable is the same as those previously, except that they
measure the proportions of Muslim populations only rather than being summed across all
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Ethnic Link 0.869** 0.879** 0.876**
(0.323) (0.322) (0.324)
CYFE Yes Yes Yes
N 16523 16523 16523
R2 0.690 0.690 0.690
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade;
Ethnic Link is instrumented by Shared Network; Religious data comes from
Maoz and Henderson (2013); ln(Distance), Landlocked, Island, Border,
Language, Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA, and Group are all included.
religions. The results are presented in Table 1.14. As with the results for religion more
generally, the inclusion of variables controlling for Muslim populations does not affect the
results in a significant way.





Ethnic Link 0.882** 0.891** 0.885**
(0.324) (0.321) (0.324)
CYFE Yes Yes Yes
N 16523 16523 16523
R2 0.690 0.690 0.690
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade;
Ethnic Link is instrumented by Shared Network; Religious data comes from
Maoz and Henderson (2013); ln(Distance), Landlocked, Island, Border,
Language, Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA, and Group are all included.
B.4 Ethnic Variable Construction
The fluid nature of ethnicity and potential subjectivity of ethnic groupings presents a prob-
lem for the definition of the ethnic variables used in this chapter. To confront this, I test
the sensitivity of the results to variations in both population thresholds and ethnic group
definitions. The results of three specifications making these adjustments are presented in
Table 1.15.
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The first two columns present results for variations in the population threshold. In the
benchmark specification the existence of any population, regardless of how small, is used
as the threshold for the presence of an ethnic group. In the first column, this threshold
is raised to 1000 people. The results produce a lower magnitude for the coefficient, but
it can not be said to be significantly different from the value in the specification with the
lower threshold. Similarly, raising the population threshold to 10000 people in the second
column does not change the results.
The definition of ethnicity used in this chapter is one that favours self-identification of
the groups themselves, potentially leading to more splits between groups (and therefore
more individual groups). The specification in the third column changes the definition of
an ethnic group to a broader view of what constitutes an ethnicity. This clumps previously
individual ethnicities into larger groups, reducing the number of ethnic groups in the data
to 2209. Despite this broader view of what constitutes a unique ethnic group, the effect of
a common ethnicity on trade is not significantly different from the baseline specification
in Table 1.5.




Ethnic Link 0.649** 0.837** 0.711**
(0.321) (0.329) (0.289)
CYFE Yes Yes Yes
N 16063 15104 14654
R2 0.697 0.696 0.663
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade;
Ethnic Link is instrumented by Shared Network; ln(Distance), Landlocked,
Island, Border, Language, Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA, and Group
are all included.
B.5 Alternative Distance Measures
The gravity model relies on distance as a variable to capture generalised transport costs
between countries. This can make the results sensitive to the measure of distance used,
particularly given the variety of ways to measure distance between two countries. The
measure used in this chapter is the direct great-circle distance as measured between the
capitals of the countries. In order to test the robustness of the results to variations in
this measure, three other distance variables are also constructed. The results of these are
presented in Table 1.16.
Column 1 includes the first of these: the direct great-circle distance between the largest
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cities of each country. This captures the distance between the main economic hubs of the
countries, as opposed to the political capitals which may not be the centres of commerce.
The use of this measure does not change the results for the coefficient on the Ethnic Link
variable.
Table 1.16. Alternative Distance Measures
(1) (2) (3)
Major City Centroid Transport
Ethnic Link 0.874** 0.563** 0.671**
(0.324) (0.279) (0.283)
CYFE Yes Yes Yes
N 16523 16523 16523
R2 0.690 0.692 0.695
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade;
Ethnic Link is instrumented by Shared Network; ln(Distance), Landlocked,
Island, Border, Language, Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA, and Group
are all included.
The second column presents the results for centroid-based distance. This distance is
calculated as the great-circle distance between the geographic centroids of the countries.
This accounts for the fact that capitals and major cities may not be located near the middle
of countries and so the distance may not capture the distance needing to be travelled to
reach a border, this is particularly acute in large countries and countries that are oriented
along a particular axis. The use of this distance measure reduces the coefficient on Ethnic
Link, but it remains strongly positive and significant. Despite the reduction in value it
cannot be statistically distinguished from the main results in Table 1.5.
The last column displays the results for a more complex, transport-based measure of
distance. This distance uses data from the CERDI database which consists of raw distance
data for three relevant measures: 1) the distance between the two countries’ relevant ports;
2) the distance between the port and capital of each country; 3) the land distance between
the capitals of the two relevant countries. In cases of landlocked countries that do not
possess their own territorial port, the foreign port that is most used as an entrepôt by the
specific country is identified and distances are calculated using it.
The distance between the two relevant ports of a bilateral pair is calculated in kilo-
metres using regularly used sea lanes for shipping cargo. The distance between port and
capital for each individual country is determined in kilometres using the most direct road
route between the two points. These three distances (the distance between ports and the
distance between port and capital for the two countries in a given pair) are then summed
to achieve the total surface travel distance for the trading pair. In cases where the land
distance (calculated as the distance between the two capitals of the relevant countries via
major road systems within each country) between two countries is shorter than the sum
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of the two capital-port distances, it is assumed that an over-land route would be primarily
used for trade and this distance is used.
The inclusion of this measure for distance also reduces the magnitude of the coefficient
for a common Ethnic Link, but it remains positive and significant. Again, despite the
reduction in magnitude, it is not statistically different from the main results.
B.6 Zero Trade and Missing Data
Trade flow data can present a significant number of zero flows or missing values. Due to
the logarithmic transformation of the gravity model, these data points are excluded from
the standard analysis. This can introduce selection bias in the results when only strictly
positive values are analysed. To address this issue of bias Silva and Tenreyro (2006)
develop a non-linear estimation technique using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
method (PPML). With this technique, the model is estimated in an exponential form so
that trade flows between countries can be estimated in levels, maintaining the zero flow
values. This modified estimation equation is given by:
E(Xijt) = exp{β0 + α ln(YitYjt) + β1 ln(dij)
+ β2landij + β4isleij + β5bordij
+ γ1ethnij + γ2langij + γ3colij
+ θ1currijt + θ2custijt + θ3rtaijt + θ4grpijt
+ µi + µj + νt + εijt}
The dataset used in this chapter has very few zero values for the trade variable (22
cases or 0.009% of total available observations), but the number of missing values is higher
(8150 cases or 31.6% of total available observations). In order to check the robustness of
the original OLS estimation, I use two variations of the PPML model. In the first, I
use the traditional method to include the zero-value cases in the estimation. The second
variation replaces all missing values for the trade variable with zeros and re-estimates the
PPML equation. This is done to account for the possibility that missing values in the data
could merely be misinterpreted zeros. The results of these two estimations are presented
in Table 1.17 along with the original linearised model for comparison. In both cases the
coefficients are slightly larger indicating that rather than over-estimating the effect, as is
more common in gravity models, the OLS specification appears to be under-estimating it.
This seems to indicate that countries without shared ethnicities tend to not only trade
less, but also tend to not trade.
B.7 Regional Sensitivity
Due to the geographic nature of ethnic distributions, the sensitivity of the results to
regional variations in the sample is an important element. It is possible that some regions
have specific ethnic groups that are large and widely distributed across multiple countries,
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Table 1.17. PPML Results
(1) (2) (3)
OLS PPML PPML+
Ethnic Link 0.495** 0.661** 0.705**
(0.163) (0.187) (0.189)
CYFE Yes Yes Yes
N 16523 16893 22970
R2 0.451 0.808 0.810
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade;
Ethnic Link is a dummy variable; ln(Distance), Landlocked, Island, Border,
Language, Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA, and Group are all included.
potentially skewing the results. To explore this I drop some regions from the sample that
have unique features with respect to ethnic distributions and so may be disproportionately
influencing the effects. These results are presented in Table 1.18.
The first column of this table presents the results just for sub-Saharan Africa, excluding
North African countries from the sample. The second column expands this to also exclude
Sahelian countries from the sample. These two regions (North Africa and the Sahel) have
a number of ethnic groups that are widely distributed across many countries within the
regions (such as the Tuareg) and excluding them tests the sensitivity of the results to
the presence of these types of ethnic distributions. As the first two columns show, the
coefficients are not significantly different from the baseline estimation. The third column
excludes West Africa, a region that has many different ethnic groups that are frequently
shared between smaller countries. Excluding this region tests the sensitivity of the results
to this type of frequent sharing of ethnic groups. The results in this case also remain
unchanged from the baseline. Finally, Southern Africa was excluded as it also has fewer
ethnicities that tend to be distributed among larger countries but it lacks the geographic
element of the Sahara. Though the coefficient is larger in magnitude, it is not found to be
significantly different from the baseline estimation.
B.8 Variations in Sample Period
I also test the sensitivity of the results to variations in the time period of the sample.
Figure 1.5 presents the coefficients for year cross-sections of the data estimated indepen-
dently. The coefficients tend to be larger towards the end of the sample, but they fluctuate
around the baseline coefficient estimate (the blue line). An exception to this is the co-
efficient for the year 2001 which is anomalously negative (despite not being significant).
An explanation for this discrepancy could be related to the sensitivity of informal net-
works to fluctuations in global trade trends. Global trade in 2001 experienced a sharp
decline across most countries and it is possible that this effect could be more pronounced
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Table 1.18. Regional Robustness Checks




Ethnic Link 0.713** 0.965** 0.860* 1.032**
(0.337) (0.363) (0.467) (0.350)
CYFE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11210 8573 8529 10905
R2 0.666 0.697 0.699 0.698
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade; Ethnic
Link is instrumented by Shared Network; ln(Distance), Landlocked, Island, Border,
Language, Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA, and Group are all included.
between countries that rely on informal networks (such as ethnic networks) to promote
trade rather than more formal institutional relationships that would be able to weather a
downturn more effectively.
Figure 1.5. Year Cross-section Coefficients
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total bilateral trade;
Ethnic Link is instrumented by Shared Network.
I supplement this with broader cross-sectional estimations based on averages over mul-
tiple years in the sample. These estimations average the time-varying variables over the
47
CHAPTER I. BRIDGING NEW DIVIDES: ETHNIC LINKAGES AND TRADE IN
AFRICA
given sub-period of years and estimate the IV model as a cross-section. Table 1.19 presents
the results for two different periods. The first column averages across the entire sample
(1995-2012) while the second column contains results for the final 10 years of the sample
period (2003-2012). The coefficients in both cases are positive and significant. Though
they are larger in magnitude than those in the main estimation, they are not found to be
significantly different from the baseline results.
Table 1.19. Year Average Cross-sections
(1) (2)
1995-2012 2003-2012





Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
country-pair level
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of
total bilateral trade; Ethnic Link is instrumented by
Shared Network; ln(Distance), Landlocked, Island,
Border, Language, Colony, Currency, Customs, RTA,
and Group are all included.
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C Appendix: Historical Trade Networks
C.1 Historical Background
The idea that cultural groups can facilitate trade through intra-cultural networks in Africa
has a long historical tradition. There is much anecdotal evidence in the literature on the
commercial dominance of various ethnic groups in certain places and at certain times. The
networks created by these groups have been attested through the early modern period,
but also pre-date colonialism. This historical literature broadly focuses on five commercial
areas which can be collapsed into three general regions: 1) North Africa, West Africa,
and the Sahel; 2) Central Africa (which is sub-divided into: a) the Congo Basin, b) the
East African Coast, and c) South-East Africa); and 3) the Horn of Africa. Below are
brief historical sketches of trade and commerce in each region.23 These regions are created
organically by the data on trade posts and the connections between them. They are
effectively five semi-isolated clusters of trade posts that are connected to each other and
rarely (if at all) to posts in other clusters.
C.1.1 North Africa, West Africa, and the Sahel The various networks that link
together in the northern half of Africa are some of the best attested networks on the
continent. Records of trade routes linking the North African coast to the Sahel through
the Sahara date back to ancient times. Documented links between these networks and
the West African coast go back nearly as far. Throughout the medieval and early modern
periods, cities in these areas maintained strong trade networks with each other for goods
of all kinds. While the most commonly attested forms of trade were the export of gold,
slaves, and salt for manufactured and luxury goods, this is primarily due to that part of
trade being of most interest to those documenting it. Despite this cash-crop bias, trade
in all kinds of other goods are documented by both local sources and outside observers.
The value of these trade routes and the prosperity they created for the cities along them
led to the rise of many empires and powerful states. In the west, the Malian empire and
later the Songhai empire rose to dominate the Niger valley while in the east Kanem-Bornu
emerged to control the area around Lake Chad. Between these extremities the various
Hausa kingdoms expanded as major ports of call for the trans-Saharan trade. On the
West African coast many cities and kingdoms exerted power through monopolisation of
export goods or dominance of major trade posts. The various Akan kingdoms derived
their power from dominance in the gold trade, while the cities along the coast and in the
Niger delta gained power by serving as major entrepôts for early European traders.
C.1.2 Central Africa Trade networks in the region of Central Africa are more com-
plex in their interaction than in either of the other two regions. Networks in this region
23For a more complete discussion of historical linkages between cities in these regions see Austen (2010),
Bovill (1995), Chirikure (2017), Coquery-Vidrovitch (2005), Gray and Birmingham (1970), King and van
Zwanenberg (1975), and Ogot (1974).
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can be subdivided into three areas: a) the Congo Basin, b) the East African Coast, and
c) South-East Africa. The difficulty derives from the fact that while trade routes and
networks within these three areas are relatively well attested and documented in the pre-
colonial period the links between the areas are not. Often, the links that do exist are
between cities in two of the three areas which heavily imply connections to the third (A
is connected to B in one source; B is connected to C in a different source; but the link
between A and C directly is missing). Similarly, there are many more cities within each
area that are attested to in isolation of the wider region than there are cities included in
networks between the areas (and therefore linking the region together). Conversely, there
are cities that are discussed solely in their relation to the wider regional links and not in
terms of any connection to local area networks. Below, are brief descriptions of each area
in isolation.
a) Congo Basin Trade networks in the Congo basin area were primarily focused on
trade between the interior and the coast. This was largely driven by the export of metals,
ivory, and slaves for manufactured goods and luxury items. Resources from the interior
and the wider Congolese watershed moved up and down the river system to be traded
at the coastal ports. While trade is often attested as being oriented towards western
coastal cities, there is evidence of trade with the eastern coast and the south-eastern
networks. The wealth of these networks gave rise to numerous cities and settlements
that participated either in the extraction of raw materials or as way-stations along the
sometimes circuitous routes. Kingdoms such as Kongo in the west and Luba in the east
profited from their positions along these routes and their power expanded further after
the arrival of European traders. Other kingdoms, such as the Lunda Empire in the south-
central Congo basin benefited through extraction of resources for trade and rich deposits
of metals and other goods.
b) East African Coast The East African coast has been a principal trade hub since
antiquity. It was called Azania in the Greco-Roman period and has been attested to
in numerous sources throughout history. The eventual rise of Swahili city-states on the
coast and settlements on offshore islands was a direct result of the prosperity created by
the trade networks of the Indian Ocean. These cities would serve as points of exchange,
buying goods from the interior and then selling them onwards to their networks in the
Indian Ocean. Raw materials such as ivory, spices, timber, and gold would make their way
from these ports into the Indian Ocean in return for finished goods such as silk, porcelain,
and cotton textiles but also other raw materials like coffee, pepper, and sandalwood. As a
result of this trade the cities of Bagamoyo, Kilwa, Mzizima, Malindi, Mombasa, Pangani,
and Tanga became some of the richest cities in the region. While kingdoms such as
Buganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Maravi centred on agriculture and raw materials rose in
the interior.
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c) South-East Africa South-East African trade networks grew around trade in ivory
and precious metals, primarily gold from the southern parts of the area and copper from
the northern parts. This trade also focused on exporting raw materials for manufactures
and luxury items, creating incredibly wealthy kingdoms. Control of lucrative gold fields
led to the rise of kingdoms based on its extraction and trade such as Mutapa and Butua,
while further to the south-west the Mapungubwe and later Zimbabwe kingdoms controlled
the trade in ivory and various metals. While this area was largely linked into coastal
trade with the Indian Ocean, routes and networks attested to mention primarily southern
coastal ports, separating it from the primary activity on the East African coast. Despite
this, there are documented links with the more northern sections of coast and the deeper
interior of the Congo basin.
C.1.3 The Horn of Africa While not as significant a region as the others mentioned,
the Horn of Africa is considered separately from Northern Africa more generally due to its
unique position and orientation. While the networks in the north of Africa were largely
oriented towards the Mediterranean or the Atlantic coast, the networks in this region
were, since ancient times, heavily connected to the Arabian peninsula and the Indian
subcontinent. Since the Iron Age, what are now northern Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea
were a significant source of valuable incense and spices and the commercial and political
connections to the southern tip of the Arabian peninsula date to this era. In this sense,
the Horn of Africa’s orientation was distinctly different from that of the majority of pre-
colonial trade in the northern half of Africa; but it was also distinct from the networks
of Central Africa with many of its trade routes having only weakly implied connections
to the wider Central African networks until the arrival of the Portuguese, and later the
Omanis.
C.2 Instrumental Variable Construction
Constructing a dataset of pre-colonial24 trade centres and routes in Africa requires the
accumulation of relevant data from a disparate set of sources. This naturally runs into
problems given that different sources will emphasise different centres within the various
areas and different routes depending on the purpose of the document’s narrative. This is a
more significant challenge for trade centres that are more minor or regional in nature and
not connected to larger networks, therefore being less likely to feature in discussions of
trade in wider regions. In order to overcome this problem a diverse set of sources dealing
with a range of issues and locations is used in an effort to obtain a multidimensional
perspective of trade centres and routes on the continent.25
In order to assemble a meaningful dataset for the instrument, each settlement (here-
after referred to as trade posts) is identified and assigned a set of geographic coordinates
24The information used spans the medieval period up until the early nineteenth century.
25Sources included Bovill (1995), Chirikure (2017), Coquery-Vidrovitch (2005), Gray and Birmingham
(1970), King and van Zwanenberg (1975), and Ogot (1974).
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corresponding to its location. The routes connecting each trade post to another trade post
are less helpful in the broader construction of the instrument beyond being indicators for
which network a given trade post is a part of. The reason for this is two fold: first, the
accuracy with which the exact route between any two trade posts is recorded is highly
suspect and conditioned on the attentiveness of the recorder, the time it was recorded
(as routes can change), and other idiosyncratic factors; and second, the idea that there
existed only one route between any two trade posts is an unjustified oversimplification of
how trade would flow between any two sites. For these reasons, the routes between any
two sites are not used directly in the analysis and are presented as straight lines (in Figure
1.1) for clarity of illustrating the various networks.
For a given trade post to be considered part of a larger network, it must be connected in
some way to that network. This is how the five area networks, and three regional networks,
are constructed and where the problems regarding the Central African region identified
previously emerge. The difficulty with the scarcity of attested connections between the
three areas within the Central African region means that there are three ways in which a
trade post can be classified within the region: 1) the trade post can be mentioned only in
reference to its area; 2) the trade post can be mentioned only as a member of the wider
regional network; and, 3) the trade post can be indicated to be a part of both an area
network and the wider regional network. The approach chosen to deal with this issue is
the path of least assumptions. The network membership of each trade post is accepted at
face value with as little interpolation of wider linkages as possible. This creates a situation
where the three areas are each themselves considered a network and the wider region is
considered an additional network. Trade posts are able to be members of either or both of
their area network and the wider regional network. This creates a situation where there are
in fact six total networks within the data, corresponding to the regions of North Africa,
the Horn of Africa, the areas of the Congo Basin, the East African Coast, South-East
Africa, and the wider region of Central Africa. Trade posts classified as members of only
their area are not included in the Central African regional network and trade posts that
are classified as only members of the Central African regional network are not included
in any potential area network. Trade posts that overlap the two networks are included in
both their assigned area network and the regional network.
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D Appendix: Data Information
Data pertaining to ethnicity are always difficult to quantify, and Africa is no exception
to this. The difficulty exists primarily in the very subjective nature of ethnic groups, and
nowhere are the boundaries of ethnic identification more fluid than the continent of Africa.
For example: the Nyanje of Malawi speak ChiChewa and are usually considered to be a
sub-group of the Chewa ethnic group, but many researchers classify them as a separate
group. Similarly the Baoulé of Ivory Coast fall under the umbrella of the Akan people both
linguistically and ethnically; however, the Asante, another sub-group of Akan people, could
be considered separate from the coastal Akan peoples in Ghana. This fluidity of division
from country to country poses many problems in terms of ethnic classification between
and within countries. This appendix details the dataset and data collection process for
the ethnic data used in this paper.
D.1 Data Composition
Due to the fluidity and inconsistency inherent in many ethnic classifications, ethnic data for
countries in Africa can be difficult to come by. Often domestic census data does not contain
ethnic information; and when it does, the information can be imprecise or incomplete. A
single source of ethnic data for the countries concerned is necessary to avoid problems
that could come from using different and unreconciled data sources, including differing
degrees of accuracy. Fortunately, missionary groups within the continent track multitudes
of data, particularly on conversion rates to their chosen religion. One group (The Joshua
Project)26 possesses two qualities which make its data useful for the purposes of this study:
it is pan-African in its scope and it maintains data on all groups of people (not just those
it has converted).
This organisation has compiled data on ethnic groups in every country of the world,
combining data from numerous sources to create a complete record of the population levels
of each ethnic group for each country. The database uses national census data as a base and
supplements this with significant input from local in-country experts and researchers. This
takes advantage of a uniquely local understanding of ethnic groups and ethnic divisions
within countries and provides a level of country-specific detail to the data that other
datasets may lack. The data are cross-checked with larger ethnolinguistic datasets such as
Ethnologue, the World Factbook, and UN sources to verify and correct any inconsistencies
in the locally gathered information.
The data come standardised at a rough level and are formatted to be consistent across
countries. The raw dataset errs on the side of splitting groups rather than combining
them, which generally increases the representativeness of the data. By including sub-
groups as potentially separate ethnic groups, there is less chance of any individual group
26More information about the raw data can be found at https://joshuaproject.net.
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being missed or subsumed into a larger group. The population figures in the dataset are
current for the year 2012.
D.2 Definition of Groups
For the purposes of this chapter the raw data need to be rendered usable in a cross-
country comparison of ethnic groups, leading to a more refined and standardised dataset.
The granular structure of the data includes all self-identified groups in a given country and
the total population within each of these groups. The propensity for the raw data to split
and uniquely identify local groups means that groups that are shared between countries are
not always identified as such due to differing local names and identifiers. There are three
general cases of this type of splitting: different local names, different language identifiers,
and different sub-group identification.
Local Names The first source of splitting is the use of different local names in different
jurisdictions for the same ethnic group. This is a common practice, particularly for groups
that are present in many countries with local languages (and different national languages)
creating different terms for the same group. The Fulbe people are a prime example of this,
with different names in different countries based on both local languages and national
languages. Former French colonies tend to categorise them using the the French term
‘Peul’, while English-speaking countries tend to use the terms ‘Fulani’ or ‘Fulbe’. Adding
complexity, different local languages also use different terms with Bambara-speaking ju-
risdictions using the term ‘Fulaw’ and Wolof-speaking areas sometimes using the name
‘Pël’. These differences in local names do not signify differences in the ethnic groups they
describe and so are reconciled across the different jurisdictions in order to standardise the
ethnic composition of countries.
Language Identifiers A second splitting feature is the division of ethnic groups along
linguistic lines. This is where ethnic groups that are largely homogenous are split due
to differences in local dialect or lingua franca. An example of this are the Hutu people
which are divided between the mutually intelligible dialects of Kirundi and Kinyarwanda.
This division and other divisions along English, French, or Portuguese lines are linguistic
divisions overlaid on ethnic categories. Since the focus of this chapter is ethnic group
connections rather than linguistic group connections, these linguistic splits are grouped
together into the common ethnic definition.
Sub-group Identification The final type of splitting is the selective use and reporting
of ethnic sub-groups between jurisdictions. This is where different countries or areas use
different levels of identification for ethnic groups with some jurisdictions splitting relatively
broad groups into more specific sub-groups and other jurisdictions using the broader cat-
egories. For example, the Akan group in West Africa is split in different ways between
different countries (with sub-groups such as the Fante and Akwamu reported in some
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countries and not others). For the purposes of this chapter, this type of splitting is accom-
modated through the grouping of the various sub-groups within the broader ethnic group.
In terms of reconciling these splits and handling the cases of overlapping ethnic identi-
ties or sub-groups of larger populations I have employed whichever grouping is considered
standard, balanced with the commonly recorded impressions of the groups themselves.
Often, this amounts to whether a sub-group is large enough to be considered distinctly
separate. This has resulted in situations such as the Baoulé not being included with the
Asante within the Akan group, while the Nyanje are combined with the Chewa; and the
various sub-groups (such as the Jelgoobe and Wodaabe, among many others) in West
Africa being considered parts of the larger Fulbe group.
While this has led to some clumping of smaller groups and naturally increases the
number of countries sharing one ethnic group, I believe the method employed best preserves
the potential effect of an ethnic group on trade networks and is shown to be robust to
different population thresholds and types of group clumping. This process resulted in
the creation of 2381 different ethnic classifications for the continent from an original set
of approximately 3700; it is done with an eye to maintaining self-identification within
groups, as this self-identification and understanding of commonality at the micro-level is
the primary pathway through which an ethnic network would be forged.
D.3 Potential Measurement Error
The subjectivity of ethnic data and the judgements made in compiling it introduce the po-
tential for several sources of measurement error. The first of these sources is the structure
of the core dataset. The difficulty in combining several sources of ethnic group population
data presents the potential for inconsistencies across the groups recorded as discussed in
the previous subsection. The efforts taken in this chapter to harmonise these issues help
to ameliorate this problem to some extent, but there remains the risk that certain groups
will be miscounted or go uncounted.
The second source of potential measurement error is in the process undertaken to
combine and divide the groups from the raw data to create consistency in ethnic group
categorisation across countries. This process is necessarily arbitrary to some extent and
there is no method that will be universally accepted. In this chapter I have sought to
maintain local identity and create groups in line with commonly accepted and self-identified
attachments. This does not make the process free from error.
Despite these risks, the data and the process to construct it is relatively robust to these
issues. This is particularly true in terms of the potential problems around clumping and
splitting, with the data being demonstrably robust to different group divisions. While the
potential for measurement errors is relatively small in terms of shared ethnicities across
countries due to the aggregation involved in constructing the variables, they cannot be
completely discounted.
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Table 1.20. List of Countries
Algeria Guinea South Africa
Angola Guinea-Bissau South Sudan
Benin Kenya Sudan
Botswana Lesotho Swaziland
Burkina Faso Liberia Tanzania
Burundi Libya Togo
Cameroon Madagascar Tunisia
Cape Verde Malawi Uganda
Central African Republic Mali Zambia
Chad Mauritania Zimbabwe
Comoros Mauritius













Interrupted Lines: Conflict, Trade
Flows, and Transport Costs
1 Introduction
Transport costs are an important factor in determining trade flows, but they are frequently
thought of as the cost of shipping goods from one country to another, including freight
costs, transport time, and insurance. In practice however, transport costs also include
many more indirect costs: administrative paper work, regulatory compliance, logistical
considerations, network costs, information costs, and uncertainty. One important, yet
often overlooked, aspect of these costs is the presence of conflict, particularly if the conflict
lies along trade routes needed to access external markets. Conflict can have an important
impact on trade costs, and consequently trade flows themselves. Landlocked countries in
particular need access to external markets via trade routes through other countries and
their ports. The case of Malawi in Figure 2.1 demonstrates this clearly. The threat of
conflict along Malawi’s lines of trade through Mozambique caused significant disruption to
economic activity and trade during the Mozambican Civil War. Malawi, as a landlocked
country, was particularly vulnerable to disruptions as it did not have alternative access
to global markets through its own ports. For countries such as these, conflict along their
trade lines can have a substantial impact on their ability to access markets for trade.
Analysing these effects is the objective of this chapter.
To approach this issue, this chapter uses a modified version of the gravity model with
aggregated trade data to test the impact of adjacent conflict on trade flows into and out of
countries. Critically, I exploit the geographic elements of both country location and conflict
location to identify the impact of conflict on trade routes. Adjacent conflict is potentially
more disruptive for a landlocked country than a coastal country as it can disrupt trade
routes and access to external markets. Additionally, adjacent conflict in a country that
is coastal (shoreward) is more disruptive as it explicitly blocks access to external ports
needed by landlocked countries to export and import goods.
I use the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset to construct conflict
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variables for both direct and adjacent conflict effects. The results indicate that there is a
strong negative effect of adjacent conflict on trade. This effect appears to be stronger for
landlocked countries and in particular when the adjacent conflict is in a coastal country.
This provides evidence for a supply-driven effect on trade in which the adjacent conflict is
disrupting trade routes and the access of affected countries to international markets.
The identification strategy rests on disentangling the different impacts of adjacent
conflict though differences in geography. I address concerns about time-varying omitted
variables at the country level and at the wider regional level by incorporating variables
to capture changes in institutions and trade agreements. While the baseline findings are
re-enforced by the inclusion of these indicators, they are not robust to controlling for more
general regional trends. The spatial nature of the identification strategy makes it difficult
to fully distinguish the effects of adjacent conflict from these wider regional trends.
This chapter contributes to the literature by seeking to explicitly disentangle the differ-
ent effects of adjacent conflict on trade and exploring the specific effect of adjacent conflict
on trade routes and the ability of countries to access external markets. This is closest to
the work of Marano et al. (2013) which looks at the production impacts of conflict in ad-
jacent countries and Qureshi (2013) which explores the effect of adjacent conflict on trade
from a demand-oriented perspective. This chapter supplements Marano et al. (2013) by
expanding the scope of the effect of adjacent conflict to trade flows and transportation
costs (after production). The primary focus of this chapter is the effect of adjacent con-
flict on trade routes and transport costs, complementing the work of Qureshi (2013) by
adding a supply-focused perspective to the discussion of the effects of conflict on trade in
neighbouring countries. In pursuing this, the results of this chapter present evidence for
an impact of adjacent conflict on trade flows through a supply-oriented channel involving
transportation costs and the disruption of trade routes.
Much of the existing research on the relationship between trade and conflict deals with
the negative impact conflict has on trade flows when one of the trade partners experiences
a conflict. This generally builds on the ‘Democratic Peace’ tradition and its extensions in
political economy.1 This has expanded into the economics literature with Goenner (2011)
providing a bridge by investigating the endogenous nature of trade as a variable in a study
on its effectiveness at reducing conflict. Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) and Mirza and
Verdier (2008) have expanded this to include the negative effects of terrorism; while Bayer
and Rupert (2004) find similar results for civil wars. Counter to the prevailing results
are some studies (Garfinkel et al., 2008; Bah and Tapsoba, 2010) that look at possible
short-run positive effects from direct conflict exposure.
Few papers expand beyond these direct effects into the impact of adjacent conflict on
trade flows. Literature that does touch on the impact of conflict in adjacent countries
tends to focus on other economic factors such as growth or income effects.2 Parallel
1See Oneal and Russet (1997), Oneal and Russet (1999a), Oneal and Russet (1999b), and Hegre et al.
(2010) among others.
2Ades and Chua (1997), Murdoch and Sandler (2002), Murdoch and Sandler (2004), Collier and Hoeffler
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to this are investigations of more complex relationships between direct conflict and trade
such as Kang and Reuveny (2001), Blomberg and Hess (2006) and Glick and Taylor (2010)
which all extend the analysis of direct conflict on trade from bilateral pairs to multi-lateral
clusters. Notable exceptions to this are Marano et al. (2013) and Qureshi (2013) which
address the impact of adjacent conflict explicitly.
Connected to this work are the linked issues of trade diversion and trade creation. Most
of this research deals with the effects of trade agreements and their potential to divert and
create trade within and between trade blocs. Discussion of the issues of trade diversion
and creation constitute a broad literature that dates back to the work of Viner (1950)
and Balassa (1967).3 This includes work on the effects of traditional trade agreements
as in Clausing (2001) and Datta and Kouliavtsev (2009); as well as more comprehensive
agreements such as the European common market covered by Haveman and Hummels
(1998) and Kahouli and Maktouf (2015). Magee (2008) and Eicher et al. (2012) take
this work further with the inclusion of counter-factual analysis and Bayesian techniques
to improve the estimations. This chapter addresses some of these related issues from a
different direction by focusing on the hindering of trade flows and the interruption of trade
routes.
Transport costs are important factors in shaping trade flows between countries and are
central to the effect of conflict on trade. Significant work has contributed to the robustness
of gravity models and documented the effects of transport costs and transport technology.4
First among these is Engel and Rogers (1996) which identifies a generalised ‘border effect’
in transporting goods to other countries. Of note are Hummels and Schaur (2013) and
Feyrer (2019), which both look at the effect of progressively decreasing air transport costs
on bilateral trade, while Pascali (2017) investigates the gains in trade made due to the
introduction of steam vessels during the nineteenth century. In the other direction, Feyrer
(2009) looks at the impact of the closure of the Suez Canal during the 1967 Six-Day War on
oceanic trade. This literature has even been extended further back to trade in the ancient
world with Barjamovic et al. (2019). I build on the effects in these papers by adding
adjacent conflict as a contributing factor to changes in transportation costs experienced
by countries.
This chapter is divided into six sections. The following section provides a discussion
on the mechanisms by which conflict impacts trade. Section 3 outlines the empirical
approach and the data is covered in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results while Section
6 concludes.
(2004), and De Groot (2010) are all examples of this trend.
3Panagariya (2000) provides a comprehensive survey of the literature.
4For a more extensive survey of literature on gravity models and transport costs, see Head and Mayer
(2014).
59
CHAPTER II. INTERRUPTED LINES: CONFLICT, TRADE FLOWS, AND
TRANSPORT COSTS
2 Mechanisms
Conflict in adjacent countries can impact the trade of a given country through two different
channels: supply and demand. The supply channel is connected to market access and the
ability to move goods in and out of the country whereas the demand channel is connected to
the availability of markets for the goods traded. This section discusses these two channels
in more detail and a methodology for disentangling the two effects.
Supply The supply effects of adjacent conflict relate primarily to the disruption of the
flow of goods or increased costs associated with transporting them. The first of these
involves interruption of trade routes through damage or threat to infrastructure needed to
transport goods into and out of the country. This can include minor impacts on shipping
at ports near the border and more major impacts on road and rail networks that travel
through the conflict zone to reach a port. This can directly disrupt trade by preventing
goods from travelling in or out of the country, but it can also increase trade costs by
forcing importers and exporters to use more expensive, second best routes and methods
of moving goods increasing trade costs and decreasing total trade flows. Additionally, the
presence of a conflict zone may not always physically disrupt infrastructure or block trade
routes, it can also increase the cost of transporting goods through the conflict zone. This
includes costs such as increased insurance, stronger security, or more difficult logistical
challenges.
Figure 2.1. Mozambican Civil War, South-East Africa
Note: Countries of south-eastern Africa, major cities of relevant countries are
indicated.
Supply effects of this nature are common anecdotally, with the case of Malawi during
the Mozambican Civil War (1977-1992) being the most prominent. As shown in Figure 2.1,
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Malawi is a relatively small landlocked country to the west of Mozambique which contains
the ports of Beira and Nacala. These ports were, prior to the conflict, the principal
entrepôts for Malawi with important rail and road links connecting it to these ports.
During the civil war in Mozambique, these links were severed—in some cases literally,
with rail lines being ripped up by some of the combatants. This led to a significant
disruption of the ability of both Malawian exports to access foreign markets and imports
to reach the country through Beira and Nacala. This scenario, while possibly an extreme
case, is indicative of the potential supply-based problems adjacent conflict can cause.
Demand The demand effects of conflict in adjacent countries are related to a reduction
in external demand for goods impacted by the adjacent conflict. This can either be directly
related to the country being near a conflict zone or indirectly through substitution effects.
The first of these involves a reduction in demand for goods from a given country because
of its association with a conflict zone.5 This can be interpreted as a ’blood diamond’ effect
where the goods from countries near or in conflict zones are considered tainted by the
conflict, either because of perceptions that revenues from industries are fuelling conflict or
because the industries are associated with combatants directly.
In addition to this direct demand effect, there are also more indirect substitution
effects. These come from firms outside the conflict zone substituting away from goods
from the country impacted by the adjacent conflict in search of potentially more reliable
sources that would not be impacted by conflict-related disruptions. This pre-emptive shift
depresses demand for goods from countries in proximity to the conflict zone and reduces
trade.
In opposition to this is the potential for the substitution effect to work in the opposite
direction, with trade in neighbouring countries increasing as firms outside the conflict
zone substitute away from the country experiencing direct conflict. This potential would
be increased if the neighbouring countries produce similar goods and are less affected by
the supply-driven effects disrupting their trade.
These demand-driven effects are also common anecdotally with the most notable im-
pacts being on diamonds and other minerals from conflict zones during the civil wars in
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola. These all involved concerted international campaigns
to reduce the desirability of products from these regions in order to reduce the revenues
going to combatants engaged in their production.
Separating the Effects The supply effect is driven by the combined geography of
preferred trade routes and adjacent conflict. The ideal approach would combine geography,
transportation costs, and conflict incidence to compute transportation costs adjusted for
the presence of conflict. The complexity of this approach makes its use difficult with
aggregate data. A simpler, and more direct, test involves identifying the disrupting effect
5This channel is what is primarily explored in Qureshi (2013).
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of conflicts from the most apparent geographic cases: coastal countries and landlocked
countries.
Consider a hypothetical case of three countries that all neighbour each other. The
first country is a coastal country and suffers from an internal conflict. The second country
is landlocked and requires access to the first country’s ports in order to engage in trade.
The third country is coastal, and so has its own ports. The conflict in the first country
will affect trade for the other two countries. It is assumed that both of these countries
will experience demand-driven effects of the adjacent conflict. However, the effect on the
second (landlocked) country will be more severe due to the supply-driven effect because it
requires access to the first country’s ports. This difference in the total effect of adjacent
conflict between the second and third countries is the supply-driven effect.
As this hypothetical example shows, separating the demand effect from the supply
effect is contingent on two aspects of the geography of the three countries. The first is the
location of the country not in conflict: the difference between being coastal and landlocked.
The second is the relationship between the landlocked country and the country in conflict:
the country in conflict must be shoreward to the landlocked country in order for it to
have ports that the landlocked country needs access to. If the conflict country were also
landlocked (inland of the other countries) then the adjacent conflict may not produce the
difference in effects in the two other countries.
This can also be illustrated concretely with the anecdotal example shown in Figure 2.1.
Tanzania is a country along the coast, to the north of Mozambique, with three oceanic
ports—the largest by far being Dar es-Salaam. This means that Tanzania, unlike Malawi,
was not reliant on accessing Mozambican ports in order to export or import goods and so
was insulated from the conflict-based disruption to its trade of the Mozambican Civil War.
Similarly, a hypothetical conflict in Zambia (which borders Malawi but is not a coastal
nation itself) may have less impact on Malawian exports and imports than the conflict in
Mozambique, since such a conflict would not restrict access to ports and external markets
in the same way.
This chapter tests the hypothesis that adjacent conflict will negatively impact trade
for a country through the disruption of trade routes by exploiting geographic variation. As
outlined in the following section, by incorporating the location of the country (landlocked
or coastal) and the location of the conflict (shoreward or inland) the impact of adjacent
conflict through the supply channel can be isolated from other, demand-driven, impacts.
3 Empirical Approach
3.1 Gravity Framework
The goal of this chapter is to analyse the effect of adjacent conflict on a country’s trade.
There is an extensive literature using gravity models to analyse the relationship between
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trade flows and transportation costs.6 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra
(2004) present a structural gravity model relying on monopolistic competition and CES
consumer preferences, representing trade between countries as a function of the relative
size of the two economies and the transportation frictions between them. Following this








where Xijt is the total value of trade between country i and country j in year t, K is a
constant, Yit and Yjt are the total outputs of country i and j respectively in year t, Pi and
Pj are the price levels of country i and j respectively, and Tijt represents transport costs
between country i and country j. Costs, Tijt, are modelled as ‘iceberg’ transport costs
such that Tiit = 1 and Tijt ≥ 1.
The trade cost term Tijt is usually modelled as a composite (often multiplicative)
function of the various factors impacting the cost of trade including shipping costs, time,
and uncertainty or insurance costs,
Tijt = f(τijt, dij) (2.2)
The distance term, dij , is used in order to proxy for many of the transportation and
logistical costs as they tend to scale with the distance needing to be travelled. The τijt effect
often encompasses both fixed and time-varying border effects such as common institutional
variables, trade agreements, contiguity, and any other impact on trade.
For simplicity, I assume that there are two countries, a small country, i, and the rest
of the world, j. This collapses the function to one of total trade for country i with the
potential for conflict in a neighbouring country.7 With this assumption, transportation
costs keep their standard form, but now represent a more generalised cost of trade with
the rest of the world—more analogous to a market access measure—and therefore cannot
be measured by distance. In this circumstance, time-invariant trade costs can be absorbed
into country fixed effects. Similarly, the Yjt and Pj terms from Equation 2.1 are no longer
dependant on j and can be absorbed into year fixed effects.
Using this model structure, Equation 2.1 can be linearised with logs as follows
ln(Xit) = αln(YitYt) + ln(di) + ln(τit)− ln(Pi)σ−1 − ln(P )σ−1 + εit (2.3)
This model inherits all of the features of standard structural gravity models including how
to deal with the price indices Pi and P , the unobservable ‘multi-lateral resistance’ terms.
8
I include both country and year fixed effects in the estimation equations that follow to
6See Head and Mayer (2014); Feenstra (2004); Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
7Adopting this structure for the model presents some difficulties by creating an aggregate ‘trade partner’
encompassing all the individual trade partners of a given country. Despite this, it benefits from simplifying
the geographic elements used to identify the different effects that may be difficult to disentangle in a
country-pair framework.
8See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
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account for these unobservable aspects.9 As mentioned, this combination of fixed effects
absorbs the Yt, di, and P terms.
I use the τit term to include variables for direct conflict within a country and adjacent
conflict in a neighbouring country. Direct conflict is included as well in order to control
for the direct impact of conflict on trade.10 The supply- and demand-based effects are
separately identified by exploiting the geographic features of countries as discussed in
Section 2 and outlined below.
3.2 Direct and Adjacent Conflict
Using this model structure, the first estimation equation used in this analysis seeks to
identify the generalised effect of adjacent conflict by using time variation in the exposure
of one country to an adjacent conflict. Incorporating the fixed effects and conflict variables
into Equation 2.3 gives:
ln(Xit) = β1ln(Yit) + β2Confit + β3AdjConfit + ρi + ut + εit (2.4)
where Xit is the total trade (exports and imports)
11 for country i in year t, Yit is the given
country’s real GDP in year t. Transport costs are covered by two sets of terms: the time-
invariant country fixed effects (ρi) which encompasses the fixed aspects of a country’s
access to external markets and the two variables for conflict (Confit and AdjConfit).
Confit is an indicator variable for conflict within the observation country and AdjConfit
is the main variable of interest: conflict in an adjacent country. Year fixed effects are
given by ut and εit is an error term. Standard errors in this equation and all following
estimations are clustered at the region-year level.12
This equation includes the general impact of adjacent conflict on a country’s trade,
combining both the supply and demand effects. This gives some insight into how adjacent
conflict impacts trade overall and provides a point of reference for later analyses of the
separated effects.
The base model of adjacent conflict can be extended in two ways in line with the
mechanisms discussed in Section 2 to better determine the supply effects of adjacent con-
flict. First, is country geography where there is likely to be a differentiated impact on
landlocked countries as opposed to coastal countries due to a difference in ease of access to
external markets. Second, is the geography of adjacent conflict with the potential impact
of whether the conflict is taking place in an adjacent country that is shoreward or inland
to the country of observation. Conflict in shoreward countries present a different risk to
transportation routes than those that are inland to the country of observation due to their
proximity to ports and transportation routes.
9As in Glick and Rose (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), and Baier and Bergstrand (2007).
10See Marano et al. (2013), Blomberg and Hess (2006), and Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) for more
discussion of these direct effects.
11The effect of adjacent conflict on exports and imports separately is included in Appendix A.
12The regional breakdown of the world is given in Figure 2.5.
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Country Geography A difference in impact of adjacent conflict on landlocked and
coastal countries is represented by a modified version of Equation 2.4 which estimates
separate coefficients for adjacent conflict according to whether a country is landlocked or
coastal.
ln(Xit) = β1ln(Yit) + β2Confit + β3AdjConfit × Coastali
+ β4AdjConfit × Landli + ρi + ut + εit
(2.5)
The variable Landli is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the country is landlocked
and 0 otherwise. Coastali is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the country is
coastal and 0 otherwise.
The estimation in this form incorporates the differentiated effect of adjacent conflict
interacting with the location of the country.13 However, it does not impose that the conflict
must happen along the coast and so identifies this general effect of adjacent conflict on
countries where it is not disruptive (coastal countries) and countries where it is potentially
disruptive (landlocked countries).
In the hypothetical example in Section 2, this equation captures the difference in the
effect of the conflict in the first (adjacent) country for the second (landlocked) country
and the third (coastal) country. In doing so, it allows for the separation of the supply
effect from the demand effect as this difference between the impact of adjacent conflict on
landlocked and coastal countries.
The difference between the supply and demand effects is given here by the difference in
coefficients on AdjConfit×Landli and AdjConfit×Coastali. This captures the difference
caused by the supply effect in landlocked countries in addition to the more general demand
effects across all countries.
Conflict Geography The second scenario involves the incorporation of two different
adjacent conflict variables: one for conflict in an adjacent country that is shoreward; and
one for conflict in an adjacent country that is inland.
ln(Xit) = β1ln(Yit) + β2Confit
+ β3AdjConf
S
it × Coastali + β4AdjConfSit × Landli
+ β5AdjConf
L
it × Coastali + β6AdjConfLit × Landli
+ ρi + ut + εit
(2.6)
The superscripts attached to the AdjConfit variable indicate whether the conflict is taking
place in an adjacent country that is shoreward (S) or inland (L).
This estimation captures the more detailed effect of the location of the adjacent conflict
on trade. The difference between coastal and landlocked nations from Equation 2.5 remains
13The effect of direct conflict (Confit) interacted with the location of the country (Landli or Coastali)
is also performed. Direct conflict has a significantly more negative impact on trade in landlocked countries
as compared to coastal countries, and landlocked countries remain more affected by adjacent conflict than
coastal countries. These results are presented in Appendix A.
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with the addition of whether the conflict itself takes place in a shoreward or inland country.
This adds the last element discussed in the hypothetical case in Section 2, that the first
(adjacent) country should be shoreward to the second (landlocked) country so that it has
ports that the second (landlocked) country needs access to.
In this equation, the supply effect can then be separated from the demand effect by
the difference between the coefficients on AdjConfSit ×Landli and AdjConfSit ×Coastali.
This represents the difference caused by disruption to trade routes and port access for the
landlocked country.
3.3 Identification
The models presented in this chapter all incorporate country and year fixed effects, captur-
ing constant unobserved heterogeneity across countries and years. The analysis exploits
the country-time variation of adjacent conflict at the country level and so is unsuitable for
the incorporation of fixed effects for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity across coun-
tries.
Two elements of omitted variation that are not easily captured by country and year
fixed effects are country-specific and region-specific factors that could impact both trade
flows and the propensity for conflict. Political institutions can influence the proliferation
of conflict or the scale of a country’s involvement in the world economy. Trade agreements
can create trade relationships that may be more robust to the disruptions in trade flows
presented by conflicts. Regional trends, such as growth or investment, can drive trade
and suppress the potential for conflict. Accounting for these factors is discussed in the
robustness checks presented in Section 5.2.
Related to this, is the potential for conflict to spill across borders causing countries
not experiencing conflict to nevertheless be impacted by it. This creates the risk for an
imperfect separation of countries that are affected by the conflict from those that are not.
These spillover effects do not generally seem to manifest as additional conflicts, as the
evidence in Section 4.3 appears to indicate; but this does not remove the possibility of
an effect. The inclusion of the direct conflict variable in the estimation controls for this
potential spillover in the country of observation. Wider spillover effects are more difficult
to manage beyond region-specific effects. However, it is likely that if countries were to be
negatively affected by conflict spillovers, it would bias the results downward leading to the
underestimation of the effect of adjacent conflict on trade flows.
The question of reverse causality is of significance when dealing with issues of trade
and conflict due to the potential for trade to reduce the incidence of conflict between
countries.14 Ideally, issues of reverse causation could be eliminated through the selection
of conflicts that are truly exogenous to economic outcomes in the country. This would
ensure that they are not derived from or ameliorated by trade flows or the possible wealth
and growth generated by such flows. Unfortunately, this would likely exclude far too many
14See Oneal and Russet (1999a) and Hegre et al. (2010) for a discussion of this effect.
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conflicts as the role of domestic economic outcomes in generating and sustaining conflict
is well documented, particularly internal conflict.15 Despite this, it is mostly a concern
with the issue of direct conflict: conflict in the country of interest or various direct trade
partners. The fact that this analysis deals primarily with adjacent conflict minimises this
issue to some extent. Regardless, there remains the potential for some regional factors,
such as wealth derived from trade flows, to reduce the incidence of conflict.
This then raises the issue of aggregation, since the structure of the data in this chapter
means that the ‘third-country’ experiencing conflict is included in the aggregate trade flows
of the observation country. This leaves open the possibility that the observed decrease in
trade is actually driven by a decrease in bilateral trade between the country of observation
and the country experiencing the conflict. The existence of an adjacent conflict effect
in bilateral data (where the conflict country is truly a third-country) would dispel this
possibility. A second solution is the removal of all direct trade with adjacent countries
experiencing conflict when aggregating the trade partners. The results of both these
solutions demonstrate that the effect is in fact one of adjacent conflict impacting trade
with other countries and not a mis-categorisation of direct conflict.16
4 Data
4.1 Conflict
In order to measure conflict within countries (both direct and adjacent) I use the Major
Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset (Marshall, 2019). This dataset includes
measures for various types of conflict within and between all the countries listed in Ta-
ble 2.15 since 1946. This chapter covers the period 1962 to 2012, well within the range
covered in the MEPV data. These years are selected based on trade data availability
and that by 1962 the majority of European colonial possessions were independent. Each
type of conflict is coded on a scale from 0 to 10 with higher numbers indicating more
intense conflict. There are four variables in the dataset that represent internal conflict:
civil violence (CIVVIOL), civil war (CIVWAR), ethnic violence (ETHVIOL), and ethnic
war (ETHWAR). Similarly, there are three variables that represent inter-state conflict: in-
dependence conflict (INTIND), international violence (INTVIOL), and international war
(INTWAR). The dataset differentiates ‘violence’ and ‘war’ through the level of institution-
alisation of the conflict—with the designation ‘war’ implying a higher institutionalisation
and clearer strategic objectives.
The direct conflict variable used in this chapter is constructed from all four of the
internal variables and the variable for independence conflicts.17 The independence conflict
measure was included for completeness in capturing conflict occurring within the territory
15Herbst (2000), Ballentine (2003), and Arnson and Zartman (2005) provide surveys of this tendency.
16Both of these results are presented in Appendix A.
17The results are not overly sensitive to adjustments in the composition of the conflict variables. Alter-
native constructions of the adjacent conflict variable are discussed in Section 5.2.
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of a country. The two other international conflict measures were excluded in order to
remove conflicts that are considered ‘overseas’ and do not involve violence within the
territory of the country.
The various conflict types are summed and normalised to create the resulting conflict
variable (dir confi). The variable confi used in the equations in Section 3.1 is a dummy
variable indicating a value for the variable that is greater than 1:
confi =
1 if dir confi > 1;0 if dir confi ≤ 1.
A base threshold of 1 is used to remove small-scale demonstrations and internal conflicts
that would be unlikely to have a large impact.18
To create the adjacent conflict variable, a procedure similar to that used in direct
conflict is followed. The variable is therefore made up of civil violence (CIVVIOL), civil
war (CIVWAR), ethnic violence (ETHVIOL), ethnic war (ETHWAR), and independence
conflict (INTIND) which are combined in the same way as before to create an index of
internal conflict (dir confj) within a given neighbouring country j. The variable adjconfi
used throughout is a dummy variable constructed using the following thresholds:
adjconfi =
1 if dir confj > 1;0 if dir confj ≤ 1.
The same base threshold used in creating the variable for direct conflict is used here for
consistency.
Neighbouring countries j for a given country i are derived from data on country adja-
cencies from the Correlates of War Direct Continuity dataset (Stinnett et al., 2002). The
continuities in this dataset include direct land connections and a variety of sea distance
proximities. For this chapter only direct land continuities are used in order to ensure
that adjacent conflict captures the potential to disrupt trade routes and other supply
factors—something that is less likely in countries separated by sea.
A different variation of the conflict variables mentioned above include conflict inten-
sity measures. This formulation uses the conflict intensity scale included in the MEPV
dataset as a measure of conflict intensity with higher values indicating more intense and/or
destructive conflict.
Each individual category of conflict in the MEPV dataset uses a 10 point scale to
score the level of conflict in that category in a given country during a given year. The
intensity values themselves are based on several aspects of conflict beyond casualties and
displacement since these can be heavily influenced by factors other than the type of conflict
that occurs (notably poverty levels and the value placed on human life by command
18For example, protests associated with the Civil Rights Movement in the US and the 1968 Student
Protests in France are coded as level 1 internal conflicts in the MEPV dataset. Level 2 is where conflict
begins to be more sustained and disruptive, and less localised. Examples of level 2 conflicts include the
Cuban Revolution and the Georgian Civil War of 1991-1993.
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structures). These scales therefore include aspects such as relational goals, technology,
and relative means of the groups involved in conflict. The MEPV dataset argues that this
is a better means of determining the impact of conflict on society and this formulation is
ideally suited to the questions addressed in this chapter since the measure cleanly captures
state and infrastructure disruption levels.
The scale is comparable across types of conflict, time periods, and countries. Impor-
tantly, the conflict scale is also additive—two level-4 events are equivalent to a level 8
event. This allows multiple scores in different categories to be aggregated in a way that
is meaningful and that this chapter takes advantage of in the construction of the conflict
intensity variables. The categories and examples provided by the MEPV dataset have
been reproduced in Table 2.14 for added clarity.
The intensity measure for adjacent conflict is created using the same base variables
from the MEPV dataset. In this case, the intensity of conflict is summed across all conflict
types (CIVVIOL, CIVWAR, ETHVIOL, ETHWAR, and INTIND) and all neighbouring







∀ x ∈ {CIVVIOL, CIVWAR, ETHVIOL, ETHWAR, INTIND}
4.2 Other Variables
Trade data used in this analysis come from the UN COMTRADE database and include
bilateral trade flows at the 4-digit SITC4 product code level. The years covered by the
data are 1962 to 2012. This data was aggregated across products and partners to create
a dataset of total trade in and out of a given country across all countries in the dataset.
The other variables used in the estimations include GDP and geographic aspects of
the countries of interest. The landlocked or coastal nature of a country was determined by
whether the country possessed coastline with an active port. As defined earlier, countries
with a coast and port were coded as ‘coastal’ while countries without both these features
were coded as ‘landlocked’. Importantly, there are no countries in the dataset that have a
coastline and no port. The GDP data for the various countries of interest (Yit) come from
World Bank figures. The list of countries used for this chapter is given in Table 2.15.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2.2 presents heat maps of conflict and adjacent conflict using intensity of conflict.
These maps illustrate that particular continents tend to experience more conflict than
others. Both Africa and Asia appear to experience the most and highest intensity conflict
over the period of study. This is supported by Figure 2.3 which breaks down the incidence
and intensity of conflict by continent. Africa and Asia tend to have both the highest
69
CHAPTER II. INTERRUPTED LINES: CONFLICT, TRADE FLOWS, AND
TRANSPORT COSTS
Figure 2.2. Intensity of Conflict
(a) Direct Conflict
(b) Adjacent Conflict
Note: Intensity of conflict (direct and adjacent) averaged across the period 1962-
2012. Scales indicate the average conflict intensity, darker colours represent
more intense conflict. (Source: Author’s own calculations based on Marshall,
2019).
average incidence of conflict and intensity of conflict among the five major continental
regions, with the Pacific experiencing the lowest.
A year-by-year tracking of conflict incidence in the first panel of Figure 2.3 shows a
general upward trend in all continents, peaking around the early 1990s and sharply falling
off again. The continental breakdown of the chart shows that despite some continents
consistently having a higher incidence of conflict than others, the trend is fairly uniform
across them. The intensity of conflict also shown in the second panel follows a similar
pattern, but peaks much earlier in most continents (except for Africa). While Asia pushes
the intensity score upwards with a large peak during the 1980s, the general shape of global
conflict intensity is consistent across continents with local peaks in different periods.
Adjacent conflict tends to be more common in the data than direct conflict; as Table
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Figure 2.3. Incidence and Intensity of Conflict by Continent
(a) Countries in Conflict
(b) Intensity of Conflict
Note: Incidence and intensity of conflict by continent over the period 1962-
2012. Lines in panel (a) represent the proportion of countries on each continent
in conflict in the given year. Lines in panel (b) represent the average intensity of
all conflicts in countries on each continent in the given year. (Source: Author’s
own calculations based on MEPV data from Marshall, 2019).
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Table 2.1. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.
Dev.
Minimum Maximum
ln(Trade) 8137 22.347 2.652 6.875 29.541
Conf 8137 0.132 0.339 0 1
AdjConf 8137 0.367 0.482 0 1
Conf (Intensity) 8137 1.462 0.010 0 10
AdjConf (Intensity) 8137 2.310 3.985 0 29
Note: Conf and AdjConf are dummy variables indicating the presence of direct conflict and adjacent
conflict; Conf(Intensity) and AdjConf(Intensity) are variables that measure the intensity (given by the
MEPV scale) of direct and adjacent conflict.
Table 2.2. Comparative Statistics
Landlocked Coastal Difference
ln(Trade) 21.371 22.548 -1.177**
(0.064) (0.032)
Conf 0.132 0.133 -0.001
(0.009) (0.004)
AdjConf 0.555 0.329 +0.226**
(0.013) (0.006)
Conf (Intensity) 0.528 0.525 +0.003
(0.037) (0.018)
AdjConf (Intensity) 3.341 2.097 +1.244**
(0.114) (0.047)
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: This table presents the difference in means of ln(Trade), Conf, and AdjConf
when a country is landlocked or coastal; standard errors are in parentheses; Conf and
AdjConf are dummy variables, except where indicated as intensity measures.
2.1 shows, approximately 37% of the country-years covered in the data experience adjacent
conflict compared to only 13% for direct conflict. This follows from the fact that a country
in conflict in a given year will tend to have multiple neighbours that all experience the
adjacent conflict in the same year. This difference in incidence of adjacent conflict com-
pared to direct conflict combined with the differences in shading in Figure 2.2 between the
map for direct conflict (the first panel) and the map for adjacent conflict (second panel),
shows that there are many countries that are impacted by adjacent conflict that do not
experience similar intensities of direct conflict themselves. This supports the idea that
spillover effects are small by indicating that even if conflict does spill into neighbouring
countries, it does so with significantly moderated intensity.
Landlocked countries tend to be more prone to adjacent conflict and more intense
adjacent conflict than coastal countries, as indicated in Table 2.2. Importantly, this is
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not a general trend as landlocked countries do not seem to experience direct conflict at a
higher rate or higher intensity when compared to coastal countries. This seems to indicate
that landlocked countries tend to have multiple neighbours in conflict more frequently
than coastal countries, producing a higher incidence but also a larger summed value of
intensity than coastal countries.
The location of the conflicts themselves are displayed in Figure 2.4 which shows the
propensity for adjacent conflict to occur in neighbouring shoreward nations or inland ones.
Measured by intensity of conflict, the majority of adjacent conflict occurs in shoreward
neighbouring nations. While this means that the vast majority of adjacent conflict in the
dataset is likely to impact trade flows by interrupting trade routes, it also means that
the sample size for inland adjacent conflict is relatively smaller making it more difficult
to clearly identify effects. Additionally, this smaller sample size is likely to lead to larger
standard errors, decreasing the potential statistical significance of results.
Figure 2.4. Intensity of Adjacent Conflict by Location
Note: Intensity of adjacent conflict by conflict location averaged across the period
1962-2012. Scale indicates the intensity and primary location of adjacent conflict
for each country; blue represents primarily shoreward adjacent conflict, green
represents primarily inland adjacent conflict. Darker colours represent more
intense conflict. (Source: Author’s own calculations based on Marshall, 2019).
5 Results
5.1 Main Results
The first column of Table 2.3 presents the results for the model given in Equation 2.4.
The coefficients on both direct conflict and adjacent conflict are strongly negative and
significant, with the effect of direct conflict being stronger than adjacent conflict. Direct
conflict reduces trade by approximately 16.7% while adjacent conflict only reduces trade by
approximately 6.8%. This is in line with the effects discussed in Section 3.1: conflict in an
adjacent country seems to negatively impact trade, but not as severely as conflict directly
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in the country. Overall, these base results indicate that there is an adjacent conflict effect
and it is both strong and significant.
The second column presents the results for Equation 2.5 which factors in the location
of the country of observation (either landlocked or coastal). The coefficients on both inter-
action terms for adjacent conflict are negative and significant, with landlocked countries
experiencing worse effects from conflict in adjacent countries. Conflict in an adjacent coun-
try reduces trade in a landlocked country by approximately 9.5%, almost twice as much as
in a coastal country. While this difference in coefficients is not statistically significant, it
provides some evidence that adjacent conflict seems to disrupt trade more for landlocked
countries than coastal countries, lending support to the idea that the supply effect from
disrupted trade routes and interrupted access to external markets discussed in Section 2
is both present and large.
Table 2.3. Principal Regression Results
Incidence Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Country Conflict Country Conflict
Model Location Location Location Location
Conflict -0.183** -0.184** -0.181** -0.178** -0.178**




x Coastal (0.023) (0.003)
AdjConf -0.100* -0.017*
x Landl (0.061) (0.009)
AdjConf(S) -0.053** -0.008**
x Coastal (0.022) (0.004)
AdjConf(S) -0.124** -0.020**
x Landl (0.057) (0.010)
AdjConf(L) -0.125** -0.002
x Coastal (0.049) (0.006)
AdjConf(L) 0.034 -0.002
x Landl (0.071) (0.016)
N 8137 8137 8137 8137 8137
R2 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total trade; Conflict, Landl, and Coastal are dummy
variables; AdjConf, AdjConf(S), and AdjConf(L) measure the presence (first three columns) or intensity
(last two columns) of adjacent conflict, shoreward adjacent conflict, and inland adjacent conflict respec-
tively. The log value of country GDP is included as an independent variable.
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The third column displays the result for the model corresponding to Equation 2.6,
combining the location of the conflict (shoreward or inland) as well as the location of the
country of observation (coastal or landlocked). The interaction terms demonstrate clearly
that adjacent conflict in a shoreward country is significantly worse for a landlocked country
than a coastal country. Adjacent conflict in shoreward countries appears to reduce trade by
11.6% for landlocked countries, over twice the impact on coastal countries. Interestingly,
the coefficient for inland conflict for coastal countries is also strongly negative, while it is
indistinguishable from zero for landlocked countries. This appears to indicate that inland
conflict is very damaging for coastal countries. This may be influenced by the relative lack
of data for landlocked countries (and inland conflict) and so might be driven by outliers
since the magnitude of the effect shrinks considerably and is insignificant with the use of
a continuous measure of conflict in the fifth column.
These results help to illustrate the difference between the supply effect and the de-
mand effect for adjacent conflict, demonstrating the larger impact of the supply effect on
landlocked countries which are more sensitive to disruptions in trade routes and restricted
access to external markets through other countries’ ports. The difference in estimated
magnitude between coefficients on adjacent conflict for landlocked and coastal countries
in column 2 helps to disentangle the supply effect from the demand effect, and provides
intuition for the impact of disruption to infrastructure and market access on trade flows.
While coastal nations have their own ports to access external markets, landlocked countries
do not and the larger impact of adjacent conflict demonstrates the difficulty that these
countries have in accessing ports in other countries with conflict along the routes. This is
supported by the results in column 3 where the location of the conflict is separated out.
The impact of shoreward adjacent conflict specifically on the trade of landlocked countries
is more than two times higher than for coastal countries. This emphasises the impact of
adjacent conflict on access to external markets.
The final two columns of Table 2.3 present the results for the models given in Equations
2.5 and 2.6 using the conflict intensity measure discussed in Section 4.1. These results
reinforce the conclusions about the impact of adjacent conflict on countries and trade.
The fourth column presents results for a continuous measure of adjacent conflict using
the specification in Equation 2.5, analogous to the second column. This result also pro-
vides evidence that landlocked countries appear to experience increasingly worse effects of
adjacent conflict than coastal countries, with trade reducing by 1.7% for each unit increase
in conflict intensity in neighbouring countries (as opposed to a decrease of 0.7% for coastal
countries). Despite this difference not being statistically significant, this provides some in-
sight that landlocked countries appear to be more sensitive to conflict intensity—suffering
a reduction of trade more than twice as large as coastal countries for each unit increase in
conflict intensity.
The final column presents the results for the location of conflict model (as in column
3) for the conflict intensity measure. These results also show that landlocked countries
are more sensitive to shoreward conflict than coastal countries, experiencing a 2% decline
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in trade for each increase in conflict intensity. By contrast, coastal countries experience
only a 0.8% drop in trade, less than half the effect of landlocked countries. The results
for inland conflict are less instructive as neither coefficient is significant and they are not
different in magnitude.
These results for the intensity measure add a subtlety to the effect revealed by the
dummy variables. The presence of adjacent conflict, and shoreward adjacent conflict in
particular, appears to be worse for landlocked countries than coastal countries; further, this
negative effect increases with the intensity of the adjacent conflict. The larger magnitude
of the coefficients on landlocked countries as opposed to coastal countries (in column 4
and for shoreward conflict in column 5) seem to indicate that the negative supply effects
from adjacent conflict grow at a faster rate than the demand effects. This makes sense
from an intuitive standpoint: the demand effects are largely determined by the presence
or perception of conflict (boycotts or substitutions) and are possibly less sensitive to small
changes in intensity, while the supply effects are grounded in infrastructural impacts which
scale with conflict intensity.
5.2 Robustness
I conduct a number of robustness checks on the results presented above. The robustness
results deal with two primary aspects of the analysis: the first is model identification issues
such as omitted variation, while the second is the construction of the conflict variable. A
third element includes spatially correlated standard errors.
Endogeneity Concerns There are many country-specific and regional effects that can
ultimately impact both trade and conflict. This is even more the case in this analysis,
which looks at conflict in neighbouring countries. Elements such as political stability,
trading blocs, regional growth trends, and various other political and economic variables
can have wider impacts on both conflict and trade flows within a given region. This effect
is also linked to issues of reverse causation in that regional trade flows and trade-driven
growth can reduce the incidence of regional conflict.
I account for two examples of these country-specific omitted effects with the inclusion
of measures for political stability and trade agreements. Political institutions within a
country can have an effect on how much it trades with other countries and the resilience
of these connections to stress and shocks. In order to account for this potential effect, I
include the Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2018) score as a control for the political institutions
of the country of observation. This score measures the openness and inclusivity of the
political institutions in a country, assigning a score between −10 and +10 with higher
numbers indicating a more democratic and inclusive institutional structure.
In addition to this, I include a control for the number of trade agreements that the
country of observation is a party to using data from the WTO database. Trade agreements
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Table 2.4. Political Stability and Trade Agreement Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Conflict Country Conflict
Location Location Location Location
Conflict -0.171** -0.169** -0.169** -0.167**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
AdjConf -0.084** -0.080**
x Coastal (0.021) (0.020)
AdjConf -0.123** -0.131**
x Landl (0.058) (0.060)
AdjConf(S) -0.090** -0.086**
x Coastal (0.020) (0.020)
AdjConf(S) -0.154** -0.161**
x Landl (0.055) (0.056)
AdjConf(L) -0.071 -0.068
x Coastal (0.043) (0.044)
AdjConf(L) 0.034 0.051
x Landl (0.074) (0.072)
RTAs 0.005** 0.005**
(0.001) (0.001)
Polity Score 0.014** 0.014**
(0.002) (0.002)
N 6652 6652 6652 6652
R2 0.967 0.967 0.968 0.968
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total trade; Conflict, Landl, and
Coastal are dummy variables; AdjConf, AdjConf(S), and AdjConf(L) are dummy
variables that measure the presence of adjacent conflict, shoreward adjacent conflict,
and inland adjacent conflict respectively. RTAs is the number of trade agreements
a country is a member of; Polity Score is the country’s Polity IV value indicating
strength of domestic institutions. The log value of country GDP is included as an
independent variable.
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N 8137 8137 8137
R2 0.968 0.968 0.968
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total trade; Conflict, Landl, and
Coastal are dummy variables; AdjConf, AdjConf(S), and AdjConf(L) are dummy
variables indicating adjacent conflict, shoreward adjacent conflict, and inland adja-
cent conflict. The log value of country GDP is included as an independent variable.
Regional time trends are included in all specifications.
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can create robust trade links to other countries that could counteract the adverse effects
of adjacent conflict.
The results for the inclusion of these controls are presented in Table 2.4. The first
two columns present the baseline estimations with the newly reduced sample size, the
second two columns present the results for the inclusion of the new variables. The in-
clusion of these controls appears to slightly strengthen the findings on adjacent conflict,
contributing stronger evidence to the suggestion of a supply effect of adjacent conflict.
Column 3 demonstrates that with these controls included, the magnitudes attached to
landlocked countries become more negative relative to coastal countries. Further, the ef-
fect of shoreward conflict on landlocked countries in the fourth column is stronger relative
to the impact on coastal countries than in the base analysis.
Despite the inclusion of these examples, this does not capture the full extent of potential
regional effects that can be associated with both trade and conflict. In order to account for
these more generally, I include a regional time trend within the estimation. These results
are presented in Table 2.5. The incorporation of the regional time trend inherently removes
some of the variation in the geographic variables and so the significance of the results are
reduced, this is particularly true for landlocked countries since there are already few cases
within the data. This makes it difficult to separate the broader regional effects from the
more specific neighbour effects looked at in this chapter. Despite this, the magnitudes
remain suggestive of the supply effect discussed previously.
Conflict Variables The second set of robustness checks deal with adjustments to the
measurement of adjacent conflict in the data. This includes a measure of adjacent conflict
that accounts for the number of neighbouring countries and variations in the variables
used to construct the overall conflict measure.
While the main analysis uses geographic elements of conflict and countries themselves
in an effort to disentangle the competing effects of adjacent conflict on trade, there is a
secondary element of geography that can be added to the measure of conflict by moderating
the intensity of adjacent conflict by the number of neighbours the country has. To do this,
I create a new measure of adjacent conflict, building on the previously constructed measure







∀ x ∈ {CIVVIOL, CIVWAR, ETHVIOL, ETHWAR, INTIND}
Where conflict intensity is summed across all conflict types, x, and all neighbouring coun-
tries, j, and divided by the number of neighbouring countries, J . The n superscript
denotes the variable as moderated by the number of neighbours. This measure of adjacent
conflict intensity moderates the conflict measure by the number of neighbours, giving an
indication of not only the intensity of adjacent conflict, but also the incidence of it in
existing neighbours. This captures a different geographic element of adjacent conflict by
accounting for the number of potential conflicts in neighbouring countries.
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N 8137 8137 8137
R2 0.964 0.947 0.947
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total trade; Conflict, Landl, and
Coastal are dummy variables; AdjConf, AdjConf(S), and AdjConf(L) measure the
intensity of conflict in neighbouring countries divided by the number of neighbours a
country has. The log value of country GDP is included as an independent variable.
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The results for this measure of adjacent conflict are presented in Table 2.6. The results
are largely in line with the baseline analysis, though the coefficients on adjacent conflict
for coastal countries are no longer significant, strengthening the results for landlocked
countries in comparison and adding further evidence for the existence of a supply effect in
the impact of adjacent conflict on countries.
Table 2.7. Alternate Conflict Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Civil Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic
Conflict Conflict Conflict Violence War
Conflict -0.184** -0.185** -0.186** -0.179** -0.185**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
AdjConf -0.061** -0.063** -0.146** -0.118** 0.009
x Coastal (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027)
AdjConf -0.100* -0.096 -0.167** -0.226** -0.018
x Landl (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.068)
N 8137 8137 8137 8137 8137
R2 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total trade; Conflict, Landl, and Coastal are dummy
variables; AdjConf is a dummy variable that measures the presence of conflict (as defined in each column)
in neighbouring countries. The log value of country GDP is included as an independent variable.
The second check adjusts the variables used to calculate the measure of adjacent con-
flict. Presented in Table 2.7 are four additional measures of the conflict variable, the first
column presents the measure used in the principal analysis for reference. The first mea-
sure, Civil Conflict, includes the measures CIVVIOL and CIVWAR. The second measure
combines only the variables for ethnic-based conflict, ETHVIOL and ETHWAR. The final
two columns are the variables ETHVIOL and ETHWAR by themselves.
All four measures produce results with magnitudes that are in line with those found in
the main analysis. While two of the measures produce results that are not significant, the
measures for Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Violence are significant. This seems to indicate
that ethnic-based violence, which is more disorganised than war and potentially problem-
atic for trade routes and logistics, is more impactful on trade than more structured types
of conflict (ethnic war for instance) and other types of civil conflict.
Inference Whereas the baseline results included standard errors clustered at the region-
year level, the results in Table 2.8 refine this to include spatially correlated standard errors,
following Conley (2008). The implementation of this level of clustering produces significant
results that remain suggestive of the supply effect with landlocked countries continuing
to experience more negative effects than coastal countries, particularly in the case of
shoreward adjacent conflict.
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N 8137 8137 8137
R2 0.405 0.405 0.406
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total trade; Conflict, Landl, and
Coastal are dummy variables; AdjConf, AdjConf(S), and AdjConf(L) are dummy
variables indicating adjacent conflict, shoreward adjacent conflict, and inland adjacent
conflict. The log value of country GDP is included as an independent variable. Errors




This chapter provides evidence for the impact of adjacent conflict on trade flows through
disruption to trade routes and access to external markets. Using data on conflict to
generate variables for both direct and adjacent conflict within countries, I exploit the
geographic features of both countries and conflict to illustrate the different impacts of
adjacent conflict on landlocked and coastal countries. The results indicate the presence
of this supply-driven effect, particularly for landlocked countries experiencing shoreward
adjacent conflict.
While the scarcity of some data prevents a fuller understanding of what is driving the
effects, the results are indicative of the negative effects of adjacent conflict through the
supply channel outlined in Section 2. The focus of this chapter on trade flows provides
evidence for an important aspect of the economic effects of adjacent conflict, but expanding
beyond this into the implications of these trade effects for the wider economy could create a
broader understanding of the effects of adjacent conflict. Similarly, a fine-grained analysis
of the strategies used by firms and countries to ameliorate the effects of adjacent conflict—
either through redirection of goods or different choices of transportation method—could
supplement the work in the other direction.
Likely the only convincing way to definitively solve the problem of reverse causation
is to select a set of truly exogenous conflicts—those conflicts that have no connection to
economic sources. This is fundamentally difficult to extract; since wars are costly, they
will frequently be fought for economic gain. However, if this could be done it would go a
long way to solving the endogeneity problems inherent in analysing the impact of conflict
on economic outcomes.
The insights into the effect of adjacent conflict in this chapter are very relevant to
research in trade and peace studies, particularly in terms of the interaction between re-
gional conflict and trade flows. The outline of the effect of conflict via a supply channel
presented in this chapter opens up new directions in analysis of the various impacts of
adjacent conflict. Going beyond traditional understandings of direct spillover effects into
the more indirect effects such as the demand channel outlined in Qureshi (2013) and the
supply channel discussed here allows for a more complete picture of the impact of regional
conflicts on the economies of non-participants. This work supports the results of other
studies in the effects of conflict on trade and contributes to the growing consensus on the
negative impacts of adjacent conflict.
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A Appendix: Supplementary Regressions
This appendix contains three supplementary estimations for the main analysis to answer
two questions. The first differentiates between direct conflict in coastal and landlocked
countries in a manner analogous to that used for adjacent conflict in the main analysis
to determine if the supply effect identified in the main analysis also plays a role in the
effect of direct conflict on trade. The second is the question of what is driving the decrease
in trade due to adjacent conflict in the aggregated trade data. Two estimations are in-
cluded to exclude the possibility that this decrease is due to lower trade with the country
experiencing the conflict.
A.1 Interacting Direct Conflict
The main analysis in this chapter addresses the effect of geography on adjacent conflict
and trade, but the effects of direct conflict can also be differentiated according to the
location of the country. It is possible that the trade of landlocked countries could be more
affected by domestic conflict than coastal countries for similar reasons to that of adjacent
conflict.
The increased logistics necessary to export from and import to a landlocked country
makes trade routes more fragile to domestic disruption. While some firms in coastal
countries may still be able to access ports due to proximity or the specific locality of the
conflict, landlocked countries must trade through other nations. Domestic conflict can
create both direct and indirect barriers to this activity: the conflict can directly disrupt
domestic infrastructure, making it more difficult to move products within the country;
neighbouring countries may also close border crossings in an effort to contain the violence,
interrupting the access of landlocked countries to their ports.
The results in this subsection estimate the following equation:
ln(Xit) = β1ln(Yit) + β2Confit × Coastali + β3Confit × Landli
+ β4AdjConfit × Coastali + β5AdjConfit × Landli + ρi + ut + εit
(2.7)
The variable Landli is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the country is landlocked
and 0 otherwise. Coastali is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the country
is coastal and 0 otherwise. Confit and AdjConfit are dummy variables indicating the
presence of direct and adjacent conflict respectively.
Table 2.9 presents the results for including the geographic effects of direct conflict.
The first column reproduces the results of the main analysis with an undifferentiated direct
conflict measure. The second column splits this effect for landlocked and coastal countries.
The results indicate that landlocked countries do experience significantly worse effects from
domestic conflict than coastal countries, reducing trade by almost 33% compared to 12%
for coastal countries.
84
A. APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY REGRESSIONS




Conflict x Coastal -0.124**
(0.028)
Conflict x Landl -0.396**
(0.083)
AdjConf x Coastal -0.061** -0.066**
(0.023) (0.023)




Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total trade;
Conflict and AdjConf are dummy variables that indicate the
presence of direct conflict and adjacent conflict; Landl and
Coastal are dummy variables for whether the country is land-
locked or coastal. The log value of country GDP is included as
an independent variable.
This seems to indicate that the supply effect outlined for adjacent conflict in the main
analysis also has a role to play in direct conflict. Further the effect appears to be very
pronounced for direct conflict, nearly tripling the effect of domestic conflict on trade.
A.2 Effect of Adjacent Conflict on Aggregate Trade
The aggregation of trade data in this chapter leaves open the possibility that the decrease
in trade due to adjacent conflict is caused by a fall in trade with the adjacent country
itself. As discussed in the main analysis, there are two ways to address this problem.
The first is the use of country-pair data where the adjacent country experiencing conflict
is outside the trade relationship and therefore cannot influence trade flows directly. The
second is the exclusion of neighbouring countries from the aggregated trade calculations.
Both these methods are given below.
Country-Pair Analysis Using bilateral trade data where the adjacent conflict is truly
a third country can help to address the issue of the cause of the decrease in trade. With
bilateral data, there is no possibility that any decrease in trade due to adjacent conflict is
the result of lost trade with the country in conflict.
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The following estimates a traditional bilateral gravity model with an estimation equa-
tion of the following form:
ln(Xit) = β1ln(YitYjt) + β2ln(dij) + β3Landlij
+ β4Confijt + β5AdjConfijt + ρi + ρj + ut + εit
(2.8)
Where Yit and Yjt are the GDP of countries i and j, dij is the distance between them, and
Landlij indicates if one of the countries in the pair is landlocked. Confit and AdjConfit
are dummy variables for if one of the countries in the pair is experiencing direct conflict
or adjacent conflict (in a country outside the pair).
The data used for this estimation are the un-aggregated bilateral data in the main
analysis. The trade data are therefore at the 4-digit SITC4 product level. All other data
sources are the same.
The results in Table 2.10 show that adjacent conflict does impact bilateral trade flows,
reducing trade by approximately 8%. This indicates that the effect of adjacent conflict in
general is not one of reduced trade with the country experiencing conflict. The conflict in
a third country significantly impacts trade between a neighbouring country and its trade
partners.














Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log
value of total trade; ln(GDP) is log value of
product of country GDPs; ln(Dist) is log dis-
tance between countries; Conflict and AdjConf
are dummy variables indicating direct conflict
and adjacent conflict for at least one of the
countries in the country-pair.
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Excluding Neighbouring Trade The second method of addressing this issue is the
exclusion of adjacent countries from the aggregate trade figures. By removing these coun-
tries, there is no potential for a reduction in trade with the adjacent conflict country
impacting aggregate trade and there can be certainty that the effect identified is one of
adjacent conflict impacting trade flows with non-conflict countries.
The results presented in Table 2.11 reproduce the results of the main analysis, but
with a modified calculation of aggregate trade flows that excludes neighbouring countries.
The first column shows that adjacent conflict still has a similar effect on the modified
calculation of aggregate trade. The second column shows the results for adjacent conflict
differentiated across landlocked and coastal countries. The result for coastal countries is
significant and similar to that in the main analysis, but the result for landlocked countries
is much smaller and insignificant. This casts some doubt on the effect of adjacent conflict
for landlocked countries and the size of the supply effect.
The results for the third column are similar to those of the second, the results for
coastal countries are significant and similar in magnitude to those in the main analysis
but the results for landlocked countries are insignificant.
Ultimately, excluding neighbouring countries from the calculations of aggregate trade
means that the estimates for landlocked countries lose statistical significance. This could
be related to the fact that landlocked countries primarily trade with neighbouring countries
and so much of the impact is felt through those trade links. This could be particularly
relevant in the positive coefficient for landlocked countries with inland adjacent conflict.
This value could represent the redirection of trade to other countries, potentially increasing
overall trade flows, in an effort to bypass the conflict zone.
A.3 Splitting Exports and Imports
The aggregation of trade in the main analysis does not explicitly distinguish between
exports and imports. It is possible that exports and imports are differentially affected
by adjacent conflict, with one direction experiencing more acute impacts of conflict in
neighbouring countries than the other. Tables 2.12 and 2.13 replicate the specification
from the main results but replace the aggregated trade variable with exports and imports
respectively.
The results for exports given in Table 2.12 are stronger than those of the main analysis,
with the coefficients increasing in magnitude and significance. The first three columns
present the results for the incidence measure of adjacent conflict while the final two columns
show the results for adjacent conflict intensity. The increase in magnitude and significance
is common to both measures of adjacent conflict, demonstrating that exports are strongly
affected by conflict in neighbouring countries.
In contrast, the results for imports in Table 2.13 decrease in both magnitude and
significance from the main results. Again, the first three columns present the results for
the incidence measure of adjacent conflict and the final two columns display the intensity
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N 8137 8137 8137
R2 0.961 0.961 0.961
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Trade), log value of total trade excluding all trade with
neighbouring countries; Conflict, Landl, and Coastal are dummy variables; AdjConf,
AdjConf(S), and AdjConf(L) are dummy variables that measure the presence of ad-
jacent conflict, shoreward adjacent conflict, and inland adjacent conflict respectively.
The log value of country GDP is included as an independent variable.
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Table 2.12. Export Trade
Incidence Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Country Conflict Country Conflict
Model Location Location Location Location
Conflict -0.271** -0.271** -0.266** -0.257** -0.258**




x Coastal (0.028) (0.003)
AdjConf -0.130** -0.042**
x Landl (0.064) (0.009)
AdjConf(S) -0.116** -0.019**
x Coastal (0.026) (0.004)
AdjConf(S) -0.189** -0.054**
x Landl (0.063) (0.010)
AdjConf(L) -0.254** -0.019**
x Coastal (0.057) (0.008)
AdjConf(L) 0.141* 0.009
x Landl (0.083) (0.017)
N 8125 8125 8125 8125 8125
R2 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.954
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Exports), log value of total exports; Conflict, Landl, and Coastal are
dummy variables; AdjConf, AdjConf(S), and AdjConf(L) measure the presence (first three columns) or
intensity (last two columns) of adjacent conflict, shoreward adjacent conflict, and inland adjacent conflict
respectively. The log value of country GDP is included as an independent variable.
measure. The results lose much of their significance across both measures, indicating that
imports are not overly affected by conflict in neighbouring countries. Despite this lack of
significance, the signs of the coefficients are still largely negative suggesting the potential
for some negative effects from adjacent conflict.
The combination of these results for exports and imports show that exports are much
more impacted by conflict in adjacent countries than imports. This suggests a differenti-
ated impact of the supply effect between the two directions of trade. This may be explained
by the difference in ease of substitution between exports and imports. It is relatively easy
and straightforward for partner countries to substitute away from the exports of a country
experiencing adjacent conflict—sourcing their imports from alternative exporters. In con-
trast, there are no conflict-free alternative routes for imports into a country experiencing
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adjacent conflict and so import trade continues to flow, though potentially with increased
friction as the signs of the coefficients seem to indicate.
Table 2.13. Import Trade
Incidence Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Base Country Conflict Country Conflict
Model Location Location Location Location
Conflict -0.162** -0.163** -0.160** -0.161** -0.160**




x Coastal (0.023) (0.003)
AdjConf -0.080 -0.004
x Landl (0.069) (0.009)
AdjConf(S) -0.035 -0.003
x Coastal (0.022) (0.004)
AdjConf(S) -0.091 -0.003
x Landl (0.064) (0.010)
AdjConf(L) -0.090* 0.003
x Coastal (0.050) (0.006)
AdjConf(L) -0.045 -0.008
x Landl (0.074) (0.017)
N 8135 8135 8135 8135 8135
R2 0.960 0.960 0.960 0.960 0.960
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Imports), log value of total imports; Conflict, Landl, and Coastal are
dummy variables; AdjConf, AdjConf(S), and AdjConf(L) measure the presence (first three columns) or
intensity (last two columns) of adjacent conflict, shoreward adjacent conflict, and inland adjacent conflict
respectively. The log value of country GDP is included as an independent variable.
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B Appendix: Supplementary Figures and Tables
Figure 2.5. Regional Country Groupings
Note: Regional country groupings are indicated by colour.
Table 2.14. Conflict Intensity Definitions
Intensity Definition Example
1 Sporadic or Expressive Political Violence United States, 1965-68
2 Limited Political Violence Georgia, 1991-93
3 Serious Political Violence Chile, 1974-76
4 Serious Warfare Liberia, 1990-97
5 Substantial and Prolonged Warfare Guatemala, 1966-96
6 Extensive Warfare Bosnia, 1992-95
7 Pervasive Warfare Vietnam, 1958-75
8 Technological Warfare France, 1914-18
9 Total Warfare Germany, 1941-45
10 Extermination and Annihilation Japan, 1945
Source: MEPV Dataset (Marshall, 2019)
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Table 2.15. List of Countries
Afghanistan Denmark Laos Saint Kitts and Nevis
Albania Djibouti Latvia Saint Lucia
Algeria Dominica Lebanon Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
American Samoa Dominican Republic Lesotho Samoa
Andorra Ecuador Liberia San Marino
Angola Egypt Libya Sao Tome and Principe
Antigua and Barbuda El Salvador Lithuania Saudi Arabia
Argentina Equatorial Guinea Luxembourg Senegal
Armenia Eritrea Madagascar Serbia
Aruba Estonia Malawi Sewden
Australia Eswatini Malaysia Seychelles
Austria Ethiopia Maldives Sierra Leone
Azerbaijan Fiji Mali Singapore
Bahamas Finland Malta Slovakia
Bahrain France Marshall Islands Slovenia
Bangladesh Gabon Mauritania Solomon Islands
Barbados Gambia Mauritius Somalia
Belarus Georgia Mexico South Africa
Belgium Germany Micronesia Spain
Belize Ghana Moldova Sri Lanka
Benin Greece Mongolia Sudan
Bhutan Grenada Morocco Surinam
Bolivia Guam Mozambique Switzerland
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guatemala Myanmar Syria
Botswana Guinea Namibia Tajikistan
Brazil Guinea-Bissau Nepal Tanzania
Brunei Darussalam Guyana Netherlands Thailand
Bulgaria Haiti New Zealand Timor-Leste
Burkina Faso Honduras Nicaragua Togo
Burundi Hungary Niger Tonga
Côte d’Ivoire Iceland Nigeria Trinidad and Tobago
Cabo Verde India North Macedonia Tunisia
Cambodia Indonesia Northern Mariana Islands Turkey
Cameroon Iran Norway Turkmenistan
Canada Iraq Oman Tuvalu
Central African Republic Ireland Pakistan Uganda
Chad Israel Palau Ukraine
Chile Italy Panama United Arab Emirates
China Jamaica Papua New Guinea United Kingdom
Colombia Japan Paraguay United States
Comoros Jordan Peru Uruguay
Congo, Democratic Republic of Kazakhstan Philippines Uzbekistan
Congo, Republic of Kenya Poland Vanuatu
Costa Rica Kiribati Portugal Venezuela
Croatia Korea, DPR Qatar Vietnam
Cuba Korea, Republic of Romania Yemen
Cyprus Kuwait Russia Zambia
Czechia Kyrgyzstan Rwanda Zimbabwe
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Chapter III
Riding the Monsoon: Geography
and Iron Age Trade in the Indian
Ocean
1 Introduction
Trade in the ancient world was often long, hard, and dangerous. Small wooden ships
would ply the oceans with rudimentary navigational tools in the hope of landing at their
destination with their produce intact. Trade costs were high, reducing the attractiveness
of long-distance, trans-oceanic trade to all but the most intrepid of merchants. The Indian
Ocean in the late Iron Age was an exception to this. The unique climatic elements of the
seasonal monsoon made trade from the Horn of Africa to the coasts of India both feasible
and attractive. A merchant setting out from one side of the Ocean could, provided they
left at the correct time, travel to the other shore with relative ease.
This chapter exploits ancient textual sources to develop a database of ancient trade
in the Indian Ocean and model trade in the region during the late Iron Age. Using the
trade information logged in the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea (Schoff, 1912), I build a
comprehensive dataset of ancient trade cataloguing products, origins, and destinations. I
supplement this with wind data to calculate sailing times between the various cities along
the shores of the Indian Ocean to fit a gravity model to the network. In order to perform
an export analysis on the cities in the Periplus, ancient development levels are captured
by archaeological data on structures and dig sites across the region.
I find that trade between cities along the shores of the Indian Ocean is well-modelled
by a gravity framework, implying that long-distance trade between the continents border-
ing the Ocean was made feasible by the reduced travel time created by sailing conditions
and monsoon winds. Further, I find that there is a significant resource endowment effect
influencing trade flows throughout the region and creating a non-linear relationship be-
tween distance and trade. Cities that are very close together and have similar resource
endowments trade less than cities with different endowments. This supplements the tradi-
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tional technological comparative advantage of a Ricardian model with a resource-derived
element of comparative advantage. I also find evidence for a relationship between the
composition of exports and the level of development of cities. Cities that export more
products and more diverse products tend to have higher development levels. This effect is
largely driven by manufacturing products with less developed cities being more dependent
on raw materials and cash-crops, such as spices and incense, implying a possible ancient
version of the ‘resource curse’.
This chapter makes two primary contributions. The first is to model ancient trade in
an under-studied region with a gravity equation. The second is to provide insight into
potentially trade-driven determinants of development in the region during the late Iron
Age. In doing so, it extends the analysis of ancient trade flows into a new geographic
region and adds to the discussion of driving factors of ancient trade. The majority of work
on modelling trade with gravity models deals with post-eighteenth century time periods.1
The work that has been done on ancient trade principally deals with the Mediterranean
and the Middle East, rarely stretching further east or south than Mesopotamia and Egypt.
This chapter extends this type of trade analysis to a new region. In contrast to Bakker
et al. (2018) which find a significant role for local and regional connectedness, the pecu-
liar conditions of the Indian Ocean allowed countries with different resource endowments
to engage in sophisticated, long-distance trade with each other; leading to a non-linear
relationship between distance and trade. This result is similar to that of Barjamovic et
al. (2019) by finding that ancient trade in the Indian Ocean is well modelled by a gravity
model but adds a non-linear element based on resource endowments. Further, the evi-
dence contributed in this work on the link between trade and development compliments
the work of Bakker et al. (2018). Whereas Bakker et al. (2018) look at the effect of con-
nectedness on development levels, this chapter links the composition of exports and trade
flows with development levels to illustrate a more direct relationship between export goods
and economic activity around cities.
This work relates to the literature that documents the relationship between trade
costs, communication costs, and trade flows. The unique climatic conditions of the Indian
Ocean created transportation efficiencies that effectively increased the market access of
cities along its shores. In this sense, the mechanisms and results of this chapter inherit
much from the literature on market access. Feyrer (2009) is a good example of this with
his study on changes in trade flows due to the closure of the Suez Canal, but similar work
can be found in Maurer and Rauch (2019), Juhasz (2018), and Liu and Meissner (2015)
among others.
The results in this chapter build on the literature around the positive effect of trade
on development, including work that discusses the development effects of trade in endow-
ment economies. The wider idea that trade links can lead to growth is a common theme
throughout the development literature (see Redding and Venables, 2004; Wacziarg and
1Work addressing the early-modern period includes Pascali (2017) who analyses trade during the
transition from sail to steam shipping.
94
2. DATA
Welch, 2008; Feyrer, 2019, for examples). I build on this tradition with the analysis of
exports and development in the Indian Ocean. Another branch of literature in this area is
the analysis of the ‘resource curse’ as outlined in Auty (1993) and Auty (2001).2 The evi-
dence in this chapter on the relationship between export sectors and development extends
the discussion of resource endowments and growth backwards into the ancient world.
This chapter exploits historical data about ancient economies, which often require a
different approach than more traditional datasets. Trade in the ancient world is frequently
dealt with indirectly (as in Fluckiger et al., 2019; Broodbank, 2006) because of a lack of
reliable data. Despite this, textual analysis and other techniques have proved useful in
developing reliable data for research. Temin (2013) uses multiple techniques to develop
useful price and trade information about Roman grain markets. Similarly, Temin (2006)
and Algaze (2008) both use a combination of archaeological evidence and textual data in
reconstructing trade in ancient periods. The techniques used in this chapter add to this
trend by exploiting written sources for trade data.
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 2 describes the data sources used for
the analysis. A Ricardian version of a gravity model is outlined in Section 3 and Section 4
contains the results of the gravity estimation. Section 5 discusses the link between trade
in the region and ancient levels of development, while Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The data in this chapter combine archaeological, textual, and geographic information to
develop a comprehensive picture of trade in the ancient Indian Ocean. The following
subsections outline the different data sources and their uses in terms of the information
they provide for the overall analysis.
2.1 The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea
Economic data for ancient eras are notoriously difficult to come by. Because of this, textual
data have become more prominent in the literature (see Barjamovic et al., 2019; Temin,
2013; Algaze, 2008; Temin, 2006, for examples). Building on this tradition, the principal
data for the gravity estimation come from a first-century document titled the Periplus of
the Erythraean3 Sea (written by an anonymous author and frequently identified by its
Latin title: Periplus Maris Erythraei, PME).4 The term ‘periplus’ comes from a Greek
term meaning “sailing around”. These types of documents were not an uncommon form
of writing in ancient periods and were generally written by merchants, sailors, and other
travellers to describe their journeys for the benefit of future voyagers (and also to laud
their achievements).5 This periplus was likely written by a Greek merchant in Roman
2Ross (1988) provides a survey of the trends in this research.
3The name Erythraean Sea was a Greek maritime designation for the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden that
also frequently included what is now known as the Persian Gulf and the wider Indian Ocean.
4The translation used for this chapter is Schoff (1912).
5Notable examples include the works of Hanno the Navigator, Pseudo-Skylax, and Arrian.
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Egypt for the benefit of other merchants looking to ply their trade in the Indian Ocean.
It follows a circular route around the coast, mentioning various cities and ports and the
goods each trades. Figure 3.1 presents a map of the cities mentioned in the Periplus.
The information contained in the Periplus is remarkably complete and detailed. The
source mentions trade goods, origins, destinations, product qualities, and shipment quan-
tities. Ideally, all this information would be used to construct a comprehensive dataset of
trade of a quality similar to the trade data used in modern trade analysis. Unfortunately,
since its purpose was one of general description, not all of the information provided in
the text is usable in this way. The information on origins, destinations, and products is
the most comprehensive and usable for a detailed trade analysis, despite some gaps. The
information on quality and quantity is less informative due to it being mostly subjective
and relative, preventing the calculation of any value for the trade flows.
Figure 3.1. World of the Periplus
Note: Cities are indicated by points and labelled. Region information is given by colour.
(Source: Author’s own calculations based on Schoff, 1912).
Data Description The detail of the document provides a very comprehensive catalogue
of goods exported and imported by each city mentioned and the origins and destinations
of those same goods. Much of the text records a specific port of destination (origin) for
each exported (imported) good:
Sailing through the mouth of the Gulf, after six-days’ course there is another
market town of Persia called Ommana. To both of these market-towns [Apolo-
gus and Ommana] large vessels are regularly sent from Barygaza, loaded with
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copper and sandalwood and timbers of teakwood and logs of blackwood and
ebony. (PME, paragraph 36)
This paragraph outlines specific shipments of copper and various types of timber from
Barygaza to the cities of Apologus and Ommana. With this level of detail, identifying
origins, destinations, and goods is a straightforward task.
The share of each broad product category in the exports and imports of the different
cities is shown in Figure 3.2. The map shows a regional distribution of some exports,
with different products dominating the export baskets of specific regions. This similarity
in export baskets implies a regional structure to production, emphasising the potential
role of resource endowments in the products offered for exports (a feature that is explored
further in Section 4). This regional correlation of products is less apparent in the imports
of cities. The larger variation in import goods emphasises the features of trade in the
region: traders were able to travel long distances across the Indian Ocean with relative
ease, making a larger variety of goods available for import throughout the network. The
monsoon system contributed to the development of this more sophisticated long-distance
trading network that allowed for significant expansion beyond local or regional mercantile
activity.
The cities mentioned in the Periplus are mostly locatable due to consistency of names
across time and comprehensive archaeological work in the region. Where there is no
precise location known, there is often a scholarly consensus among archaeologists about
city locations. This analysis makes use of these agreed locations of the cities in the data.
Figure 3.1 shows the locations and names of each city mentioned in the Periplus.
Issues Many of the passages of the Periplus follow the format above, where destination,
origin, product, and other details are clearly indicated and explicitly mentioned. Despite
this, there are cases in which the information is incomplete. Frequently in these cases the
destination or origin of the product being traded is given as a region and not a specific
city:
After Avalites there is another market-town, better than this, called Malao, dis-
tant a sail of about eight hundred stadia...There are exported from these places
myrrh, a little frankincense, (that known as far-side), the harder cinnamon,
duaca, Indian copal and macir, which are imported into Arabia; and slaves,
but rarely. (PME, paragraph 8)
From this paragraph, there are identified shipments of myrrh, frankincense, and other
spices to Arabia, a region with no cities explicitly mentioned in this context. In cases
such as this, I interpolated the relevant cities using information on the goods traded by
various cities in the named region. In this way, if a city located in Arabia is identified
in a different paragraph as importing myrrh or frankincense it is designated as a partner
city for Avalites and Malao with those goods. Both the non-interpolated data and the
interpolated data are used in the analysis.
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Figure 3.2. Goods Categories as Share of Exports and Imports
(a) Export Shares
(b) Import Shares
Note: Cities are indicated by points. Pie charts display share of good categories




Due to the nature of the source, the terms used to describe the attributes of the trade
goods are inconsistent in many places. While the name of each good is consistent across
cities, the quality of the goods traded is generally rather vague and imprecise:
There are imported into this market-town, wine, Italian preferred, also Laodicean
and Arabian; copper, tin, and lead; coral and topaz; thin clothing and inferior
sorts of all kinds; bright-coloured girdles a cubit wide; storax, sweet clover, flint
glass, realgar, antimony, gold and silver coin, on which there is a profit when
exchanged for the money of the country; and ointment, but not very costly and
not much. (PME, paragraph 49)
As this paragraph illustrates, terms such as ‘inferior’ and ‘not very costly’ are used along
with named varieties (such as Italian and Laodicean wine) or vague references to exchange
rates of precious metals (‘on which there is a profit’). While these passages contain sig-
nificant detail about the quality or value of goods, they tend to be imprecise or relative
descriptions. This prevents reliable calculations of value for the products identified in the
document.
Quantities are often discussed in equally vague terms:
Beyond Mundus, sailing toward the east, after another two days’ sail, or three,
you reach Mosyllum, on a beach with a bad anchorage. There are imported
here the same things already mentioned, also silver plate, a very little iron, and
glass. There are shipped from the place a great quantity of cinnamon, (so that
this market-town requires ships of a larger size), and fragrant gums, spices, a
little tortoise shell, and mocrotu, (poorer than that of Mundus), frankincense,
(the far-side), ivory and myrrh in small quantities. (PME, paragraph 10)
As with the quality of items mentioned, phrases such as ‘very little’, ‘small quantities’,
and a ‘great quantity’ that requires larger ships make it impossible to identify the true
quantities of traded products.
These difficulties with both the quality and quantity mean that it is not possible
to reliably calculate volumes or prices for goods traded by various cities, and so it is
impractical to measure trade flows in value-terms. For this reason, and for the purpose
of theoretical consistency that will be discussed in Section 3, trade volume is measured as
the number of different goods traded. A list of different products, product categories, and
the number of cities that import and export them is given in Table 3.1.
Related to the issue of incompleteness in the data is potential selective reporting of
trade flows. While the Periplus is very comprehensive in its cataloguing of trade goods,
trade between cities that are close together could be under-reported and trade via land
routes is not recorded. In the first instance, the focus of the Periplus on larger value
items and trade in differentiated goods means that trade between cities that are closer
together and more likely to trade similar goods may be omitted. This could bias the
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results downward with the data favouring more long-distance trade. The possibility of
this effect impacting the results is more fully addressed in Section 4.2.
The omission of trade via land routes is potentially more problematic with the possibil-
ity that bias is introduced through the focus on a single transportation method. While this
presents a problem that is difficult to accommodate in the data, it is somewhat mitigated
by the fact that trade in the ancient world was largely a marine affair, when waterways
were present and accessible, due to the higher risks associated with over-land caravan
trade (Gurukkal, 2016). The relative difficulty of the terrain between many of the cities in
the Periplus combined with their easy access to the coast makes it likely that most trade
into and out of the cities catalogued in the Periplus was conducted by sea. Despite this,
the omission of land-based trade in the data remains a problem and could also lead to
the results being under-estimated due to the possible concentration of such omitted trade
between cities that are close together.
Table 3.1. Products of the Periplus
Product Product Category X M Product Product Category X M
Clarified Butter Animal Products 6 2 Arabian Clothing Textiles 1 2
Horses Animal Products 1 2 Blankets Textiles 1 2
Mountain Tortoise Ivory & Shell 1 1 Cloaks Textiles 6 3
Tortoise Shell Ivory & Shell 12 9 Coloured Sashes Textiles 1 2
Ivory Ivory & Shell 9 6 Girdles Textiles 7 2
Elephant Ivory Ivory & Shell 1 1 Local Clothing Textiles 2 3
Rhino Ivory Ivory & Shell 6 2 Robes Textiles 1 1
Rice Grain 7 7 Skin Coats Textiles 1 1
Wheat Grain 14 9 Thin Clothing Textiles 1 2
Indian Copal Plant Products 2 1 Tunics Textiles 5 1
Aloes Plant Products 1 12 Indian Cloth Textiles 1 6
Coloured Lac Plant Products 1 1 Cloth Textiles 2 5
Macir Plant Products 2 1 Cotton Cloth Textiles 7 2
Palm Oil Plant Products 5 1 Mallow Cloth Textiles 2 2
Sesame Oil Plant Products 7 6 Monache Cloth Textiles 7 2
Dates Plant Products 2 2 Muslins Textiles 3 4
Sour Grape Juice Plant Products 6 1 Purple Cloth Textiles 1 2
Sugarcane Juice Plant Products 6 2 Raw Silk Textiles 1 5
Blackwood Timber 2 1 Sagmatogene Cloth Textiles 7 2
Ebony Timber 2 1 Silk Cloth Textiles 4 5
Sandalwood Timber 2 1 Silk Yarn Textiles 1 5
Teakwood Timber 2 1 Carnelian Gems & Glass 1 1
Purple Dye 2 2 Coral Gems & Glass 1 2
Wine Wine 8 6 Diamonds Gems & Glass 3 4
Duaca Aromatics & Spices 2 1 Pearls Gems & Glass 5 6
Fragrant Ointments Aromatics & Spices 1 2 Sapphires Gems & Glass 3 4
Frankincense Aromatics & Spices 4 13 Transparent Stones Gems & Glass 3 4
Myrrh Aromatics & Spices 3 3 Flint Glass Gems & Glass 1 1
Spikenard Aromatics & Spices 3 4 Glass Gems & Glass 5 1
Storax Aromatics & Spices 1 2 Murrhine Glass Gems & Glass 1 1
Cinnamon Aromatics & Spices 2 3 Copper Metals & Minerals 3 3
Malabathrum Aromatics & Spices 4 8 Iron Metals & Minerals 1 1
Pepper Aromatics & Spices 3 4 Steel Metals & Minerals 1 1
Spices Aromatics & Spices 1 2 Tin Metals & Minerals 1 2
Awls Manufactures 5 1 Slaves Humans 6 11
Daggers Manufactures 5 1 Gold Gold 2 2
Hatchets Manufactures 5 1 Gold Plate Plateware 1 2
Images Manufactures 1 2 Silver Plate Plateware 1 2
Lances Manufactures 5 1
Sewn Boats Manufactures 1 1
Native Produce Manufactures 1 12
Note: This table includes all individual products listed in the text of Schoff (1912). X indicates the number of cities exporting the product; M indicates the
number of cities importing it.
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Trade Variable Construction In order to construct the variable for trade used in this
analysis, the number of different products a city imports or exports is summed across all






1 if good g is traded between cities i and j;0 otherwise.
Where xijg is an indicator function for whether a given product g is traded between cities
i and j.
The same process is used to calculate the total number of products Xi a given city i






1 if good g is traded by city i;0 otherwise.
Importantly, for this measure products are not double counted. If a city trades the same
item with multiple cities, it is calculated as one product making this a strict measure of
the number of product varieties traded.
Table 3.2 lists the cities from the Periplus, their coordinates, the number of goods they
trade, and the number of other cities they trade with. The trade network mapped by the
Periplus is quite heterogeneous; the cities in various regions do not all trade with the same
number of partners nor the same number of products. Many cities have only one or few
trade partners. The majority of cities trade in multiple goods with only nine cities having
fewer than ten products, and only three having a single product. Cities in the Horn of
Africa, Arabia, Persia, and Indian are at the centre of the network with the most trade
partners and trading in more products with other regions being largely peripheral to the
system.
As indicated in Table 3.2, not every city in the Periplus trades with every other city
mentioned. While there are no zero-trade flows explicitly recorded, these missing connec-
tions between cities could be inferred to be zeros in the trade data. This feature of the
data is used in Section 4 to include zero-trade flows in the analysis.
2.2 Ancient Sea Routes
The distances between cities in the data are calculated using sailing times with respect to
wind speed and direct sailing times without accounting for variations in wind speed. These
travel times are calculated based on wind speed information and calculations of sailing
speeds relative to the wind using the results of sea-trials of a modern reconstruction of a
historical trading vessel.
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Table 3.2. Cities of the Periplus
City Region Coordinates Goods Partners
Arsinoe Egypt 29.97, 32.55 3 7
Berenike Egypt 23.91, 35.48 22 3
Diospolis Egypt 25.72, 32.61 3 7
Myos Hormos Egypt 26.16, 34.24 22 3
Adulis Horn of Africa 15.26, 39.66 32 3
Avalites Horn of Africa 11.35, 43.47 22 6
Malao Horn of Africa 10.44, 45.02 30 9
Mosyllum Horn of Africa 11.17, 49.11 34 5
Mundus Horn of Africa 10.9, 46.92 31 9
Tabae Horn of Africa 11.82, 51.25 32 5
Opone Horn of Africa 10.42, 51.27 30 7
Menuthias East Africa -6.13, 39.33 13 1
Nicon East Africa -1.22, 41.84 11 1
Pyralaae Islands East Africa -2.27, 40.9 11 1
Rhapta East Africa -7.85, 39.78 11 1
Sarapion East Africa 2.03, 45.33 11 1
Cana Arabia 14.03, 48.34 36 16
Dioscorida Arabia 12.51, 53.92 11 10
Moscha Arabia 17.04, 54.43 5 8
Muza Arabia 13.32, 43.25 47 11
Ocelis Arabia 12.77, 43.65 14 3
Sarapis Arabia 20.47, 58.82 1 1
Apologus Persia 30.89, 47.58 12 4
Ommana Persia 24.34, 56.73 16 6
Oraea Persia 25.21, 64.63 8 1
Ariaca Scythia 23.06, 70.62 19 7
Barbaricum-Minnagara Scythia 24.86, 67.01 22 1
Bacare India 9.59, 76.49 34 6
Barygaza India 21.71, 72.99 64 15
Camara India 11.14, 79.86 13 5
Muziris India 10.16, 76.21 34 7
Nelcynda India 9.32, 76.54 34 6
Paethana India 19.48, 75.38 1 1
Poduca India 11.9, 79.82 13 5
Sopatma India 12.53, 80.16 13 5
Tagara India 18.32, 76.13 4 1
Tyndis India 10.77, 75.9 34 6
Besatae East Asia 27.33, 88.62 1 5
Thinae East Asia 34.35, 108.72 3 5
Note: This table only includes cities that have both goods and partners listed in the text of Schoff (1912).
Coordinates are in (Lat, Lon) format; Goods indicates the number of unique products the city trades (both
imports and exports); Partners indicates the number of other cities a given city trades with.
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The data on wind speed and direction come from ERS-1 data on surface wind conditions
from CERSAT/Laboratoire D’Océanographie Spatiale. These data provide ocean wind
speed and direction information for 1 degree-by-1 degree squares of the Earth’s surface.
Monthly data are available over the period 1991 to 1996. The data used in this chapter
are a monthly average of wind speeds over the years 1992 to 1995 for the summer monsoon
(June to July) and the winter monsoon (January to February). These months are used as
they tend to be peak monsoon periods and correspond with the time of year voyages would
depart various ports to sail with the winds (Cobb, 2018; Gurukkal, 2016). The vector data
are visualised for the Indian Ocean in Figure 3.3 and nicely illustrate the unique feature
of the two monsoon seasons, with consistent south-easterly winds in the summer season
compared with steady north-westerly winds in the winter season—facilitating sailing across
the ocean between India and Africa/Arabia on a seasonal basis.
The speed of a sailing ship relative to the wind is based on a number of important
factors, but primary among these is the angle of the ship’s direction to the wind. A method
of calculating this relationship is necessary in order to measure the hypothetical speed of
a ship travelling with the monsoon winds shown in Figure 3.3. There are no extant data
of this detail on ancient ocean-going vessels, but there do exist modern reconstructions
of similar ships with accompanying tests and data. Nomoto et al. (2000) documents the
sea-trials of a reconstructed Japanese higaki kaisen-style merchant ship, a type of ship
Figure 3.4. Polar Diagram of the
‘Naniwa-maru’ (Nomoto et al, 2000)
Note: Points are readings of
ship speed as a proportion of
wind speed at a given angle to
the wind (0◦). (Source: Nomoto
et al., 2000).
from the sixteenth/seventeenth century and very
similar in design to ancient oceanic trading vessels.
The data from these sea-trials record vessel speed for
given wind speeds and directions, then plots them
on a polar diagram of the ship (Figure 3.4). From
this information, a functional form for the speed of
the ship as a proportion of wind speed for an arbi-
trary wind direction can be approximated with:
s = 0.2− 0.129 cosω
Where s is the coefficient that gives the speed of the
ship as a proportion of wind speed and ω is the angle
of the wind relative to the direction of travel. The
first term of this formula is the average transforma-
tion of wind speed to ship speed and the second term
is the amplitude around the angle of the wind. This
methodology means that a ship will sail four times
faster with a tailwind as opposed to a headwind.
This formula also implies that a ship will travel at its fastest with a direct tailwind; a
feature that, while not fully consistent with the mechanics of sailing, simplifies the process
of calculating ship speeds on a grid.
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Figure 3.3. Monsoon Winds
(a) Summer Monsoon
(b) Winter Monsoon
Note: Cities are indicated by points. Arrow direction indicates wind direction;
arrow length corresponds to wind speed. (Source: Author’s own calculations
based on data from CERSAT/Laboratoire D’Océanographie Spatiale).
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Using this formula to calculate the speed of a ship for any angle and any wind speed, a
network of sailing pathways was overlaid on the wind vectors for the Indian Ocean. This
created a web of pathways for a ship to travel through the 1 degree-by-1 degree grid squares
of the wind vector map. The shortest and fastest routes were then calculated using GIS
network analysis software to produce a series of travel times and distances along optimal
sailing routes (according to wind speed and season) for all the city pairs in the Periplus.
These calculated pathways are displayed in Figure 3.5. Both summer and winter routes
were calculated in both directions.
Table 3.3. Travel Times Between Cities in the Periplus
Origin Destination Travel Time
Attested Calculated
Berenike Malao 1 Month 36.03 Days
Myos Hormos Muza 1 Month 30.84 Days
Myos Hormos Barygaza >2 Months 64.70 Days
Tabae Rhapta <1 Month 17.99 Days
Note: Travel times are calculated according to monsoon wind data in the ideal
sailing season for the direction of travel. Attested travel times come from Cobb
(2018).
The resulting travel times are in line with attested travel times from the period and
region. Table 3.3 presents selected routes and the calculated unidirectional travel times
between them. The calculated distances include two types of calculations: the shortest
distance in km (regardless of time), and the fastest time in days (regardless of lateral
distance).
2.3 Historical Economic Activity
The data for historical economic activity come from archaeological sources. To proxy for
historical activity, a measure of the number of built-up structures in a given location is
used. This is similar to a commonly used method for determining development in modern
times: the use of night-time light levels (see Elvidge et al., 2012; Bluhm and Krause, 2019,
for notable examples). The concentration of human-made structures gives an indication
of the amount of activity at a location at a given time.
To construct this measure, data on archaeological sites are used. The Pleiades dataset
(Bagnall et al., 2016) catalogues various ‘places’ throughout ancient history. These places
can be anything from provinces, temples, roads, and beyond. Each item is geolocated and
given a date range for activity. This dataset originally included primarily the Mediter-
ranean area, but its expansion to include other areas of the world (particularly the Middle
East and India) makes it well suited for the purposes of this chapter. Figure 3.6 presents
the location of the sites contained in the data for the region of the Periplus.
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Figure 3.5. Sailing Routes Between Cities
(a) Summer Routes
(b) Winter Routes
Note: Cities are indicated by points. Lines represent sailing routes between cities
based on fastest sailing time. (Source: Author’s own calculations).
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Figure 3.6. Ancient Archaeological Sites
Note: Cities are indicated by points; archaeological sites are indicated by crosses. (Source:
Author’s own calculations based on Schoff, 1912; Bagnall et al., 2016).
The data used for this analysis include all human-made ‘places’ that existed contin-
uously from 100 CE (around the time of the writing of the Periplus) up until 640 CE,
encompassing approximately 6600 sites. The date 640 CE was chosen as it coincides with
the Arab invasion and conquest of Egypt and marks the point at which Roman access
to the Indian Ocean was interrupted, signifying a potentially significant disruption to the
trading system of the region (McLaughlin, 2018), despite the continued functioning of the
system long after (Chaudhuri, 2005). The variable for the number of sites yi around a






1 if diα ≤ d̄i;0 otherwise.
Where Rα is an indicator function for the distance between site α and city i being less
than the radius d̄i. These radii can be considered to correspond to a ‘hinterland’ view of
the cities and their surroundings. The area around any given city in the ancient world is
largely dependent on the prosperity of that city so that each city-hinterland area creates
a core-periphery dynamic.
Table 3.4 shows the distribution of these sites across regions. There are two issues that
emerge from the data on archaeological sites: one related to the summing of different sites
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and the other related to bias in the archaeological record. For the first issue, summing
across diffferent sites captures different levels of information. The variety of different
‘places’ in the data means that summing across all sites would combine cities, towns,
structures, geographical features, and political units like provinces. To address this, the
type of sites used to construct this variable are limited to human-built features. While
this definition includes cities, towns, and structures together, it is the most direct solution
to the difficulty introduced by the second issue: a lack of data for the non-Mediterranean
world.




Horn of Africa 2.286 1.380





All Regions 24.795 50.567
Note: Sites is the average number of sites within 200km
of cities in the given region.
The second issue is related to selection bias within the data. Historically, archaeologists
have been more interested in, and therefore more focused on, excavating and researching
sites related to the Roman Empire or Egypt. This creates a bias within the data since
the vast majority of archaeological sites are from around the Mediterranean or within the
former Roman province of Egypt, with relatively few outside of these regions. While this
analysis is not focused on the area around the Mediterranean, Egyptian cities are included
in the data as major ports involved in trade in the Indian Ocean. This creates a problem
where the number of sites in the areas around Egyptian cities is artificially large, as can
be seen in Table 3.4.
In addition to this bias in the data, the fact that Egypt was a constituent part of the
Roman Empire at the time introduces a significant confounding variable for the number of
sites present: it is reasonable to assume that the number of sites could also be influenced by
the presence of a somewhat centralised Roman administration. The other regions, though
influenced by trade and economic exchange with the Roman Empire (McLaughlin, 2018),
are more distant and separated from direct Roman influence meaning the number of sites
is more related to local factors. In an effort to address the issue of bias in site density and
the direct influence of Roman administration, I exclude Egyptian cities from the analysis
of ancient development in Section 5.
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3 Gravity in a Ricardian World
Trade costs in the ancient world were notoriously high; with long-distance, trans-oceanic
networks exceedingly rare. In this period, distance is frequently thought of as being such a
significant barrier to trade that its impact is exponential – approaching prohibitive levels
of cost very rapidly. This raises the question of whether a gravity model is suitable, since
if distance has a cost-prohibitive upper-bound it cannot be modelled smoothly with a
standard gravity equation. While this may be a potential obstacle in other locations, the
unique features of the Indian Ocean, notably the seasonal monsoon,6 mitigate this barrier
and make long-distance trade feasible (Chaudhuri, 2005). The regularity of the monsoon
and the orientation of landmasses around the Indian Ocean means that regular voyages
can leave any given port at a certain time of year and arrive with favourable winds at a
destination on an opposite landmass. This seasonal scheduling of voyages is attested to in
the Periplus and other extant sources (see Schoff, 1912, for examples) and lends evidence
to the theory that predictable monsoon winds allowed for long distance trade in the region
independently of advanced nautical technology.
Despite these unique features of trade in the Indian Ocean, modern gravity models that
are based on monopolistic competition and demand for variety are not always well specified
to deal with pre-modern trade – particularly ancient trade. In this period, production and
trade of goods was largely based on technology.7 In this context, a Ricardian world of
comparative advantage predominates where specialisation is promoted through declining
transport costs which facilitate trade.
In addition to a Ricardian model being more theoretically sound for ancient trade flows,
the mechanics of the model also fit more precisely with the data. Due to the nature of the
Periplus data described in Section 2.1 the trade variable of observation is the number of
good types shipped between cities. This extensive-margin measure makes models based
on the value or quantity of goods traded unworkable. With a Ricardian gravity model,
the driving force of comparative advantage means that more competitive8 cities will trade
more types of products (not just more goods) and this fact can be used to fit the data to
the model.
I follow Eaton and Kortum (2002) in constructing a simplified version of their gravity
model of Ricardian trade.9 In this model cities have differential access to technology. City
j’s technological efficiency of producing good g is given by the parameter zj(g) which is
6There could be debate as to the declining impact of this theoretical upper-bound as technology for
ocean-going ships developed and changed in the Roman Empire (McLaughlin, 2018). Regardless, the
diffusion of this technology was slow and would not have impacted non-Roman cities at the same rate,
leaving the climatic factors of the Indian Ocean system a predominant force. An alternative model of trade
that imposes an upper-bound on distance is discussed in Appendix B.
7Though endowments can also play a part, the ability of Eurasian and East African communities to
exploit those endowments was determined by the spread of technology such as iron working. Section 4
explores the inclusion of endowment effects to supplement the model.
8In this context, competitiveness is related to both the size of the city (labour) and the distance from
the destination market (transport cost).
9See Eaton and Kortum (2002) for a detailed derivation of the model.
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the realisation of random variable Zj , drawn independently for each g, from a city-specific
probability distribution Fj(z) = Pr[Zj ≤ z]. City j’s efficiency distribution is assumed to
be Fréchet (Type II extreme value distribution):
Fj(z) = e
−Tjz−θ (3.1)
where Tj > 0 is a city specific parameter and θ > 1 is a global parameter capturing the
variation within the distribution. A larger Tj means a higher-efficiency draw for any given
good is more likely and a larger θ indicates less variability.
From this, the cost (and under perfect competition, the price in the destination) of







where cj is the cost of all inputs, including labour, and dij is an iceberg representation of
transport costs.10 Consumers in destination i are not limited to goods from origin j and
will choose goods from destinations that minimise the prices they face. Therefore, for any
given good g its price in destination i will be the lowest across all N sources:
pi(g) = min{pik(g); k = 1, ..., N} (3.3)
Substituting (3.2) into the efficiency distribution (3.1) gives a distribution of prices
presented to destination i by origin j:





= 1− e−[Tj(cjdij)−θ]pθ (3.4)
Because the lowest price for a good in city i will be less than p unless each source j’s
price is greater than p, the price distribution for what city i actually buys is:




inserting the price distribution (3.4) collapses the function into something resembling
Gij(p):









It can then be shown that the probability that city j provides a good at the lowest






10In order for 1 unit of good g to arrive in destination i, dij units must be shipped from origin j. 1− 1dij
‘melts’ along the way.
110
3. GRAVITY IN A RICARDIAN WORLD
which is equivalent to the contribution of city j to city i’s price parameter. Helpfully,
conditioning on the source has no impact on a good’s price since a source with a competitive
advantage exploits this by selling a wider range of goods up to the point that what it sells
in a given destination i is the same as the destination’s overall price distribution.11 This
means that city i’s average expenditure on each good also does not vary by source, and so
the proportion of goods that city i buys from city j is equivalent to the proportion of its














Departing from Eaton and Kortum (2002), this expression can then be rearranged into



















kXk is total output and Φj and Φi serve as multi-lateral resistance terms.
Equation (3.9) is therefore a Ricardian structural gravity function and can be estimated
in a similar fashion to a tradition gravity function. Following Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) and Silva and Tenreyro (2006), this model can be estimated with a pseudo-Poisson
Maximum Likelihood estimator and fixed effects. With this technique, the gravity function
is estimated in exponential form, allowing the number of good types to be measured in
levels. The estimation equation is given by:
E[Xij ] = exp{β0 + β1ln(dij) + µi + µj + εij} (3.10)
where µi and µj represent city-specific fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at
the city-pair level.
The Ricardian foundation of this model means that at its core is the concept of com-
parative advantage. This feature, incorporated into the price distributions, means that a
city j with a higher comparative advantage (either through technology, input prices, or a
shorter transport distance) will sell a wider range of goods (more product types) to city
i. As the model illustrates, the proportion of goods sold to city i by city j is equivalent to
the proportion of expenditure of city i on goods from city j; this is equally proportional
to the range of products sold by city j to city i. This unique feature of the Ricardian
model is what can be exploited in order to measure the trade between cities in terms of
the number of products traded between them, rather than the value of those products as
in traditional gravity models. This allows the Xij term of Equation 3.10 to be given as the
number of products traded between cities i and j, linking it to the analogous term from
Section 2.1.
11See Eaton and Kortum (2002) for a detailed derivation of these properties.
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4 Ancient Gravity Estimation
4.1 Linear Specification
The results of the gravity estimations using Equation 3.10 are presented in Table 3.5.
The data included in these estimations are all identified trade flows, missing trade flows
between cities are not included (the following subsection discusses the inclusion of these
missing values as zero trade).






City FE Yes Yes Yes
N 109 109 109
R2 0.852 0.854 0.859
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of good varieties traded;
ln(ShortDist) is the log of total round-trip sailing time for the shortest
calculated route without wind speed; ln(FastDist) is the log of the total
round-trip sailing time for the fastest calculated route accounting for
wind speed.
The first two columns of Table 3.5 compare results using the two measures of distance
discussed in Section 2.2: ShortDist is the measure of the shortest geographic distance
between two cities; FastDist is the measure of the fastest travel time between two cities.
The coefficients on both ShortDist and FastDist are on the lower end of expected measures
of the distance elasticity, but this is not uncommon under PPML estimation (Silva and
Tenreyro, 2006) and could be related to the fact that the elasticity concerns the number of
product types instead of explicit trade volume as in traditional gravity estimations. They
are negative and significant, indicating that distance has a suppressing effect on trade—in
a Ricardian world, distance reduces a city’s comparative advantage in markets. In these
estimations, a 1% increase in distance between two cities reduces trade between them by
approximately 0.27%. The magnitudes of the two coefficients are also nearly identical,
allowing for little interpretation of the suitability of each measure.
To compare the suitability of the two distance measures, I follow Pascali (2017) in
creating a horse-race between the two measures. While the results are (as expected)
not significant, the magnitudes and signs provide insight into the suitability of the two
measures. From these results, FastDist performs better as a measure of trade distance
between cities in the data, producing a strongly negative coefficient.
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These results indicate that sailing time seems to be a more important factor in distance
between cities than the length of the route—a result that is in line with the idea that the
monsoon weather system facilitated trade in the region. The seasonal and strong winds of
the monsoon created sailing efficiencies that could more than compensate for potentially
longer routes.
4.2 Endowments and Non-linearity
Including city-pairs not explicitly mentioned in the Periplus as observations with zero
trade removes the linearity of the relationship between distance and trade flows due to
the number of cities that are close together but do not trade. As shown in Figure 3.7
the relationship takes the shape of an inverted-U due to a large number of zero-trade
observations in low-distance city-pairs. Importantly, this effect is skewed towards cities
that are close together, leading to two possible explanations for this effect. The first is
that there could be a bias in the data, with trade between cities that are close together
being systematically excluded from the Periplus because of its focus on longer-distance
trade. The second is that cities with similar endowments are likely to trade less, and cities
that are close together geographically are more likely to have similar endowments.
Figure 3.7. Non-linear Trade-Distance Estimates
Note: Trade is given by the total number of good varieties traded; distance is the log total
round-trip sailing time for the fastest calculated route accounting for wind speed. Missing
city pairs are included as zero-trade observations.
While the first explanation is plausible, it requires the vast majority of trade to be
ignored regardless of the scale of such trade. It is more likely that trade would have
113
CHAPTER III. RIDING THE MONSOON: GEOGRAPHY AND IRON AGE TRADE
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
been ignored between cities that are close together because trade between such cities was
already quite low in value.
This seems to imply that a pure Ricardian model based on technology-derived compar-
ative advantage is insufficient to fully explain the trade relationships described by the data.
I therefore relax the technology-derived comparative advantage assumption of the model
derived in Section 3 and incorporate factor endowments, in line with a Heckscher-Ohlin
model. This allows for comparative advantage to also be derived from factor endow-
ments.12 Such a model is more likely to fit the data and more accurately describe trade
flows.
To test this, I create two measures of proximity between cities. The first is a dummy
variable indicating whether the two cities are within 14-days’ sail of each other (a short
return trip that could be covered easily more than once within one sailing season):
Neighbourij =
1 if dij ≤ 14 days;0 otherwise.
Where dij is the sailing distance in days between city i and city j.
The second measure is an endowment index controlling for similarity in export goods







Where λin is the number of products within the narrow product category n (as given in
Table 3.1) exported by city i and Li is the total number of products exported by city i.
Higher values of the index indicate higher levels of endowment similarity.
The results for the estimations that include these two measures are presented in Table
3.6. The first column includes just the first proximity measure with a negative and signif-
icant coefficient, indicating that there is a significant negative effect on trade when cities
are close together. The second column supplements this with the endowment index. The
coefficient on the index is strongly negative and significant illustrating the highly negative
impact of similar endowments on trade between cities, a 1% increase in the similarity of
endowments reduces the number of good varieties traded by just under 0.11%. Crucially,
the coefficient on the distance measure in both estimations is much more in line with
expected distance elasticities in gravity models. This seems to indicate that the lower
magnitude of this coefficient in the linear analysis may have been due to these proximity
and endowment effects.
While the potential for bias in the data remains due to selective reporting of trade,
these results supplement the evidence for a Ricardian gravity system from the linear specifi-
cation. Where the Ricardian gravity model derived for this analysis focuses on technology
and distance as sources of comparative advantage, this inclusion of endowment effects
12Ruffin (1988) and Ruffin (1990) provide more discussion on supplementing Ricardian models with
factor endowments, creating a synthesis of Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory.
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City FE Yes Yes
N 565 565
R2 0.295 0.451
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of good varieties traded;
ln(FastDist) is the log of the total round-trip sailing time for the fastest
calculated route accounting for wind speed; Neighbour is a dummy
variable for cities in close proximity; Endowment Index is an index of
similarity of endowments.
potentially adds another dimension to this: resource endowments. Increasing distance
increases trade costs, therefore reducing trade, but cities could also be sensitive to endow-
ment effects in that cities with similar product offer baskets are less likely to trade with
each other. The size of the coefficient on the endowment effect in Table 3.6 indicates that
this may be a very pronounced effect.
5 Trade and Development
The results of the previous section provide evidence for the Indian Ocean as a highly
functioning trade network and the data used as a good representation of that activity.
The impact of this trade network on the development of cities occupying the Indian Ocean
littoral is the subject of this section.
5.1 Export-led Growth in the Iron Age
I use the data on exports and imports for individual cities (not city-pairs) and the data
on archaeological sites from the Pleiades dataset as a proxy for ancient economic activity
to test whether the trade balance of a city is related to its level of development. A
frequent theme among ancient writers when discussing trade between Rome and the Indian
Ocean was the threat of import dependence and the adverse economic effects of it (Cobb,
2018; McLaughlin, 2018). Generally these discussions focused on the effect of dependence
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Figure 3.8. Exports and Archaeological Sites
Note: Cities are indicated by points; archaeological sites are indicated by crosses. Pie charts
display share of good categories each city exports. (Source: Author’s own calculations based
on Schoff, 1912; Bagnall et al., 2016).
on imports from the Indian Ocean on Rome and its wealth,13 but implicit in this is
the corollary that the cities of the Indian Ocean were growing and benefiting from their
exports. Figure 3.8 shows a map of the sites in the Pleiades dataset overlaid with the
sectoral export shares from Figure 3.2. Cities in Egypt are excluded from the analysis for
the reasons covered in Section 2.3.
For this section, the development of a city (yi) is constructed as the number of archae-
ological sites within a 200km radius14 of the city’s location and is estimated as a linear
combination of the effects of exports and imports using a PPML structure so that the
dependent variable can be measured in levels:
E[yi] = exp{β0 + β1Oi + β2Qi + νi + εi}
Where Oi is the number of export markets city i exports to and Qi is the number of import
markets. The number of export (import) markets a city trades with are calculated as the
weighted sum of the number of cities a given city i exports to (imports from). The weights
used are the number of goods exported to (imported from) each city. Region fixed effects
are given by νi and correspond to the regions in Figure 3.1; εi is a normally distributed
error term.
13Pliny complained at length about the large outflow of money to the cities and countries of the Indian
Ocean and how they were becoming rich at the expense of Rome.
14The results of different hinterland sizes are presented in Appendix A.
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Table 3.7. Ancient Development: Exports and Imports
(1) (2) (3)
Export Partners 0.379** 1.091**
(0.133) (0.345)
Import Partners -0.284** -1.088**
(0.107) (0.432)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
N 26 30 22
R2 0.558 0.681 0.823
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of ancient place records
within 200km of a city in the Periplus; Export Partners and Import
Partners are logged values of the number of export or import partners
weighted by the number of goods.
The results for this estimation are presented in Table 3.7. The first two columns present
the results for export partners and import partners separately. These indicate that the
number of export partners has a positive relationship with the level of development around
the city while the number of import partners has the opposite effect. An increase in the
number of export partners is linked to a 38% increase in the number of sites around a city,
while a similar increase in the number of import partners reduces the number of sites by
28%. These results are reinforced in the third column which includes both export partners
and import partners. Both coefficients are significant and the coefficient on export partners
is strongly positive while the number of import partners is strongly negatively associated
with development.
From the data, cities that have broader export markets available for their goods tend
to be more developed while cities that are dependant on many import partners are under-
developed. Trade in the early first century CE, specifically the number of export or import
markets, seems to have influenced the number of sites present around cities during the
following 500 years. This appears to indicate an effect similar to that of modern export-
led growth where cities fuel their development and urbanisation through positive trade
balances.
5.2 Ancient Resource Curse
The results for export-led effects on development in this section can be expanded to inves-
tigate the role of different sectors (such as manufacturing, agriculture, and luxury items
like spices and incense). In order to accommodate this, two types of variables are con-
structed: an index of export diversity across sectors, and a set of sector-specific export
variables. These capture two different elements of city export diversity. The first mea-
sures the diversity of export products while the second accounts for the concentration of
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those products in specific sectors that constitute different production methods (such as
manufacturing, agriculture, or luxury crops).
The measure for export diversity is a modified Herfindahl index across the exported








Where λim is the number of products within the sector m exported by city i and Li is the
total number of products exported by city i. This measure is constructed so that higher
values indicate a higher level of sectoral diversity.




The share Sim of sector m for city i is the number of products λim in sector m exported
by city i divided by the total number of products exported by city i, Li.
These variables feed into the following estimation equation for the development of a
city (yi) given by the number of archaeological sites within 200km of the city:
E[yi] = exp{β0 + β1hi + β2Si + νi + εi}
Where hi is the diversity index and Si is a vector of export sector variables; εi is an error
term. Regional fixed effects, νi, are included to control for endowment effects and regional
variation in the number of archaeological sites.
The results of these estimations are presented in Table 3.8. The first three columns of
the table present the diversity index and the sector-specific variables as separate models.
From the first column, diversity of exports matters, with the coefficient on the diversity
measure being strongly positive and significant, linking a 1% increase in the range of
export sectors with a proportionate increase in levels of development. This result, while
informative, could be linked to a Ricardian production effect in that more development
(a larger population) could be driving increased diversification of products due to an
increased comparative advantage. To add more detail to this picture, the sectoral analysis
is important.
The second two columns present the sector-specific variable models. While the results
in the second column are not significant, the magnitudes are suggestive of a split in impact
across sectors with some contributing positively (such as manufactures) and some nega-
tively (such as luxuries and raw materials). The third column divides the manufacturing
sector into non-textile manufactures and textiles. These results are more illustrative of the
possible impact of the various sectors: manufacturing has a large, positive, and significant
relationship to development while luxury items (such as spices) and raw materials (such
as minerals and timber) are negatively associated with the number of sites.
This seems to imply a divergence in the results for manufacturing (positive with devel-
opment) and more plantation/extractive production (negative with development). Most
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Table 3.8. Ancient Development: Export Diversification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





(not textiles) (1.831) (1.936)
Textiles -3.840** -3.154**
(1.228) (1.432)
Agriculture 1.851 -1.678 0.340 -1.841
(1.533) (1.289) (1.603) (1.375)
Luxuries -0.744 -4.325** -0.917** -3.742**
(0.469) (1.290) (0.437) (1.564)
Raw Material -2.404 -8.557** -3.986 -8.233**
(3.481) (3.137) (2.662) (3.240)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 39 39 39 39 39
R2 0.542 0.580 0.626 0.596 0.632
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of ancient place records within 200km of a city in the
Periplus; Diversity Index is a HHI-style measure of export sector diversity, a higher value is more diverse;
Manufactures, Textiles, Agriculture, Luxuries, Raw Materials are the proportion of total exports that each
sector represents.
of the products included in the luxuries and raw materials sectors are plantation-based
cash crops (such as various spices, mining, timber, and others). These seem to relate to
under-developed cities compared to those that rely more on manufacturing. The outlier
here is the textile sector, which seems to be linked with lower levels of development despite
being a manufacturing-related sector. This could be due to much of textile production
involving many production methods similar to that of plantation-products (such as spices
and incense) with much of the process dominated by harvesting and processing the raw
material (frequently cotton, wool, or silk) with potentially less emphasis on weaving and
dyeing.
The final two columns include the diversity index with the sector-specific variables.
These results show that rather than diversity of exports, it appears that specific sectors
are more important for levels of development. The coefficients display the same trends
as the previous two columns in that manufactures (particularly with textiles excluded)
are associated with higher levels of development while luxury goods and raw materials
are negatively associated with the number of archaeological sites. This effect is analogous
119
CHAPTER III. RIDING THE MONSOON: GEOGRAPHY AND IRON AGE TRADE
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
to the modern effect of a ‘resource curse’ where an over-reliance on exploiting natural
resources (in this case spices, incense, and other raw materials) leads to a cycle of under-
development. These results are robust to adjustments in both the cut-off year for inclusion
of sites in the data and the extent of the ‘hinterland’ of a city. Variations in these values
and the related tables are discussed in Appendix A.
These results seem to indicate that export sector shares and product diversity in trade
circa 50 CE to 100 CE had significant influence on the density of archaeological sites during
the subsequent 500 years to 640 CE. While causal statements in this regard are difficult
due to the peculiarities of the data, this evidence is suggestive of features of the Indian
Ocean trade network that are analogous to an export-led development effect and a effect
similar to the modern ‘resource curse’.
6 Conclusion
This chapter uses extant textual sources to model and estimate ancient trade flows in the
Indian Ocean. The detail of the data allows for the construction of a comprehensive picture
of economic interaction, fuelled by climatic conditions, between communities around the
Indian Ocean and the way those communities were potentially shaped by that interaction.
Two important results are derived from the analysis of these connections.
The first result is that the unique climatic conditions of the Indian Ocean (namely the
presence of the seasonal monsoon) facilitated long-distance trade between cities along its
shores. This trade is well fitted by a gravity model using sailing times between destinations
based on seasonal winds. The relationship between distance and trade flows is decreas-
ing but also non-linear, implying possible endowment effects consistent with comparative
advantage being derived from both technology and resource endowments.
Second are the results for the relationship between exports and development in the
region during the late Iron Age. The data and analysis presented in this chapter are
suggestive of an export-driven development process with more evidence of human activity
linked with increased access to export markets and specifically the influence of particular
product sectors. This leads to the potential emergence of an ancient version of the ‘resource
curse’ with cities that were more reliant on exporting the ancient equivalent of cash-crops
and raw materials (such as spices, incense, and timber) being more under-developed than
cities that were more reliant on manufactures.
Despite these insights, the evidence (particularly for the results related to development
levels) remains suggestive. This opens up new avenues for inquiry into the potential
for trade in the ancient world to influence development. Particularly inviting further
investigation of the potential for and impact of an ancient ‘resource curse’.
Ultimately, the insight provided by this chapter into the structure of Indian Ocean trade
during the Iron Age helps to illuminate the driving forces behind economic connections in
the ancient world. The results presented here are consistent with modern trade models and
demonstrate the importance of long distance trade networks in the Indian Ocean during
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the late Classical period. Merchants and economies faced similar challenges (albeit on a
different scale) to those faced by current firms and countries as the mechanisms driving
the economic relationships then are analogous to those we currently face.
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A Appendix: Robustness Checks
This appendix contains a number of robustness checks for the analysis presented in Section
5. The first subsection includes results for changing the date range of sites used for
the export estimations in the main analysis. The second subsection covers variations in
hinterland size for cities.
A.1 Third Century Decline
In the principal analysis, a cut-off of 640 CE was chosen for the presence of archaeological
sites used in the data for development levels. This date was chosen as it is the date of
the Arab conquest of Egypt. Despite the interruption of Roman access being a defining
moment in the operation of the Indian Ocean trade network, there is evidence that Roman
involvement had been in decline for several centuries prior to this date, beginning in the
early third century CE.15
In order to address this possibility the data used for this estimation have a cut-off date
of 250 CE. Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 reproduce the results of Section 5 with the new date.
The implications of the results are not different from those presented in the main analysis.
Specifically, the effects for exporters and importers are nearly identical; and the results
for the diversity index, manufactures, luxuries, and raw materials are broadly similar with
increased development linked to diversity of export sectors and manufactures in particular.
Dependence on luxury goods and raw materials remain linked to under-development. This
strengthens the results presented in the main analysis and provides more evidence for the
possibility of both an export effect on development and a potential ‘resource curse’.
Table 3.9. Third Century: Exports and Imports
(1) (2) (3)
Export Partners 0.360** 0.992**
(0.126) (0.335)
Import Partners -0.283** -1.011**
(0.099) (0.414)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
N 26 30 22
R2 0.572 0.697 0.811
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of ancient place records
within 200km of a city in the Periplus; Export Partners and Import
Partners are logged values of the number of export or import partners
weighted by the number of goods.
15Cobb (2018) and McLaughlin (2018) contain a more comprehensive discussion around the dating of
this decline.
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Table 3.10. Third Century: Export Diversification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





(not textiles) (1.738) (1.824)
Textiles -3.515** -3.079**
(1.178) (1.381)
Agriculture 2.258 -0.972 0.997 -1.064
(1.462) (1.165) (1.642) (1.235)
Luxuries -0.809* -4.109** -0.970** -3.742**
(0.445) (1.240) (0.461) (1.507)
Raw Material -2.691 -8.237** -3.951 -8.041**
(3.324) (3.126) (2.644) (3.217)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 39 39 39 39 39
R2 0.537 0.592 0.629 0.602 0.632
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of ancient place records within 200km of a city in the
Periplus; Diversity Index is a HHI-style measure of export sector diversity, a higher value is more diverse;
Manufactures, Textiles, Agriculture, Luxuries, Raw Materials are the proportion of total exports that each
sector represents.
A.2 Variations in Hinterland Size
There is potential for the development effects analysed in Section 5 to be sensitive the the
size of the ‘hinterland’ radius around a city. The results in this subsection include two






1 if diα ≤ d̄i;0 otherwise.
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 reproduce the results of Section 5 with two alternative radii:
100km and 300km. The results of Table 3.11 are broadly in line with those of the third
column of Table 3.7. The coefficients have different magnitudes, particularly the ones for
the 100km radius, but the signs remain the same and all are significant, supporting the
trends outlined in the main analysis: increased access to export markets is correlated with
higher levels of development.
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Table 3.11. Alternative Hinterland: Exports and Imports
(1) (2)
100km 300km
Export Partners 0.952** 1.283**
(0.401) (0.340)
Import Partners -0.511** -1.089**
(0.218) (0.099)
Region FE Yes Yes
N 22 22
R2 0.773 0.810
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of an-
cient place records within the given radius of a city in
the Periplus; Export Partners and Import Partners are
logged values of the number of export or import partners
weighted by the number of goods.
The results in Table 3.12 are also broadly in line with those in the main analysis.
Again, the magnitudes are different across the coefficients, but the signs remain the same.
Importantly, the coefficients on the key variables for manufactures, luxuries, and raw ma-
terials are significant in both specifications. This provides support for the effects outlined
in the main analysis. While the coefficient on textiles is significant for a radius of 100km,
it is not for the larger radius of 300km. This doesn’t impact the main effects of the results,
but could be related to the size of the radius in that specification—300km may be reaching
the limit of what could be constructively referred to as a ‘hinterland’.
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Table 3.12. Alternative Hinterland: Export Diversification
100km 300km
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diversity Index 0.924** 0.352 0.648** 0.741
(0.389) (0.625) (0.291) (0.596)
Manufactures 4.543** 3.054**







Raw Material -3.538** -6.756**
(2.034) (1.750)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 38 38 39 39
R2 0.639 0.744 0.626 0.596
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is the total number of ancient place records within the given radius
of a city in the Periplus; Diversity Index is a HHI-style measure of export sector diversity, a
higher value is more diverse; Manufactures, Textiles, Agriculture, Luxuries, Raw Materials
are the proportion of total exports that each sector represents.
125
CHAPTER III. RIDING THE MONSOON: GEOGRAPHY AND IRON AGE TRADE
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
B Appendix: Connectedness
While this chapter and other work (such as Barjamovic et al., 2019) use a gravity model
to analyse trade in the ancient world, other methods of measuring the drivers of trade
have also been developed. One of these is a model based on connectedness as outlined in
Bakker et al. (2018). This appendix tests the suitability of such a model for ancient trade
in the Indian Ocean.
B.1 Data
The data used for the analysis of the impact of connectedness comes from purely geographic
sources. In order to construct this data a map of the Indian Ocean is overlaid with a grid
of cells. Each grid cell measures 0.1 degrees longitude by 0.1 degrees latitude (equivalent to
approximately 11 km by 11 km). Each grid cell is then determined to either be land, sea,
or coast. Land cells are those consisting entirely of land while sea cells are those entirely
of sea. Coast cells are determined to be any cell with a coastline within 0.05 degrees of
the centroid of the cell (this measure includes islands). Following Bakker et al. (2018),
connectedness is then defined as the number of ‘coastal’ cells within a certain radius of
a given cell—for the purpose of this appendix, a cell with a city from the Periplus in it.
Table 3.13 illustrates the average number of cells in each category (coastal, land, city) for
three ranges (500km, 300km, 100km) around a city.
Table 3.13. Connectedness Data
Coast Cells Land Cells City Cells
500km 284.267 6951.289 5.822
(106.417) (1303.117) (4.554)
300km 138.533 2502.333 3.289
(77.441) (470.840) (2.312)
100km 33.000 274.733 1.622
(23.685) (52.588) (1.134)
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Coast, Land, and Cities are the average number of cells within
the given range of a city cell that are classified as coast cells, land cells,
or cells with other cities in them. Standard deviations are given in
parentheses.
B.2 Trade with Neighbours and Connectedness
The concept of connectedness as an explanation for trade relationships and development
in the ancient world focuses on the idea that long-distance trade was difficult with the
technology available and the opportunities for trade were limited to potential ports nearby.
In this sense, the world it theorises is an extreme application of trade gravity with the
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connectedness model assuming that within a certain range (the limit of travel) of a given
city the cost of transport is constant, outside of this range the cost approaches infinity—
presenting an insurmountable barrier to trade.
From the theory of connectedness, what should impact the level of exports and imports
from a city is the potential number of markets within the given range of the city. Often
nearby coastline16 is used as a proxy for this measure: the more coastline exists within
the given range, the more potential for there to be markets for goods. In this way, it can
be thought of as a measure of potential market access.
In pursuing this model I follow Bakker et al. (2018), incorporating many aspects of
their empirical specification. While their analysis estimates the impact of connectedness
on development, arguing that increased trade leads to more developed/populous locations,
this appendix tests the first element of that proposed relationship directly. In doing this,
I depart from their analysis by estimating the following equation:
E[Xi] = exp{β0 + β1cri + ψi + εi} (3.11)
where Xi is the total trade of city i, cri is the measure of connectedness for city i (within ra-
dius r), and ψi is a set of geographic coordinate fixed effects. This estimation is conducted
with a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator so that trade can be measured in
levels.
B.3 An Upper-limit on Navigation?
The results for the model of connectedness are presented in Table 3.14. All three specifi-
cations include coordinate controls for the centroids of the cells. Three separate distance
radii are presented in this table: 500km, 300km, and 100km. No specification produced a
significant result for a link between connectedness and trade levels, further the estimated
coefficients themselves are close to zero with no consistent sign.
Table 3.14. Connectedness Results
(1) (2) (3)
500km 300km 100km
Coast -0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008)
Coordinate FE Yes Yes Yes
N 45 45 45
R2 0.007 0.015 0.007
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable is Trade, sum of total goods traded; Coast
is the number of cells with coastal geography within a given radius.
16Coastline is used due to the fact that sea-born trade was significantly more efficient than land-based
trade for longer distances (Bakker et al., 2018).
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To explore this further, the estimation is replicated for exports and imports only,
includes controls for the presence of other cities within the given radius, and estimates
standardised variables. Tables 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17 present the results for these alternative
measures with the same ranges as before (500km, 300km, and 100km respectively). The
results were not improved with these adjustments and remained insignificant.
Table 3.15. Alternative Connectedness Measures - 500km Radius
(1) (2) (3) (4)
City Exports Imports Standardised
Coast -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.131)
City 0.040
(0.059)
Coordinate FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 45 45 45 45
R2 0.016 0.025 0.029 0.007
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable (column 1) is Trade, sum of total goods traded; Dependent variable
(column 2) is Exports, sum of total exports; Dependent variable (column 3) is Imports, sum of total
imports; Dependant variable (column 4) is std(Trade), a standardised measure of Trade; Coast is
the number of cells with coastal geography within a given radius; City indicates the number of other
cities within a given radius.
Table 3.16. Alternative Connectedness Measures - 300km Radius
(1) (2) (3) (4)
City Exports Imports Standardised
Coast -0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.115
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.160)
City 0.023
(0.086)
Coordinate FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 45 45 45 45
R2 0.017 0.025 0.056 0.015
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable (column 1) is Trade, sum of total goods traded; Dependent variable
(column 2) is Exports, sum of total exports; Dependent variable (column 3) is Imports, sum of total
imports; Dependant variable (column 4) is std(Trade), a standardised measure of Trade; Coast is
the number of cells with coastal geography within a given radius; City indicates the number of other
cities within a given radius.
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Table 3.17. Alternative Connectedness Measures - 100km Radius
(1) (2) (3) (4)
City Exports Imports Standardised
Coast 0.000 0.006 -0.004 0.032
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.191)
City 0.096
(0.163)
Coordinate FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 45 45 45 45
R2 0.016 0.034 0.034 0.007
Standard errors in parentheses
* Significant at 0.10; ** Significant at 0.05
Note: Dependent variable (column 1) is Trade, sum of total goods traded; Dependent variable
(column 2) is Exports, sum of total exports; Dependent variable (column 3) is Imports, sum of total
imports; Dependant variable (column 4) is std(Trade), a standardised measure of Trade; Coast is
the number of cells with coastal geography within a given radius; City indicates the number of other
cities within a given radius.
B.4 Long Distance Trade and the Monsoon
The results above seem to indicate that a model of connectedness does not predict trade in
the Indian Ocean during the Iron Age. This is not to say that the connectedness model is
invalid generally, it merely demonstrates that the unique climatic conditions of the Indian
Ocean reduces the efficacy of predictions based on upper-limits to navigation.
The regularity and strength of the monsoon winds in the Indian Ocean created sailing
efficiencies that facilitated long-distance, inter-continental trade. In such a circumstance
access to regional markets is less important for the determination of trade flows. By
reducing the costs of travel between the coasts of the Indian Ocean, the monsoon winds
shrunk the effective distances between cities occupying its coast, creating a more integrated
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